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TO THE HONORABLE TEXAS SUPREME COURT:
COMES NOW Relator, John Doe (“Doe” or “Relator”) and files this
Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Relator would show that all references in the trial
court to “John Doe,” and “Trooper” mean Relator, all references to “Petitioner(s)”
means Real Parties in Interest, Robert T. Brockman and/or The Reynolds and
Reynolds Company (“Brockman,” and “Reynolds,” respectively, and collectively
“R & R”), and all references to Google, Inc. means Real Party in Interest, Google,
Inc. (“Google”). Relator would respectfully show the Court as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
R & R filed a Rule 202 Petition against Google seeking the name, address
and telephone number of the internet blogger(s) known as the “Trooper” in the
152nd Judicial District Court, in Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Robert
Schaffer, presiding (“Respondent”). R & R alleged Doe’s internet blog known as
“Reynolds News and Information,” had defamed and disparaged R & R. R & R
sought the disclosure of Doe’s identity in anticipation of filing a suit against Doe
for libel and business disparagement and to investigate whether R & R could bring
a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Doe pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1
(a) & (b).
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Doe filed a Special Appearance objecting to the Court’s personal jurisdiction
over him, and subject thereto, a Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order.
Doe argued the disclosure of his identity would violate his fundamental First
Amendment right to anonymous free speech and that the statements made on the
blog did not rise to the level of actionable conduct warranting the disclosure of
Doe’s identity. Respondent held an evidentiary hearing on R & R’s Petition and
Doe’s Motions. After the hearing, Respondent granted R & R’s Rule 202 Petition
and denied Doe’s motions. (App. 6 & 7). On May 21, 2010, Respondent ordered
Google to disclose Doe’s identity to R & R one month later. (App. 7).
Doe filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the First District Court of
Appeals (sometimes the “Court”) challenging Respondent’s Orders. Prior to ruling
on Doe’s Petition, the Texas Supreme Court issued an opinion in In Re John Does
1 and 2, 54 Tex. Sup. J. 855 (Tex. Apr. 15, 2011, orig. proceeding) (the “Does
Decision”). The Court modified its Order staying the trial court proceedings to
"allow the trial judge to take appropriate action in light of" the Does Decision.
(App. 8). The Court also asked the Parties to file supplemental briefing based on
the Does Decision and copies of any new orders entered by Respondent pursuant to
the Does Decision. (App. 8).
R & R filed a motion with Respondent asking Respondent to order a
deposition on written questions of Google instead of the subpoena duces tecum
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initially ordered by Respondent. Doe filed a response, objections and a motion for
a protective order (“Doe’s Response”). Doe’s Response re-urged his previously
filed Special Appearance, Motions to Quash, Motions for Protective Orders,
Requests for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for
Reconsideration (“Doe’s Motions”). After an oral hearing on the Parties’ Motions,
Respondent entered an Amended Order, again granting R & R’s Rule 202 Petition
and denying Doe’s Motions. (App. 5).
Per the Court’s request, the Parties filed Respondent’s Amended Order and
supplemental briefing based on the Does Decision with the Court. The Court
dismissed Doe’s Petition without prejudice to Doe’s refiling of his Petition
pursuant to Respondent’s Amended Order. (App. 9).
R & R filed another motion with Respondent asking Respondent to modify
its Amended Order to require Doe to file a new mandamus by a date certain.
Respondent entered its Second Amended Order which modified its Amended
Order to require Doe to file a new Petition within one month. (App. 4).
Doe timely filed his second mandamus in the First District Court of Appeals
pursuant to Respondent’s Second Amended Order, on August 15, 2011. On May
18, 2012, Justices Keyes, for the Panel, and Justice Bland denied Doe’s Petition,
with Justice Sharp dissenting. (App. 1). Relator filed a Motion for Rehearing.
Justices Keyes and Bland denied the Motion for Rehearing, again with Justice
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Sharp dissenting. (App. 2). Relator filed a Motion for En Banc Reconsideration.
Justice Keyes, for the Court, denied the Motion, with Justice Sharp dissenting on
November 29, 2012.

(App. 3).

The Court’s Memorandum Opinion denying

Relator’s second Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the subject of this petition, is
cited at No. 1-11-00683-CV; In Re John Doe a/k/a Trooper, Relator. (App. 1).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Article V, § 6 of the Texas
Constitution and §22.221 (a) and §22.221 (b) of the Texas Government Code. An
order pursuant to Rule 202 allowing pre-suit discovery incident to a contemplated
lawsuit against a nonparty is not a final appealable order. Therefore, Doe’s remedy
is by mandamus. See, e.g., IFS Security Group, Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 175
S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, dism’d).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Reynolds and Reynolds Company (“Reynolds”) is an Ohio corporation
with its principal place of business in Kettering, Ohio. (C.R. 7). Reynolds is a
privately held company that develops and sells dealer management computer
systems to automobile retailers. (C.R. 8). Reynolds is one of the two largest dealer
management systems providers in the country. (VI, R.R 580).
Brockman is the founder and CEO of Universal Computers Systems, Inc.
(“UCS”), (C.R 141-42). In 2006, UCS acquired Reynolds, then a public-traded
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company, for $2.8 billion. (C.R. 141-42). The combined companies supplied
dealer management software to 11,000 automobile dealers nationwide. (C.R. 141).
Brockman has served as the Chairman and CEO of Reynolds since the acquisition.
(C.R. 8). Brockman is known as a “tough, opinionated, hard-nosed businessman”
“who sets rigid terms in contracts and enforces them to the letter.” (C.R. 141).
Since UCS’s purchase of Reynolds and Brockman’s takeover of management as
the “Boss”, Reynolds has lost a significant number of customers, laid off
employees, and employee satisfaction has dramatically decreased. (Volume VI,
R.R. 544-66).
UCS had a reputation for being inflexible, expensive and preferring to
litigate rather than negotiate with its customers. (C.R. 141). Reynolds’s business
practices, on the other hand, were “well known as the friendliest in the industry.”
(C.R. 133; R.R. 559). UCS's takeover of Reynolds was highly controversial. (C.R.
110-36; R.R. 544-66).

At the time of the purchase, Brockman was described as

a “shy tech nerd,” who was “intensely private” and declined interviews. (C.R.
141-42). However, in February 2007, Brockman addressed the media at the
National Automobile Dealers Association Convention, claiming that Reynolds was
now one company which had “blended the best talent from both companies.”
(C.R. 133; R.R. 559).
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In November 2007, Brockman launched a “road show” to visit automobile
dealers in 20 cities by year end. (C.R. 110-12; R.R. 544-46). Automotive News
reported that Brockman was giving up his media shy habits and was warming to
his role as the public voice and face of Reynolds. Id. The purpose of the road show
was to dispel “misinformation,” including but not limited to telling the dealers to
“ignore the persistent rumors” about Reynolds’ intentions to alter the dealer
contracts and to explain to the dealers that Brockman is “not the ogre the industry
has made him out to be.” Id.; (R.R. 544-46).
Autonews.com later designated Brockman as one of its top ten news makers
and stated: “Dealers either love him or hate him,” but Brockman “has emerged
from the shadows to be the public face of the nation’s largest vendor of dealership
management systems.”
Reynolds.

(C.R. 147).

Brockman remains the public face of

(C.R 110-31; 138-39; 141-44; R.R. 544-65; C.R. 101, citing

http://www.reyrey.com/interviews/ondex.asp). At the end of 2008, Glassdoor.com
published its company ratings based on employee satisfaction. (C.R. 123-29; R.R.
560-65). R & R ranked third worst with a 2.0% overall rating and Brockman had
an 8% CEO approval rating. Id.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

R & R’s Rule 202 Petition
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According to R & R’s Petition, an individual using the pseudonym, “The
Trooper,” formed and became the primary author of an internet website entitled
“Reynolds News & Information” in 2007 (the “Trooper Blog”). (C.R. 8-9). Three
years after the Trooper blog began, R & R filed a Rule 202 petition against Google.
(“Petition”). (C.R. 7-15).
R & R claimed the “Trooper” Blog (1) published defamatory statements
disparaging Reynolds’ business interests; (2) published defamatory statements
disparaging Brockman’s personal and professional reputation; and (3) if “Trooper”
was an employee of Reynolds’, constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties. (C.R.
9). R & R paraphrased examples of the complained of statements:1
•
Trooper stated that Brockman is exactly like Bernard Madoff, and that
Brockman does not care about people or morals, and that if you judge people by
character, integrity, morals, and honesty [sic] then [Brockman] is Satan.
•
Trooper stated that Brockman is looked at as the biggest idiot anyone
has ever seen and no one wants do to business with him.
•
Trooper stated that Brockman is a lunatic who caused [Reynolds]’
customers and competition to perceive the company as a joke.
•
(C.R. 9).

1

Trooper described Brockman as a bad business person and a crook.

None of the blog statements attributed to Doe are exact transcriptions of the statements Doe
allegedly made. R & R’s Petition misrepresents the true language of the statements and the
context within which the statements were made. With respect to the alleged statement that
Brockman was a crook, R & R’s Rule 202 Petition was filed more than one year after that
statement was allegedly posted by Doe.
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R & R asked the Court to issue an order authorizing R & R to take a pre-suit
deposition on written questions of Google to obtain: The identity (name, address,
and telephone number) of the individual or individuals to whom the following
addresses or screen names are registered:
(i) the blog located at “http://reynoldsinformation.blogspot.com/”;
(ii) the Blogger user i.d., “The Trooper;” and/or
(iii) the email address reynoldsinfo@gmail.com
(C.R. 13).
R & R stated “[t]o be clear, Petitioners anticipate the institution of a suit in
which one or both of Petitioners would be a party and/or; at a minimum, seek to
investigate their potential claims.” (C.R. 10). Doe was “served” with R & R’s suit
by email. (C.R. 14).
B.

Doe’s Special Appearance
Doe filed a Special Appearance prior to filing his Motion to Quash and

Motion for Protective Order. (C.R. 47-62). Doe argued that Texas courts have no
personal jurisdiction over him because he has no contacts with Texas and
exercising jurisdiction over him would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. (C.R. 47-62). Doe’s Special Appearance was supported by
affidavits from his attorney and from Doe himself. (C.R. 58-59, 464-465). Doe
stated he is the blogger known as the “Trooper”, that he is not an employee, or an
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officer or director of Reynolds, that he is not and has never been a resident of
Texas, that he does not conduct business in Texas, that he does not maintain a
place of business in Texas, and that he does not advertise or solicit customers in
Texas. (C.R. 464-65). Respondent never ruled on Doe’s special appearance, (C.R.
467-69), even though it was set for written submission (C.R. 460), and even though
Doe reurged it on multiple occasions. (C.R. 472-76; 477-81; 488-86).
C.

Doe’s Motion to Quash R & R’s Rule 202 Petition and Motion for
Protective Order
Doe filed a Motion to Quash R & R’s Rule 202 Petition and a Motion for

Protective Order, subject to Doe’s Special Appearance. (C.R. 27-49). Doe moved
to Quash R & R’s Petition because R & R failed to follow the pleading
requirements of Rule 202.2, failed to follow the notice and service requirements of
Rule 202.3, and failed to meet the burden of proof required by Rule 202.4. (C.R.
28-38).
Doe claimed disclosing his identity would destroy his constitutional right to
anonymous free speech. (C.R. 39, 63-66). Doe urged Respondent not to order the
disclosure of Doe’s identity without requiring R & R to raise a genuine issue of
material fact on each element of R & R’s claims. (C.R. 40, 63-66, 87-154). Doe
alleged the summary judgment standard is the appropriate test to strike a balance
between a plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and a defendant’s right to
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exercise free speech anonymously. (C.R. 40, 63-66, 87-154). Doe argued Doe’s
alleged blog statements were insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
on each element of R & R’s defamation claims. (C.R. 41-46, 63-66, 87-154).
More specifically, Doe argued among other things, the statements cited by R
& R were not objectively verifiable false statements of fact, that Reynolds had no
cause of action for defamation as a matter of law, that Brockman was a limited
purpose public figure as a matter of law, that Brockman could not raise a genuine
issue of material fact on whether Doe’s statements were made with actual malice,
that R & R had failed to support its Petition with any evidence of damages, and
that Doe owed no fiduciary relationship to R & R. (C.R. 41-46, 63-66, 87-154).
Doe supported his motions with newspaper articles, internet articles, and Reynolds
marketing materials and press releases. (C.R. 110-49).
D.

R & R’s Response to Doe’s Motions
R & R filed a response to Doe’s Motions. (C.R. 158-83). R & R argued that

a good faith pleading standard was sufficient to protect Doe’s First Amendment
rights. (C.R. 170). R & R argued for the very first time that Doe was an employee
of Reynolds and that Doe had signed an employment agreement with Reynolds.
(C.R. 170). R & R claimed it was entitled to a Rule 202 deposition because Doe
had allegedly violated fiduciary duties he owed to Reynolds and because Doe had
breached his employment agreement with Reynolds. (C.R. 170-76). R & R
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supported its response with exhibits and an affidavit from Brockman. (C.R. 184251).
E.

Doe’s Objections to R & R’s affidavit and evidence
Doe timely objected to Brockman’s affidavit and the exhibits attached

thereto. (C.R. 443-50). Doe objected on the grounds that Brockman’s affidavit
and exhibits were inadmissible because Brockman failed to aver that the facts
stated within his affidavit were within his personal knowledge and true, that the
affidavit contained improper factual and legal conclusions, that the exhibits
contained hearsay, that the exhibits violated the rule of optional completeness, and
that Brockman’s affidavit failed to properly authenticate the “Trooper” Blog. (C.R.
443-50, 522-530).
F.

The Evidentiary hearing on R & R’s Petition and Doe’s Motions
On May 21, 2010, Respondent held an evidentiary hearing and heard oral

argument from R & R, Doe, and Google. (V. IV, R.R. 1-43; V. VI, R.R. 544-845;
V. IV, R.R. 45-286; V. V, R.R. 288-542). Respondent admitted all of R & R’s
tendered exhibits and all of Doe’s tendered exhibits. Doe introduced exhibits
which establish that:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

11

•
Brockman is a limited purpose public figure with respect to (1) the
controversy over UCS’s purchase of Reynolds and (2) Reynolds’ current handling
of its business affairs (R.R. 544-59);2
•
Reynolds has the third lowest employee satisfaction rating of the fifty
lowest ranked employers (R.R. 560);
•
Brockman only has an 8% approval rating by Reynolds’ employees
(R.R. 560);
•
UCS’s takeover of Reynolds was hostile and that morale of Reynolds’
employees has suffered as a result of Brockman’s management practices, (R.R.
674-76).
During the evidentiary hearing, R & R tendered Brockman’s supplemental
affidavit and the exhibits attached thereto which allegedly contain portions of the
“Trooper” Blog, over Doe’s objections. (R.R. 45-286; 288-542; C.R. 522-26).
G.

Respondent’s May 21, 2010, Orders ordering Google to disclose Doe’s
identity by June 21, 2010
Prior to ruling on R & R’s Petition and Doe’s Motions, Respondent stated

this will be a good opportunity for our appellate courts in Houston to make some
law on this issue. Respondent then granted R & R’s Petition and denied Doe’s
Motions. (C.R. 470-71; R.R. 35). However, Respondent stayed his Orders for
thirty days, or until June 21, 2010. (C.R. 475). (R.R. 38).

2

Brockman sought publicity surrounding the controversy, Brockman had had access to the media,
and Brockman "voluntarily engaged in activities that necessarily involved the risk of increased
exposure and injury to his reputation.” (R.R. 544-59).
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ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1:

Respondent clearly abused its discretion for which there is no

adequate remedy by appeal when Respondent found that it had jurisdiction and
venue to grant R & R’s Rule 202 Petition.
ISSUE 2:

Respondent clearly abused its discretion for which there is no

adequate remedy by appeal when Respondent granted R & R's Rule 202 Petition
without first requiring R & R to introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact on all of the elements of R & R’s claims within its control in violation
of Doe's fundamental First Amendment right to anonymous free speech.
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
STANDARDS - Mandamus & Rule 202
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available only when a trial court
clearly abuses its discretion and when there is no adequate remedy on appeal. See
In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180-81 (Tex. 2003). A trial court has no discretion
in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. A failure by the
trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly, as when a discovery order conflicts
with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutes an abuse of discretion. See
Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d at 181. A party will not have an adequate remedy by appeal
when the appellate court would not be able to cure the trial court's discovery error.
Id.
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Rule 202 allows the court to authorize the taking of a deposition on oral
examination or written questions either (1) to perpetuate or obtain a person’s own
testimony or that of any other person for use in an anticipated suit; or (2) to
investigate a potential claim or suit. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1.

A court must

order a deposition to be taken only if it finds that:
(1) allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition may
prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit; or
(2) the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the requested
deposition to investigate a potential claim outweighs the burden or expense of the
procedure.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4. (App. 10). An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling
on Rule 202 Petition under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Hewlett
Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.–Austin 2006, orig. proceeding).
A.

ISSUE 1: Respondent clearly abused its discretion for which there is
no adequate remedy by appeal when Respondent found it had
jurisdiction and venue to grant R & R’s Rule 202 Petition.
The Texas Supreme Court has recently admonished trial courts to strictly

adhere to the requirements of TEX. R. CIV. P. 202 to prevent abuse of the Rule. In
In Re Michael Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011), the Court stated:
Rule 202 is not a license for forced interrogations. Courts must
strictly limit and carefully supervise pre-suit discovery to prevent
abuse of the rule.
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Id. (emphasis added). 3
In granting mandamus relief from a Rule 202 petition seeking the disclosure
of two anonymous bloggers' identities, the Court stated in In Re John Does 1 and
2, 337 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. 2011):
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to follow Rule
202. . . . The intrusion into otherwise private matters authorized
by Rule 202 outside a lawsuit is not to be taken lightly. . . .
."judges should maintain an active oversight role to ensure that
[such discovery is] not misused".
Id. (emphasis added). (App. 11).
A court order, even when issued at the behest of a private party, is state
action subject to constitutional limitations. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265 (1964). Court orders that compel the production of an individual’s
identity in a situation that threatens fundamental rights are “subject to the closest
scrutiny.” See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). (emphasis added).
Before a trial court can order a Rule 202 deposition, it must find that it has
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute and that venue is proper. The Rule states
“[t]he petition must be filed in a proper court of any county: (1) where venue of
the anticipated suit may lie, if suit is anticipated; or (2) where the witness resides,
3

See also In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (party to Rule 202
proceeding has no adequate remedy on appeal if court abused its discretion in ordering discovery
that would compromise procedural or substantive rights). (emphasis added).
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if no suit is yet anticipated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.2(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). The
term "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent. See TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 311.016; see also § 311.002(4) (applying Code Construction Act "to each
rule adopted under a code"). “A reasonable interpretation of "proper court" is a
court with jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.” City of Willow Park v. Squaw
Creek Downs, 166 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); In re
Donna Indep. Sch. Dist., 299 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2009,
orig. proceeding).
Before Respondent ruled on R & R’s Petition, Respondent should have
“look[ed] to the substantive law respecting the anticipated dispute,” and denied R
& R’s Petition because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Doe and
venue in Harris County was not proper. See City of Dallas v. Dallas Black Fire
Fighters Assoc., 353 S.W.3d 547, 553-55 (Tex. App. – Dallas, no pet.). In In re
Wolfe, this Court granted mandamus relief because the county attorney had not
joined in the Rule 202 suit, and the county attorney would be required to join the
anticipated suit. 341 S.W.3d at 933. This Court also refused to grant a Rule 202
petition because the anticipated suit was based on a statute that limits discovery
until after the plaintiff serves an expert report. In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 420
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(Tex. 2008); City of Willow Park, 166 S.W.3d 336, 340-40; City of Dallas, 353
S.W.3d 547 at 553-55.
1.

No Jurisdiction over Doe

No Texas court has personal jurisdiction over Doe in this ancillary
proceeding or in any anticipated suit, so Respondent abused its discretion by
granting R & R’s Rule 202 Petition. “The Due Process Clause guarantees that a
party cannot be bound to the “judgments of a forum with which he has established
no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson,
897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995) (granting writ of mandamus where the trial
court’s assertion of jurisdiction was arbitrary), quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). For Respondent to have jurisdiction over
Doe, the anticipated proceeding must arise out of Doe’s contact with Texas, or Doe
must have had continuous and systematic contacts with Texas. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). This applies to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure including Rule 202, which are “not to be
construed to (1) ‘enlarge or diminish any substantive rights or obligations of
any parties to any civil action’ or (2) ‘extend of limit the jurisdiction of the
courts of the State of Texas nor the venue of actions therein.’” Dallas Black
Fire Fighters, 353 S.W. 3d at 554. (emphasis added). Applying the rules of
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personal jurisdiction to Rule 202 is consistent with the legislature’s intent, which is
that “Rule 202 … is equitable in nature, and a court must not permit it to be
used inequitably.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 202, 1999 Comment 2. (emphasis added).
Because no test for personal jurisdiction is met, Doe filed a Special
Appearance in the trial court and reurged it on multiple occasions (C.R. 47-62;
464-65; 472-76; 477-76; 482-86). Doe offered affidavits establishing Doe has no
contacts with Texas: he is not a resident of Texas, he has never been a resident of
Texas, he does not do business in Texas, and he does not solicit business in Texas.
(C.R. 58-59; 464-65).
Even R & R’s claims point to jurisdiction outside Texas. R & R claims that
Doe is an employee of Reynolds and Reynolds. (R.R. 525-29). R & R produced
an unsigned employment agreement that requires most disputes arising out of the
employment agreement and the employee/employer relationship to be submitted to
arbitration in Ohio. (R.R. 141) (R.R. 524-29). Assuming, arguendo, this evidence
was competent and admissible, it would establish personal jurisdiction and venue
in Ohio, not in Texas. By ruling on R & R’s Petition and ordering the disclosure of
Doe’s identity without first finding that Texas has personal jurisdiction over Doe,
the trial court impermissibly construed Rule 202 to extend the jurisdiction of the
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courts of the State of Texas. See Dallas Black Fire Fighters, 353 S.W. 3d at 55354.
2.

Harris County is not Proper Venue

Venue is not proper in Harris County because R & R failed to present any
competent and admissible evidence establishing venue in Harris County. If any
Texas court were a proper venue, it would be Travis County, the location of
Google, not Harris County. (C.R. 7, 11). The only evidence pertaining to Harris
County is Mr. Brockman’s verified petition that he is a resident of Harris County,
Texas (C.R. 7, 22) and R & R’s counsels’ argument that R & R resides in Harris
County. (R.R. 13).
Neither Mr. Brockman’s nor R & R’s arguments are competent or
admissible to warrant the trial court’s finding that venue was proper in Harris
County. “[P]leadings are not competent evidence to prove the facts alleged …
even if, as here, the pleadings are sworn or verified.” In re Rockafellow, No. 07-1100066-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5495 (Tex. App. Amarillo, July 19, 2011, at
*1) (finding the petitioner’s Rule 202 burden was not met because its only showing
of necessity was in the pleadings), citing Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City
of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995). Moreover, “the petitioner must
introduce evidence which supports the findings required by Rule 202,” and
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pleadings and assertions of counsel are not enough. In re Contractor’s Supplies,
Inc., No. 12-09-00231-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396, at *15-16 (Tex. App. –
Tyler, Aug. 17, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (petitioner’s verified petition
and a letter from his counsel was not sufficient, even if it were admitted, to prove
necessity to prevent a failure or a delay of justice in an anticipated suit).
The only evidence presented to support that Harris County was a proper
venue is R & R’s Petition and the in-court statements of R & R’s counsel and
neither is competent or admissible to support the trial court’s finding that venue
was proper in Harris County under Rule 202. (C.R. 7, 22); (R.R. 13). Because
Respondent failed to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 202 when
Respondent found it had jurisdiction and venue to grant R & R’s Petition,
Respondent abused its discretion for which Doe has no adequate remedy by appeal,
requiring mandamus relief.
B.

ISSUE 2: Respondent clearly abused its discretion for which
there is no adequate remedy by appeal when Respondent granted
R & R's Rule 202 Petition without requiring R & R to introduce
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on all of the
elements of R & R’s claims within its control in violation of Doe's
First Amendment right to anonymous free speech.

Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of
ideas, and the constitutional rights of Internet users, including the First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded. Doe v.
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2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001). See
also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999). Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
Doe’s First Amendment rights must be weighed against R & R’s need for
discovery of his identity to redress alleged wrongs. See Best Western Int’l, Inc. v.
John Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014 (D.
Arizona, July 25, 2006), at *9; and see, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 353 (U.S. 1995) (free speech right is not absolute). To ensure that
the First Amendment rights of anonymous internet speakers are not lost
unnecessarily, courts require a petitioner to make some showing before obtaining
discovery of the speakers’ identities. See Best Western, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
56014, at *9. An entire spectrum of "standards" that could be required, ranging (in
ascending order) from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to pleading sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing of prima facie evidence
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, and beyond that, hurdles
even more stringent. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (De. 2005).
Arguably, only one reported Texas case addresses the standard necessary to
strip an anonymous speaker of his First Amendment rights against a complaining
party’s right to discover the speaker’s identity. See In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d
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805, 819-23 (Tex. App–Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding). (App. 12). In Does 110, a hospital sued ten Does who had allegedly defamed the hospital by posting
“many scurrilous comments that unfairly disparage the Hospital, its employees,
and the doctors,” on an internet site. Id. at 810. The hospital asked the internet
provider to disclose the Does’ identities pursuant to the Cable Communications
Act. Id. at 810, 813. The trial court ordered the provider to disclose the name and
address of the Does. Id. at 811. Doe 1 filed a mandamus seeking to set aside the
trial court’s order. Id. at 811. The court conditionally granted Doe 1's petition
because the trial court failed to follow the Texas discovery rules. Id. at 819. The
Court held that if the trial court was presented with this matter again, it should
require the hospital to present a prima facie case on each element of the claims that
were within its control before ordering the disclosure of the Doe’s identities. Id. at
821-23. (emphasis added).
Other courts have applied a standard similar to the summary judgment
standard applied in Does 1-10. The Delaware Supreme Court imposed a summary
judgment standard on petitions to reveal the identity of anonymous internet
speakers because the court was “concerned that setting the standard too low will
chill potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 451. (App. 14). The New Jersey Superior
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Court requires plaintiffs to "produce sufficient evidence supporting each element
of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis," after which the court "balance[s] the
defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength
of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure . . . ."
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); (App. 13); Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md.
2009) (same test). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated courts should:
(1) ensure the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of the
defamation claim, (2) require reasonable efforts to notify the
anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the
subpoena has been served, (3) delay further action for a reasonable
time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash,
(4) require the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact on each element of the claim that is within its control,
and (5) determine that the information sought is important to enable
the plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit.
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. App. 2009); Ind. Newspapers v.
Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534, 551-52 (In. Ct. App.
2012).
Because this case involves state action, and because this is a case of first
impression, the challenge for this Court is to set a standard for this case and future
Texas cases that clarifies and imposes a standard that protects both an anonymous
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speaker’s First Amendment rights and an aggrieved party’s rights to redress
legitimate actionable conduct.
If complainants like R & R are allowed to simply plead bad conduct to
obtain an anonymous blogger’s identity, the effect on internet free speech would be
both significant and chilling. See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (De. 2005). Doe
urges this Court to apply the summary judgment standard in Does 1-10 to R & R’s
claims in addition to the required burdens imposed under Rule 202.4. The Does
1-10 summary judgment standard, coupled with the Rule 202.4 required findings
are clear, easily applied, familiar to judges and counsel, and it strikes the right
balance between the anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights and the
aggrieved party’s rights.
1.

R & R did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on each
element of its claims for defamation, business disparagement,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.
a.

Defamation

To maintain a defamation cause of action, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant: (1) published a statement of fact; (2) that was defamatory concerning
the plaintiff; (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public
official or public figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual,
regarding the truth of the statement; and (4) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary injury,
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except in cases of defamation is per se. See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978
S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998); Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wecter, 683 S.W.2d 369,
374 (Tex. 1984).
R & R has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each element of
its defamation claims because the only evidence R & R offered in support of its
defamation claims were Brockman’s affidavits and exhibits containing selected
excerpts of the Trooper blog allegedly authored by Doe and a copy of an unsigned
employment agreement allegedly signed by Doe because R & R assumes he is an
employee of Reynolds. (R.R. 524-29). Doe objected to both affidavits and the
exhibits attached thereto. (C.R. 443-50).

Brockman’s affidavits also contain

substantive defects and are not competent summary judgment evidence. (C.R.
443-50, 522-530). (R.R. 28). Moreover the complained of statements, as a matter
of law, are not false statements of objectively verifiable facts. See, e.g., Bentley v.
Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 580-81 (Tex. 2002); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 21 (1990). Finally, as a matter of law, Reynolds has no right to assert a
defamation claim. Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 339 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex.
1960) (holding that a defamation suit cannot be brought on part of a corporation
and that the proper plaintiff if a corporation is defamed is the owners). R & R
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each of the elements of its
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defamation claims within its control and R & R failed to present any evidence to
sustain its Rule 202 burdens.
b.

Business Disparagement

To prevail on a business disparagement claim, a plaintiff must establish that
(1) the defendant published false and disparaging information about it, (2) with
malice, (3) without privilege, (4) that resulted in special damages to the plaintiff.
Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. 2003), citing
Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). To prove
special damages, the plaintiff must prove the disparaging communication played a
substantial part in inducing third parties not to deal with the plaintiff, resulting in a
direct pecuniary loss that has been realized, such as specific lost sales, loss of
trade, or loss of other dealings. See Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 766-67.
For the same reasons as set forth above with respect to defamation, R & R
has not raised a genuine issue of material fact on each of the elements of its
business disparagement claim. Brockman’s affidavits and the alleged “Trooper”
Blog excerpts attached thereto are not competent summary judgment evidence. R
& R has not raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether Doe published false
and disparaging information about it and R & R has not raised a genuine issue of
material fact on damages.
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c.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

To prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, (2) a breach by the
defendant of his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff or
benefit to the defendant as a result of the defendant's breach. Priddy v. Rawson,
282 S.W.3d 588, 599 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
(citations omitted). Id.
R & R contends Doe is an employee of R & R and that as such Doe’s
alleged statements and blog violate his fiduciary duties to R & R. The only
evidence R & R produced to establish that Doe is an employee of R & R are
Brockman’s self-serving and speculative affidavits.

For the reasons set forth

above, Brockman’s affidavits are not competent summary judgment evidence.
d.

Breach of Contract

The elements of a breach of contract claim are (1) the existence of a valid
contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of
the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained as a result of the breach.
B&W Supply, Inc. v. Beckman, 305 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Tex. App–Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, pet. denied).
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R & R’s contention that Doe is an employee of R & R and that he signed the
employment agreement attached to Brockman’s affidavits is insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on any element of R & R’s breach of contract claim.
First, as set forth above, R & R has failed to produce any competent summary
judgment evidence establishing that Doe is an employee of Reynolds. In contrast,
the only competent summary judgment evidence is Doe’s affidavit which
conclusively establishes that Doe is not an employee, officer, or director of
Reynolds. Second, R & R’s contention that Doe signed an employment agreement
with Reynolds based on Brockman’s statement that “[d]uring the entire lifespan of
the “Trooper” Blog, all Reynolds’ employees (including by definition, the
“Trooper”) were bound by a written employment agreement, is pure speculation.
Without proof of a valid contract, R & R cannot raise a genuine issue of material
fact on any of the elements of its breach of contract claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Respondent clearly abused its discretion for which there is
no adequate remedy by appeal when Respondent found that R & R had met its
burden of proving that the deposition on Google disclosing Doe’s identity would
prevent a failure or a delay in justice in an anticipated suit and that the likely
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benefit of the deposition would outweigh the burden and expense of procedure to
investigate a potential claim.
PRAYER
Relator asks this Court to conditionally grant Relator a writ of mandamus
and to direct Respondent to vacate its July 15, 2011, Order ordering Google to
disclose Relator’s identity. Relator prays for all other and such further relief, both
at law and in equity, to which Relator may show himself justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
BLUME, FAULKNER, SKEEN
& NORTHAM, PLLC
/s/ Shelly L. Skeen
James D. Blume
State Bar. No. 02514600
jblume@bfsnlaw.com
Shelly L. Skeen
State Bar No. 24010511
sskeen@bfsnlaw.com
Claire E. James
State Bar No. 24083240
cjames@bfsnlaw.com
111 W. Spring Valley Road
Suite 250
Richardson, Texas 75081
(214) 373-7788
(214) 373-7783 - fax
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
RELATOR, JOHN DOE A/K/A
“TROOPER”
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS
DALLAS COUNTY

§
§

Before me, the undersigned Notary, on this day personally appeared Shelly
L. Skeen, the affiant, a person whose identity is known to me. After I administrated
an oath to the affiant, the affiant testified as follows:
1.
“My name is Shelly L. Skeen. I am over the age of 18, of sound mind,
and capable of making this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my
personal knowledge and are true and correct.
2.
I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. I am a
partner in the law firm of Blume, Faulkner, Skeen, and Northam, P.L.L.C. I have
been licensed to practice law in the State of Texas since 1999 and I am in good
standing with the State Bar of Texas. I am co-counsel of record for Relator John
Doe a/k/a “Trooper” in this case.
3.
I am also co-counsel of record for John Doe a/k/a “Trooper” in the
trial court case; Cause No. 2010-13724; In re Robert T. Brockman and The
Reynolds and Reynolds Company, pending before the 15 2nd Judicial District Court
in Harris County, Texas (“Trial Court Case”). I was also co-counsel of record for
John Doe a/k/a “Trooper” in the first filed mandamus case, Cause No. 01-1000494-CV, In re John Doe, a/k/a “Trooper,” Relator (“First Mandamus Case”)
and the second filed mandamus case, Cause No. 01-1 1-00683-CV, In re John Doe
a/k/a Trooper (“Second Mandamus Case”). I am familiar with the facts and legal
proceedings in the Trial Court Case, in the First Mandamus Case, and the Second
Mandamus based my review of the trial court and the appellate court files as well
as my participation as counsel of record in the above-referenced cases.
4.
Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is accompanied by a Record.
The Record consists of the Clerk’s Record and a Reporter’s Record from the Trial
Court Case. It also consists of a portion of the Clerk’s Record from the First and
Second Mandamus cases. I have personal knowledge that the Clerk’s Record
contains true and correct certified copies of the pleadings and papers on file with
the Trial Court which were obtained by this firm from the Harris County District
Clerk’s website. I also have personal knowledge that the pleadings and papers
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contained in the Clerk’s Record that are not certified are true and correct copies of
the pleadings, papers and Orders filed by, and served on, the Parties in the Trial
Court Case, and the First and Second Mandamus Cases.
5.
I have personal knowledge that the Reporter’s Record contains a true
and correct copy of the May 21, 2010, evidentiary hearing transcript and exhibits
that were admitted into evidence by the trial court. I participated in that hearing.
The Reporter’s Record contains true and correct copies of the transcript and
exhibits that this law firm obtained from the court reporter. In addition, the
Reporter’s Record contains a true and correct copy of the court reporter’s transcript
from May 20, 2011 oral hearing before the trial court. Real Parties in Interest
Robert T. Brockman and The Reynolds and Reynolds Company served this firm
with a copy of the May 20, 2011, transcript which is reproduced in the Reporters
Record herein and which Mr. Brockman and Reynolds filed with the Court of
Appeals in the First Mandamus Case. I participated in the May 20, 2011, oral
hearing. I have reviewed the May 20, 2011, transcript. With the exception of
minor non-substantive errors, the transcript is a fair and accurate representation of
the May 20, 2011, oral hearing.

6.
Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is accompanied by an
Appendix. I have personal knowledge that the Appendix contains true and correct
certified copies of the Orders from the Trial Court Case, dated May 21, 2010; May
23, 2011; and July 15, 2011, which were obtained by this firm from the Harris
County District Clerk’s website. The Appendix also contains true and correct
copies of selected pleadings filed by, and served on, the Parties in the First
Mandamus Case and the Second Mandamus Case.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

I
S1illy L. Skeen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on the 1st day of February,
2013, to certify which witness my hand and official sea
‘n

1
°‘

TRECHELLE L. ANDERSEN
Notary Pubhc
STATE OF TEXAS

1 or the State of Texas
Nbtary Public

My Comm. Exp. July 23, 2016

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

31

CERTIFICATION
I certify that I have reviewed this petition and every factual statement in the
petition is supported by competent evidence included in the record and/or the
appendix. In addition, I certify that Relator’s Petition contains less than 4,329
words when considering the included and excluded contents for length set forth in
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4.
/s/ Shelly L. Skeen
Shelly L. Skeen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that Realtor served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition
for Writ of Mandamus and Record was served on counsel for the Real Parties in
Interest and Respondent on this the 1st day of February 2013, as follows:
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL
AND EMAIL
Mr. Grant J. Harvey
gharvey@gibbsbruns.com
Mr. Brian T. Ross
bross@gibbsbruns.com
Gibbs & Bruns, LLP
1100 Louisiana, Suite 5300
Houston, Texas 77002
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest
Robert T. Brockman and the R & R and Reynolds Company
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL
ANE EMAIL
Mr. Dennis Lynch
Figari & Davenport
3400 Bank Of America
901 Main St Ste 3400
Dallas, TX 75202
dennis.lynch@figdav.com
Attorney for Real Party in Interest Google, Inc.

VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL
Honorable Judge Robert Schaffer
152ND Judicial District Court
Harris County Civil Courthouse
201 Caroline, 11th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Respondent

/s/ Shelly L. Skeen
Shelly L. Skeen
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Cause No. ________________-CV
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Opinion issued May 18, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————

NO. 01-11-00683-CV
———————————
IN RE JOHN DOE A/K/A TROOPER, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, John Doe a/k/a Trooper, petitioned for writ of mandamus asking
that we vacate the trial court’s July 15, 2011 order authorizing real parties in
interest, Robert T. Brockman and The Reynolds & Reynolds Co., to serve Google

Inc. with a deposition on written questions pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 202 and directing Google to produce relator’s identifying information. 1
We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Any pending motions are
dismissed as moot.

Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp.
Justice Sharp, dissenting.

1

The underlying case is In re Robert T. Brockman and The Reynolds & Reynolds
Co., No. 2010-13724 (152nd Dist. Ct., Harris Cnty., Tex.), the Honorable Robert
Schaffer, presiding.
2

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Cause number and style:

01–11–00683–CV; In re John Doe a/k/a Trooper

Date motion filed:

June 4, 2012

Party filing motion:

Relator, John Doe

It is ordered that the motion for rehearing is denied.
Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes
Acting for the Court
Panel consists of: Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp.
Sharp, J., dissents from the denial of rehearing.

Date: September 26, 2012

FILE COPY

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON
NOTICE OF ORDER ON MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION
Appellate case name:

In re John Doe a/k/a Trooper

Appellate case number:

01-11-00683-CV

Trial court case number: 1013724
Trial court:

152nd District Court of Harris County

Date motion filed:

October 10, 2012

Party filing motion:

Relator

It is ordered that the motion for en banc reconsideration is DENIED.
Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes
Acting for the Court
The en banc court consists of Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Jennings, Keyes, Higley, Bland,
Sharp, Massengale, Brown, and Huddle. Justice Sharp dissenting from the denial of en banc
reconsideration.
Date: November 29, 2012

Certified Document Number: 48824427 - Page 1 of 2

Certified Document Number: 48824427 - Page 2 of 2

I, Chris Daniel, District Clerk of Harris
County, Texas certify that this is a true and
correct copy of the original record filed and or
recorded in my office, electronically or hard
copy, as it appears on this date.
Witness my official hand and seal of office
this June 3, 2011

Certified Document Number:

48824427 Total Pages: 2

Chris Daniel, DISTRICT CLERK
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated
documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal
please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com

Certified Document Number: 45403444 - Page 1 of 1

I, Loren Jackson, District Clerk of Harris
County, Texas certify that this is a true and
correct copy of the original record filed and or
recorded in my office, electronically or hard
copy, as it appears on this date
Witness my official hand and seal of office
this May 29, 2010
Certified Document Number: 45403444 Total Pages: 1

LOREN JACKSON, DISTRICT CLERK
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated
documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal
please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com

Certified Document Number: 45396591 - Page 1 of 2

I, Loren Jackson, District Clerk of Harris
County, Texas certify that this is a true and
correct copy of the original record filed and or
recorded in my office, electronically or hard
copy, as it appears on this date
Witness my official hand and seal of office
this May 29, 2010
Certified Document Number: 45403444 Total Pages: 1

LOREN JACKSON, DISTRICT CLERK
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated
documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal
please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com

Opinion issued June 16, 2011

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————

NO. 01-10-00494-CV
———————————
IN RE JOHN DOE A/K/A TROOPER, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus1

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This petition for a writ of mandamus was filed concerning the district
judge’s May 21, 2010 discovery order. On May 23, 2011, the district judge
amended that order. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus
1

The Honorable Robert Schaffer, judge of the 152nd District Court of Harris
County, Texas. The underlying proceeding is In re Robert T. Brockman and
The Reynolds and Reynolds Co., No. 2010-13724 (152nd Dist. Ct., Harris
County, Tex).

without prejudice to the relator filing a new petition based on the May 23, 2011
order, and we vacate this Court’s June 22, 2010 order granting temporary relief.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Wilson.2

2

The Honorable Davie L. Wilson, retired justice, Court of Appeals for the
First District of Texas, participating by assignment.
2
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STATE RULES
TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS
SECTION 9. Evidence and Discovery
B. DISCOVERY
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 (2012)
Rule 202 Depositions Before Suit or to Investigate Claims
202.1. Generally. --A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral
examination or written questions either:
(a) to perpetuate or obtain the person's own testimony or that of any other person for use in an anticipated suit; or
(b) to investigate a potential claim or suit.
202.2. Petition. --The petition must:
(a) be verified;
(b) be filed in a proper court of any county:
(1) where venue of the anticipated suit may lie, if suit is anticipated; or
(2) where the witness resides, if no suit is yet anticipated;
(c) be in the name of the petitioner;
(d) state either:
(1) that the petitioner anticipates the institution of a suit in which the petitioner may be a party; or
(2) that the petitioner seeks to investigate a potential claim by or against petitioner;
(e) state the subject matter of the anticipated action, if any, and the petitioner's interest therein;
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(f) if suit is anticipated, either:
(1) state the names of the persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated
suit, and the addresses and telephone numbers for such persons; or
(2) state that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons petitioner expects to have interests
adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated suit cannot be ascertained through diligent inquiry, and describe those persons;
(g) state the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the persons to be deposed, the substance of the testimony
that the petitioner expects to elicit from each, and the petitioner's reasons for desiring to obtain the testimony of each;
and
(h) request an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons named in the petition.
202.3. Notice and Service.
(a) Personal Service on Witnesses and Persons Named. --At least 15 days before the date of the hearing on the
petition, the petitioner must serve the petition and a notice of the hearing - in accordance with Rule 21a - on all persons
petitioner seeks to depose and, if suit is anticipated, on all persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to
petitioner's in the anticipated suit.
(b) Service by Publication on Persons Not Named.
(1) Manner. --Unnamed persons described in the petition whom the petitioner expects to have interests adverse
to petitioner's in the anticipated suit, if any, may be served by publication with the petition and notice of the hearing.
The notice must state the place for the hearing and the time it will be held, which must be more than 14 days after the
first publication of the notice. The petition and notice must be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in
the newspaper of broadest circulation in the county in which the petition is filed, or if no such newspaper exists, in the
newspaper of broadest circulation in the nearest county where a newspaper is published.
(2) Objection to Depositions Taken on Notice by Publication. --Any interested party may move, in the
proceeding or by bill of review, to suppress any deposition, in whole or in part, taken on notice by publication, and may
also attack or oppose the deposition by any other means available.
(c) Service in Probate Cases. --A petition to take a deposition in anticipation of an application for probate of a
will, and notice of the hearing on the petition, may be served by posting as prescribed by Section 33(f)(2) of the Probate
Code. The notice and petition must be directed to all parties interested in the testator's estate and must comply with the
requirements of Section 33(c) of the Probate Code insofar as they may be applicable.
(d) Modification by Order. --As justice or necessity may require, the court may shorten or lengthen the notice
periods under this rule and may extend the notice period to permit service on any expected adverse party.
202.4. Order.
(a) Required Findings. --The court must order a deposition to be taken if, but only if, it finds that:
(1) allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an
anticipated suit; or
(2) the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition to investigate a potential claim
outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure.
(b) Contents. --The order must state whether a deposition will be taken on oral examination or written questions.
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The order may also state the time and place at which a deposition will be taken. If the order does not state the time and
place at which a deposition will be taken, the petitioner must notice the deposition as required by Rules 199 or 200. The
order must contain any protections the court finds necessary or appropriate to protect the witness or any person who
may be affected by the procedure.
202.5. Manner of Taking and Use. --Except as otherwise provided in this rule, depositions authorized by this rule
are governed by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. The scope of discovery in
depositions authorized by this rule is the same as if the anticipated suit or potential claim had been filed. A court may
restrict or prohibit the use of a deposition taken under this rule in a subsequent suit to protect a person who was not
served with notice of the deposition from any unfair prejudice or to prevent abuse of this rule.
NOTES:

PUBLICATION REFERENCES. --See Texas Litigation Guide, Ch. 10, Depositions Before Suit; Ch. 90, Discovery:
Scope and Limitations.
Notes and Comments
Exceptions & Applicability:
Rule 202 applies to all such proceedings filed on or after January 1, 1999, but a court may use the rule for guidance in
previously filed proceedings. Misc. Docket No. 98-9196 Para. 4f.
Comment to 1999 change:
1. This rule applies to all discovery before suit covered by former rules governing depositions to perpetuate testimony
and bills of discovery.
2. A deposition taken under this rule may be used in a subsequent suit as permitted by the rules of evidence, except
that a court may restrict or prohibit its use to prevent taking unfair advantage of a witness or others. The bill of
discovery procedure, which Rule 202 incorporates, is equitable in nature, and a court must not permit it to be used
inequitably.
LexisNexis (R) Notes:
CASE NOTES

1. In an action challenging a city's bidding process, the trial court properly denied the city's plea to the jurisdiction,
which was filed in response to an unsuccessful bidder's presuit discovery petition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, because the
trial court would have had jurisdiction over the successful bidder, even if it did not have jurisdiction over the city. There
was no requirement in Rule 202 that the person sought to be deposed be a potentially liable defendant in the claim under
investigation. City of Houston v. U. S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 242, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 106 (Tex.
App. Houston 1st Dist. 2006).

2. Insured's petition for a discovery deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 brought against an insurer and an adjustor did
not constitute the filing of a civil lawsuit, and thus the matter was not removable under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441. Further, the
non-diverse adjustor was not fraudulently joined so that diversity jurisdiction was lacking under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332.
Davidson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654 (S.D. Tex. June 19 2006).
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3. Insured's petition for a discovery deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 brought against an insurer and an adjustor did
not constitute the filing of a civil lawsuit, and thus the matter was not removable under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441. Further, the
non-diverse adjustor was not fraudulently joined so that diversity jurisdiction was lacking under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332.
Davidson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654 (S.D. Tex. June 19 2006).

4. When the trial court granted appellee's petition for on order authorizing the taking of appellant's oral deposition to
investigate a potential suit under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), the taking of the deposition was governed by the rules
applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. Therefore, appellant was subject to deposition in his county of
residence under Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b)(2)(A),(C); the trial court erred by the deposition to be conducted in a county
other than the county of appellant's residence. Beausoleil v. Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, L.L.P., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 993
(Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 11 2011).
5. Venue was not a basis to challenge a decision under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 relating to a worker's death because a
workers' compensation adjuster lived in the county where the action was filed, and there was conflicting evidence
regarding whether the worker's wife anticipated filing suit. In re Campos, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5485 (Tex. App. Fort
Worth July 12 2007).

6. Witnesses could not challenge orders authorizing a party to take the witnesses' deposition testimony by written
questions pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 and denying the witnesses' motions to transfer venue to the county where they
resided; no statute provided for interlocutory review of such orders, and both Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
15.064 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 87 expressly disallowed interlocutory appeal of such venue determinations. In re Am. State
Bank, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6554 (Tex. App. Amarillo Aug. 16 2005).

7. Trial court erred in granting a request to take a doctor's oral deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 to investigate a
potential health care liability claim; even if the medical records were incomplete or inadequate, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 74.351 precluded the taking of the doctor's deposition before an expert report was filed, in accordance with
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.002, which states that the provisions of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch.
74 control over rules of procedure. In re Raja, 216 S.W.3d 404, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6558 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006).

8. Summary judgment properly declared that amendments to restrictive covenants were void because a majority of the
homeowners in a subdivision had not executed an agreement in writing approving the amendments, as required by the
original covenants. A petition circulated by the homeowners' association asked only about terminating the covenants;
the record contained no evidence that the homeowners who signed the petition ever saw what was eventually filed with
the county clerk. VICC Homeowners Assn v. Los Campeones, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 832, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7447 (Tex.
App. Corpus Christi 2004).

9. With respect to a potential health-care liability claim against some physicians, Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 depositions of the
physicians were barred by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 because the discovery restrictions of Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 applied both before and after such a cause of action was filed. In re Jorden, 249
S.W.3d 416, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 228, 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 657 (Tex. 2008).

Page 5
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202

10. As to a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 pre-suit discovery petition filed by police and firefighter associations in a dispute relating
to a meet and confer agreement, governmental immunity was not waived under Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 147.007(b)
because the petition was insufficiently specific to demonstrate that the associations were potentially aggrieved;
however, because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, an opportunity to
amend was appropriate. City of Dallas v. Dallas Black Fire Fighters Ass'n, 353 S.W.3d 547, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8336
(Tex. App. Dallas 2011).
11. In determining jurisdiction for purposes of pre-suit discovery under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, a court should look to the
substantive law respecting the anticipated suit, in accordance with the purposes and proper construction of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth in Tex. Const. art. V, § 31(b) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 1, 815, 816. City of Dallas v.
Dallas Black Fire Fighters Ass'n, 353 S.W.3d 547, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8336 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).
12. Trial court abused its discretion in allowing pre-suit discovery of two anonymous internet bloggers' identities as it
failed to make the required findings under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4(a); an agreement regarding the discovery between two
corporations and a search engine corporation was not valid under Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.1 as it did not include the bloggers.
In re Doe, 337 S.W.3d 862, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 295, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 855 (Tex. 2011).
13. Although there was no dispute at trial that Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petitions were legitimate mechanisms to investigate a
claim, the jury was free to accept the State's argument that the use of the petitions by defendant and her husband under
the circumstances presented amounted to a shake down for hush money, thereby rejecting defendant's argument under
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.03(a) that she believed her and her husband's use of the petitions was legal. Roberts v. State,
319 S.W.3d 37, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1849 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2010).
14. Although defendant argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that she, acting with intent
to promote or assist in the theft, solicited or attempted to aid her husband to commit theft, and she pointed to certain
testimony, her argument ignored the standard of review appropriate for legal sufficiency challenges; the jury heard
evidence that (1) defendant had sexual relations with the four complainants, (2) defendant typed revisions to some of
the Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petitions, (3) each complainant received the petition, (4) defendant set up meetings between her
husband and some of the complainants, (5) defendant and her husband then bought a new house, and (6) the
complainants paid a certain amount to the husband, defendant, or a children's charity, such that the jury could have
inferred that defendant, acting with intent to promote or assist in the theft, attempted to aid her husband in the theft.
Roberts v. State, 319 S.W.3d 37, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1849 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2010).
15. Because a purported forum selection clause was never offered or admitted into evidence at a hearing on pre-suit
depositions in a contract case involving foreign corporations, the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce the forum
selection clause and in authorizing the pre-suit depositions. In re Int'l Profit Assocs., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5105 (Tex.
App. Dallas June 29 2007).

16. Attorney contended that because the judge did not serve notice on the judges named at the hearing, the petition for
deposition had to be denied, but the court disagreed; the testimony never accused any of the judges of being the source
of defamatory material and the trial court was within its discretion in finding that the judges were not identified as
persons the judge expected to have an interest adverse to the judge, for purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.2(f)(2). In re
Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
17. Requirements under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 were not met here, but such deficiency was not argued as a reason to deny
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the deposition and was not argued to the court as being a defect supporting the requested relief here, for purposes of
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
18. Trial court was within its discretion in finding that the deposition was necessary to avoid a failure or delay of justice
and that the deposition's benefits outweighed its burdens; the trial court's language addressed both of the alternative
justifications for such discovery that were specified by Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4(a). In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS
8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
19. For purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, one significant factor bore on the potential for a failure or delay of justice in this
case: the statute of limitations on a defamation lawsuit by a judge against an attorney and others might run near the end
of October 2010, but it would appear that the judge was aware of the attorney's utterances but the judge did not actively
pursue relief until less than two months before expiration of limitations; furthermore, if the judge thought he had a
viable lawsuit, he could file it immediately. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8
2010).
20. Judge claimed that he did not know the identities of other potential parties and that was what he sought to determine
at the deposition; this factor would cut in favor of allowing the deposition to prevent a failure or delay of justice in the
anticipated suit. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
21. It was within the trial court's discretion to find that the benefits described, including to investigate unknown
potential parties, outweighed the burden of one, hour-long deposition. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex.
App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
22. Because the court could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a pre-suit deposition under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202, the court denied mandamus relief. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana
Oct. 8 2010).
23. Judge identified an attorney as an anticipated defendant in his action, and against others not so named in his petition;
because the order under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, this was a type of
situation in which mandamus relief could be available, if the trial court abused its discretion. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
24. Building on the foundation of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.2(f)(1), Rule 202.3(a) requires service not just on the witness, but
also, if suit is anticipated, on all persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated suit.
In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
25. Mandamus was improper, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the employee's verified
petition for pre-suit depositions of relators, when it was not at all clear to the appellate court that the employee's
potential claims, if they were indeed eventually pursued, would necessarily be brought against relators, and the
employee's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition stated that his potential claim was for slander or tortious interference with
contract, not a violation of school law or a violation of his employment contract. In re Donna Indep. Sch. Dist., 299
S.W.3d 456, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7833 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2009).
26. Appellate court dismissed a client's appeal of an order denying the client's motion to depose the client's former
attorney pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 for the purpose of filing a malpractice action where the trial court's order was
interlocutory in nature; there was no statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a deposition of a
person against whom suit was contemplated. In re Alexander, 251 S.W.3d 798, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1809 (Tex. App.
Houston 1st Dist. 2008).
27. Trial court's order, which granted a patient's petition for pre-suit discovery that sought to depose a doctor and to
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require him to produce medical records regarding a medical procedure performed by the doctor on the patient in order to
investigate a potential health care liability claim, was an abuse of discretion because it permitted discovery to be
conducted contrary to the prohibitions stated in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 74; because pre-report oral
depositions of physicians and health care providers were not allowed under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351,
pre-suit depositions were not permitted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. In re Wilner, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1870 (Tex. App.
Dallas Mar. 13 2008).
28. Retailer was not entitled to mandamus relief from a trial court's order granting a distributor's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202
petition to take an investigatory deposition because the retailer had an adequate remedy by appeal because the trial
court's order was final and appealable and an appellate court would have jurisdiction over a direct appeal filed by the
retailer because the distributor did not specifically contemplate suit against the retailer; rather, it contemplated suit
against the retailer's suppliers. In re Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9605 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Dec. 7
2007).
29. Because it was unknown whether a health care liability claim would be asserted, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 74.351 did not require a preliminary expert report before a presuit deposition could be taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202
as to a potential claim arising from an alleged sexual assault at a hospital. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
30. Because a person had not been served with a petition for presuit discovery and a notice of hearing under Tex. R. Civ.
P. 202, he could not be ordered to appear for a deposition and produce documents. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
31. Employee could not be required to produce personnel files kept by his employer on another employee because those
files were not within his possession, custody, or control; he could, however, be required to produce his own personnel
files. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
32. Petition for a writ of mandamus was conditionally granted because there was no basis for ordering a deposition
under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 where a workers' compensation adjuster testified under oath that she did not possess any of the
information sought by a worker's wife pertaining to a possible death claim. In re Campos, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5485
(Tex. App. Fort Worth July 12 2007).
33. Venue was not a basis to challenge a decision under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 relating to a worker's death because a
workers' compensation adjuster lived in the county where the action was filed, and there was conflicting evidence
regarding whether the worker's wife anticipated filing suit. In re Campos, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5485 (Tex. App. Fort
Worth July 12 2007).
34. Trial court properly denied appellant's request to take a judge's deposition because appellant cited no authority
holding that the merit of the underlying claim was to be considered in the court's benefit/burden analysis when ruling on
a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition. In re Caraway, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5131 (Tex. App. Fort Worth June 28 2007).
35. Where the trial court had taken notice of several facts regarding a judge's oath of office as a special visiting judge,
the benefit of deposing the judge was minimal, but the burden of setting up and conducting such a deposition would
have been complicated due to appellant's being incarcerated; thus, the trial court properly denied appellant's request to
take the judge's deposition. In re Caraway, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5131 (Tex. App. Fort Worth June 28 2007).
36. Where an individual's deposition was taken after final judgment had been entered and without notice to other parties
in the lawsuit, and was then attached as evidence in support of appellant's motion for new trial, Tex. R. Civ. P. 202,
which allowed for depositions in certain instances with notice only to the deponent, was not applicable, and the trial
court properly struck the deposition. Chemject Int'l, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex.
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App. Corpus Christi Jan. 25 2007).
37. Relators were not entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring a trial court to set aside its orders that a physician could
conduct four pre-suit depositions because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the findings required by
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4. In re Emergency Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 162 (Tex. App. Houston
14th Dist. 2007).
38. Investigating a potential claim or suit is one of the express purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, and a potential litigant
should be permitted to explore whether claims exist without having to file a lawsuit to do so. In re Emergency
Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 162 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2007).
39. Trial court abused its discretion by allowing pre-suit oral depositions of health care professionals as to potential
health care claims; such depositions are not allowed under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 and therefore
could not be permitted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 because the statute controls over the rule as provided in Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 74.002(a). In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 209 S.W.3d 835, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10215 (Tex.
App. Houston 14th Dist. 2006), appeal dismissed,Siddiqi v. Guzman, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10727 (Tex. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.]s Dec. 14, 2006).
40. Trial court erred in granting a request to take a doctor's oral deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 to investigate a
potential health care liability claim; even if the medical records were incomplete or inadequate, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 74.351 precluded the taking of the doctor's deposition before an expert report was filed, in accordance with
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.002, which states that the provisions of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch.
74 control over rules of procedure. In re Raja, 216 S.W.3d 404, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6558 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006).
41. Insured's petition for a discovery deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 brought against an insurer and an adjustor did
not constitute the filing of a civil lawsuit, and thus the matter was not removable under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441. Further, the
non-diverse adjustor was not fraudulently joined so that diversity jurisdiction was lacking under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332.
Davidson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654 (S.D. Tex. June 19 2006).
42. Requiring an individual to sit for a deposition and disclose information to a former employer, under oath, as to why
that person left to work for a competitor and what that person now does for the competitor, particularly when no lawsuit
has been filed, is a substantial, intrusive, expensive and time-consuming burden; allowing companies to conduct pre-suit
depositions based solely on the possibility that a lawsuit may be avoided would allow companies to use Rule 202 to
gain access to the trade secrets of competitors under the pretext of investigating suspected claims, creating a danger that
potential litigants could use Rule 202 for anti-competitive purposes. In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 2006 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4122, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (Tex. App. Austin 2006).
43. Given that (1) a company and employees had no adequate remedy on appeal because their only opportunity to
appeal the trial court's order granting depositions under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 would have occurred after the depositions
had taken place and trade secrets had been disclosed, and (2) an order under Rule 202 was not a final, appealable order,
mandamus was proper and the court reviewed the trial court's order under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Hewlett
Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4122, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (Tex. App. Austin 2006).
44. Definition of "health care liability claim" does not include a potential cause of action; thus, the stay of discovery
imposed by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) does not preclude Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 depositions, and no
conflict exists between Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. In re Allan, 191 S.W.3d
483, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3346 (Tex. App. Tyler 2006).
45. Appeal of order denying deposition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order denying the guard
services' Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition to take the pre-suit deposition of an insurance company employee was not a final,
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appealable order because it was in aid of and incident to the contemplated lawsuit against the insurance company. Not
only did the guard service seek to depose an employee of the insurance company, but it requested that the witness be
subpoenaed to produce documents clearly described as the insurance company's documents. IFS Sec. Group, Inc. v. Am.
Equity Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 560, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8923 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005).
46. Order denying the city's plea to the jurisdiction was affirmed because the trial court did have jurisdiction over the
owner's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition seeking to depose various city officials concerning allegedly unpaid water service
charges, when one of the reasons the owner expressly alleged for desiring the testimony of the city officials was to
investigate the validity of city's lien, a question over which the district court had jurisdiction; the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not preclude the district court from exercising its jurisdiction, as the owner did not seek final or even
preliminary adjudication of its claims, but rather sought only to investigate potential claims. City of Willow Park v.
Squaw Creek Downs, L.P., 166 S.W.3d 336, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3868 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2005).

47. When the trial court granted appellee's petition for on order authorizing the taking of appellant's oral deposition to
investigate a potential suit under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), the taking of the deposition was governed by the rules
applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. Therefore, appellant was subject to deposition in his county of
residence under Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b)(2)(A),(C); the trial court erred by the deposition to be conducted in a county
other than the county of appellant's residence. Beausoleil v. Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, L.L.P., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 993
(Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 11 2011).
48. When the trial court granted appellee's petition for on order authorizing the taking of appellant's oral deposition to
investigate a potential suit under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The
taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony was ancillary to the anticipated suit and not subject to interlocutory
appeal. Beausoleil v. Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, L.L.P., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 993 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 11 2011).
49. Mandamus relief was conditionally granted where a former employee sought to take a presuit deposition under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202 because the record contained no evidence; neither the employee's verified pleadings nor a letter from his
counsel was admitted. Even if they had been, pleadings were not competent evidence, and letter contained hearsay
within hearsay. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 17 2009).
50. Former employee was not required to give notice to a worker's compensation carrier of a former employer of a
petition where a pretrial deposition was filed to preserve testimony because an anticipated action was based on gross
negligence. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 17 2009).
51. Because the taking of a pretrial deposition did not interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative
agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies did not apply where a former employee sought to take such a deposition
to preserve his testimony prior to death. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler
Aug. 17 2009).
52. Court conditionally granted a surgeon's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought an order directing a trial
court to vacate its order allowing a patient to depose the surgeon in anticipation of filing a lawsuit, because although the
trial court did not violate a duty imposed on it under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, its order did not exclude inquiries of the
surgeon that were forbidden by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351. In re Temple, 239 S.W.3d 885, 2007 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8861 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2007).
53. Prohibition against pre-suit depositions provided by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 does not include a
potential cause of action; therefore, where a party seeks to depose someone regarding a "potential cause of action," Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 does not prohibit a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 deposition. In re Temple, 239 S.W.3d
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885, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8861 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2007).
54. Where an individual's deposition was taken after final judgment had been entered and without notice to other parties
in the lawsuit, and was then attached as evidence in support of appellant's motion for new trial, Tex. R. Civ. P. 202,
which allowed for depositions in certain instances with notice only to the deponent, was not applicable, and the trial
court properly struck the deposition. Chemject Int'l, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex.
App. Corpus Christi Jan. 25 2007).
55. Relators were not entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring a trial court to set aside its orders that a physician could
conduct four pre-suit depositions because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the findings required by
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4. In re Emergency Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 162 (Tex. App. Houston
14th Dist. 2007).
56. Investigating a potential claim or suit is one of the express purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, and a potential litigant
should be permitted to explore whether claims exist without having to file a lawsuit to do so. In re Emergency
Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 162 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2007).
57. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's deposition, taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1 on extremely short notice
before defendant insurer's investigation was complete, was conditionally admitted for trial on the insured's claim to
recover on a crime policy for the controller's illegal actions, pending the insurer completing the controller's deposition.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).
58. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's second deposition was only conditionally admitted, conditioned on
defendant insurer's completion of the deposition, for use at trial in the insured's action against defendant insurer to
recover on a crime policy where the insured asserted the controller's illegal actions caused the losses; while the insured
argued the second deposition was a continuation of the first deposition taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1, the second
deposition was not taken pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4 because the state court did not authorize the controller to be
deposed on the second date, and its order did not state the date of the second deposition. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l
Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).
59. Trial court's order dismissing a petition for deposition to perpetuate testimony in contemplation of a lawsuit was not
a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Thomas v.
Fitzgerald, 166 S.W.3d 746, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2649 (Tex. App. Waco 2005).

60. Trial court's order granting the former partner's request to take depositions under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 contained no
finding that the likely benefit of allowing the partner to take the requested depositions to investigate a potential claim
outweighed the burden or expense of the procedure; the trial court had no discretion to order depositions under Rule 202
without the required finding under Rule 202.4(a)(2). Patton Boggs Llp v. Moseley, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10175 (Tex.
App. Dallas Dec. 29 2011).
61. Because a person had not been served with a petition for presuit discovery and a notice of hearing under Tex. R. Civ.
P. 202, he could not be ordered to appear for a deposition and produce documents. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
62. Employee could not be required to produce personnel files kept by his employer on another employee because those
files were not within his possession, custody, or control; he could, however, be required to produce his own personnel
files. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
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63. Nacogdoches Court made the required findings when it entered its order for deposition, and the findings tracked the
language of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202; even if the appellate court were to entertain the employee's challenge, the Nacogdoches
Court conducted a hearing on the company's original petition, but a transcript of that petition was not included in the
record on appeal. Cognata v. Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4827 (Tex. App.
Houston 14th Dist. 2012).
64. Mandamus was improper, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the employee's verified
petition for pre-suit depositions of relators, when it was not at all clear to the appellate court that the employee's
potential claims, if they were indeed eventually pursued, would necessarily be brought against relators, and the
employee's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition stated that his potential claim was for slander or tortious interference with
contract, not a violation of school law or a violation of his employment contract. In re Donna Indep. Sch. Dist., 299
S.W.3d 456, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7833 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2009).
65. Trial court properly denied appellant's request to take a judge's deposition because appellant cited no authority
holding that the merit of the underlying claim was to be considered in the court's benefit/burden analysis when ruling on
a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition. In re Caraway, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5131 (Tex. App. Fort Worth June 28 2007).
66. Where the trial court had taken notice of several facts regarding a judge's oath of office as a special visiting judge,
the benefit of deposing the judge was minimal, but the burden of setting up and conducting such a deposition would
have been complicated due to appellant's being incarcerated; thus, the trial court properly denied appellant's request to
take the judge's deposition. In re Caraway, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5131 (Tex. App. Fort Worth June 28 2007).
67. In a case in which a client challenged a trial court's denial of his request to take the deposition of his former attorney
pursuant to a request filed under the authority of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), because the client was seeking discovery from
his former lawyer with an intent to file a legal malpractice case, the order of the trial court was interlocutory in nature;
because an appellate court's jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals was specified by statute, and there was no statute
authorizing interlocutory appeal from an order denying a deposition against a person suit was contemplated against, the
appellate court had no jurisdiction over the appeal, which thus it had to be dismissed. Layton v. Clark, 2007 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1632 (Tex. App. Amarillo Mar. 5 2007).
68. Appeal of order denying deposition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order denying the guard
services' Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition to take the pre-suit deposition of an insurance company employee was not a final,
appealable order because it was in aid of and incident to the contemplated lawsuit against the insurance company. Not
only did the guard service seek to depose an employee of the insurance company, but it requested that the witness be
subpoenaed to produce documents clearly described as the insurance company's documents. IFS Sec. Group, Inc. v. Am.
Equity Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 560, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8923 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005).
69. Witnesses could not challenge orders authorizing a party to take the witnesses' deposition testimony by written
questions pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 and denying the witnesses' motions to transfer venue to the county where they
resided; no statute provided for interlocutory review of such orders, and both Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
15.064 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 87 expressly disallowed interlocutory appeal of such venue determinations. In re Am. State
Bank, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6554 (Tex. App. Amarillo Aug. 16 2005).
70. Order denying the city's plea to the jurisdiction was affirmed because the trial court did have jurisdiction over the
owner's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition seeking to depose various city officials concerning allegedly unpaid water service
charges, when one of the reasons the owner expressly alleged for desiring the testimony of the city officials was to
investigate the validity of city's lien, a question over which the district court had jurisdiction; the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not preclude the district court from exercising its jurisdiction, as the owner did not seek final or even
preliminary adjudication of its claims, but rather sought only to investigate potential claims. City of Willow Park v.
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Squaw Creek Downs, L.P., 166 S.W.3d 336, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3868 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2005).

71. Attorney contended that because the judge did not serve notice on the judges named at the hearing, the petition for
deposition had to be denied, but the court disagreed; the testimony never accused any of the judges of being the source
of defamatory material and the trial court was within its discretion in finding that the judges were not identified as
persons the judge expected to have an interest adverse to the judge, for purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.2(f)(2). In re
Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
72. Requirements under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 were not met here, but such deficiency was not argued as a reason to deny
the deposition and was not argued to the court as being a defect supporting the requested relief here, for purposes of
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
73. Trial court was within its discretion in finding that the deposition was necessary to avoid a failure or delay of justice
and that the deposition's benefits outweighed its burdens; the trial court's language addressed both of the alternative
justifications for such discovery that were specified by Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4(a). In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS
8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
74. For purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, one significant factor bore on the potential for a failure or delay of justice in this
case: the statute of limitations on a defamation lawsuit by a judge against an attorney and others might run near the end
of October 2010, but it would appear that the judge was aware of the attorney's utterances but the judge did not actively
pursue relief until less than two months before expiration of limitations; furthermore, if the judge thought he had a
viable lawsuit, he could file it immediately. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8
2010).
75. Judge claimed that he did not know the identities of other potential parties and that was what he sought to determine
at the deposition; this factor would cut in favor of allowing the deposition to prevent a failure or delay of justice in the
anticipated suit. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
76. It was within the trial court's discretion to find that the benefits described, including to investigate unknown
potential parties, outweighed the burden of one, hour-long deposition. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex.
App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
77. Because the court could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a pre-suit deposition under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202, the court denied mandamus relief. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana
Oct. 8 2010).
78. Judge identified an attorney as an anticipated defendant in his action, and against others not so named in his petition;
because the order under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, this was a type of
situation in which mandamus relief could be available, if the trial court abused its discretion. In re Johnston, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
79. Building on the foundation of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.2(f)(1), Rule 202.3(a) requires service not just on the witness, but
also, if suit is anticipated, on all persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated suit.
In re Johnston, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8165 (Tex. App. Texarkana Oct. 8 2010).
80. In a businessman's slander suit against anonymous web site message board posters, as the posters could not appeal
from the trial court's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 order authorizing the web site's disclosure to the owner of the poster's names,
addresses, and phone numbers, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the posters' appeal from the order. Doe v.
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Haddock, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Mar. 29 2007).

81. Record supported dismissal for lack of prosecution, under the trial court's inherent authority, based on plaintiff's
failure to set a trial date over a nine month period without a reasonable excuse, coupled with the 42-month overall time
that the case was on file. Plaintiff argued that notice had been defective in that it had the cause number of a proceeding
under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, which had been consolidated, but the court did not consider whether notice prior to dismissal
was timely because plaintiff had the opportunity to move to reinstate. Harvey v. Wetzel, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6818
(Tex. App. Austin July 29 2004).

82. Country club's mandamus petition was conditionally granted because a trial court abused its discretion by ordering
the club to comply with its members' subpoena duces tecum and produce over five years of documents, which related to
its transactions with other individuals and had no relevance to whether it breached its contract with the specific
members. In re Woodlands Country Club, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7311 (Tex. App. Beaumont Sept. 6 2007).

83. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's deposition, taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1 on extremely short notice
before defendant insurer's investigation was complete, was conditionally admitted for trial on the insured's claim to
recover on a crime policy for the controller's illegal actions, pending the insurer completing the controller's deposition.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).
84. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's second deposition was only conditionally admitted, conditioned on
defendant insurer's completion of the deposition, for use at trial in the insured's action against defendant insurer to
recover on a crime policy where the insured asserted the controller's illegal actions caused the losses; while the insured
argued the second deposition was a continuation of the first deposition taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1, the second
deposition was not taken pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4 because the state court did not authorize the controller to be
deposed on the second date, and its order did not state the date of the second deposition. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l
Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).

85. Mandamus relief was conditionally granted where a former employee sought to take a presuit deposition under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202 because the record contained no evidence; neither the employee's verified pleadings nor a letter from his
counsel was admitted. Even if they had been, pleadings were not competent evidence, and letter contained hearsay
within hearsay. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 17 2009).
86. Retailer was not entitled to mandamus relief from a trial court's order granting a distributor's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202
petition to take an investigatory deposition because the retailer had an adequate remedy by appeal because the trial
court's order was final and appealable and an appellate court would have jurisdiction over a direct appeal filed by the
retailer because the distributor did not specifically contemplate suit against the retailer; rather, it contemplated suit
against the retailer's suppliers. In re Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9605 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Dec. 7
2007).
87. Country club's mandamus petition was conditionally granted because a trial court abused its discretion by ordering
the club to comply with its members' subpoena duces tecum and produce over five years of documents, which related to
its transactions with other individuals and had no relevance to whether it breached its contract with the specific
members. In re Woodlands Country Club, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7311 (Tex. App. Beaumont Sept. 6 2007).
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88. Petition for a writ of mandamus was conditionally granted because there was no basis for ordering a deposition
under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 where a workers' compensation adjuster testified under oath that she did not possess any of the
information sought by a worker's wife pertaining to a possible death claim. In re Campos, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5485
(Tex. App. Fort Worth July 12 2007).

89. In a businessman's slander suit against anonymous web site message board posters, as the posters could not appeal
from the trial court's Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 order authorizing the web site's disclosure to the owner of the poster's names,
addresses, and phone numbers, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the posters' appeal from the order. Doe v.
Haddock, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Mar. 29 2007).

90. When the trial court granted appellee's petition for on order authorizing the taking of appellant's oral deposition to
investigate a potential suit under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The
taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony was ancillary to the anticipated suit and not subject to interlocutory
appeal. Beausoleil v. Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, L.L.P., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 993 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 11 2011).
91. In a case in which a client challenged a trial court's denial of his request to take the deposition of his former attorney
pursuant to a request filed under the authority of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b), because the client was seeking discovery from
his former lawyer with an intent to file a legal malpractice case, the order of the trial court was interlocutory in nature;
because an appellate court's jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals was specified by statute, and there was no statute
authorizing interlocutory appeal from an order denying a deposition against a person suit was contemplated against, the
appellate court had no jurisdiction over the appeal, which thus it had to be dismissed. Layton v. Clark, 2007 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1632 (Tex. App. Amarillo Mar. 5 2007).
92. Witnesses could not challenge orders authorizing a party to take the witnesses' deposition testimony by written
questions pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 and denying the witnesses' motions to transfer venue to the county where they
resided; no statute provided for interlocutory review of such orders, and both Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
15.064 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 87 expressly disallowed interlocutory appeal of such venue determinations. In re Am. State
Bank, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6554 (Tex. App. Amarillo Aug. 16 2005).
93. Trial court's order dismissing a petition for deposition to perpetuate testimony in contemplation of a lawsuit was not
a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Thomas v.
Fitzgerald, 166 S.W.3d 746, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2649 (Tex. App. Waco 2005).

94. Order dismissing an inmate's petition to depose the trial judge that presided over his felony murder trial under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202 was properly dismissed because Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 applied only to civil proceedings, and any effort to
nullify his conviction had to be undertaken via a habeas corpus petition per Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 11.07. In re
Reger, 193 S.W.3d 922, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4734 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2006).

95. Michigan law authorized the Michigan court to order a respondent to testify for use in the Texas proceeding,
because the statute provided authority to Michigan courts to order persons in Michigan to give testimony for use in "any
proceedings" before tribunals outside Michigan; in Texas, a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1 procedure was a proceeding as defined
by Michigan law and the procedure, authorized by Texas law, provided access to Texas courts to perform specific
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judicial actions pre-suit. Ewin v. Burnham, 272 Mich. App. 253, 728 N.W.2d 463, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 2635 (2006).

96. Order dismissing an inmate's petition to depose the trial judge that presided over his felony murder trial under Tex.
R. Civ. P. 202 was properly dismissed because Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 applied only to civil proceedings, and any effort to
nullify his conviction had to be undertaken via a habeas corpus petition per Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 11.07. In re
Reger, 193 S.W.3d 922, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4734 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2006).

97. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's deposition, taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1 on extremely short notice
before defendant insurer's investigation was complete, was conditionally admitted for trial on the insured's claim to
recover on a crime policy for the controller's illegal actions, pending the insurer completing the controller's deposition.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).
98. Plaintiff insured's Brazilian controller's second deposition was only conditionally admitted, conditioned on
defendant insurer's completion of the deposition, for use at trial in the insured's action against defendant insurer to
recover on a crime policy where the insured asserted the controller's illegal actions caused the losses; while the insured
argued the second deposition was a continuation of the first deposition taken under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1, the second
deposition was not taken pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.4 because the state court did not authorize the controller to be
deposed on the second date, and its order did not state the date of the second deposition. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont'l
Cas. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60357 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25 2006).

99. Because a merchant could not have prevailed on its assertion that a credit card company breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the trial court's denials of the merchant's request for judicial notice of New York law
regarding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was harmless error. E Parts & Servs., Llc v. Am. Express Travel
Related Servs. Co., 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 545 (Tex. App. Dallas Jan. 25 2012).

100. In an action alleging breach of a partnership agreement, the trial court could reasonably order production of
purported trade secrets because information about finances and the partnership's largest customers was necessary to an
adjudication of the value of an interest in the partnership. In re West Tex. Positron, Ltd., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 496
(Tex. App. Amarillo Jan. 20 2005).

101. In determining jurisdiction for purposes of pre-suit discovery under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202, a court should look to the
substantive law respecting the anticipated suit, in accordance with the purposes and proper construction of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth in Tex. Const. art. V, § 31(b) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 1, 815, 816. City of Dallas v.
Dallas Black Fire Fighters Ass'n, 353 S.W.3d 547, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8336 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).

102. Definition of "health care liability claim" does not include a potential cause of action; thus, the stay of discovery
imposed by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) does not preclude Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 depositions, and no
conflict exists between Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. In re Allan, 191 S.W.3d
483, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3346 (Tex. App. Tyler 2006).
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103. As to a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 pre-suit discovery petition filed by police and firefighter associations in a dispute
relating to a meet and confer agreement, governmental immunity was not waived under Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §
147.007(b) because the petition was insufficiently specific to demonstrate that the associations were potentially
aggrieved; however, because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, an
opportunity to amend was appropriate. City of Dallas v. Dallas Black Fire Fighters Ass'n, 353 S.W.3d 547, 2011 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8336 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).

104. With respect to a potential health-care liability claim against some physicians, Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 depositions of
the physicians were barred by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 because the discovery restrictions of Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 applied both before and after such a cause of action was filed. In re Jorden, 249
S.W.3d 416, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 228, 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 657 (Tex. 2008).
105. In a potential health care liability claim, a doctor should not have been ordered to appear for a pre-suit oral
deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 because the patient had not served the doctor with an expert report as required by
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351; pre-report depositions were not permitted. In re Pazandak, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1769 (Tex. App. Dallas Mar. 12 2008).
106. Because it was unknown whether a health care liability claim would be asserted, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 74.351 did not require a preliminary expert report before a presuit deposition could be taken under Tex. R. Civ.
P. 202 as to a potential claim arising from an alleged sexual assault at a hospital. In re Kiberu, 237 S.W.3d 445, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 8679 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007).
107. Trial court abused its discretion by allowing pre-suit oral depositions of health care professionals as to potential
health care claims; such depositions are not allowed under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 and therefore
could not be permitted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 because the statute controls over the rule as provided in Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 74.002(a). In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 209 S.W.3d 835, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10215 (Tex.
App. Houston 14th Dist. 2006), appeal dismissed,Siddiqi v. Guzman, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10727 (Tex. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.]s Dec. 14, 2006).
108. Trial court erred in granting a request to take a doctor's oral deposition under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 to investigate a
potential health care liability claim; even if the medical records were incomplete or inadequate, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 74.351 precluded the taking of the doctor's deposition before an expert report was filed, in accordance with
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.002, which states that the provisions of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch.
74 control over rules of procedure. In re Raja, 216 S.W.3d 404, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6558 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006).
109. Definition of "health care liability claim" does not include a potential cause of action; thus, the stay of discovery
imposed by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) does not preclude Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 depositions, and no
conflict exists between Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(s) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. In re Allan, 191 S.W.3d
483, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3346 (Tex. App. Tyler 2006).

110. Because the taking of a pretrial deposition did not interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative
agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies did not apply where a former employee sought to take such a deposition
to preserve his testimony prior to death. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler
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Aug. 17 2009).

111. Former employee was not required to give notice to a worker's compensation carrier of a former employer of a
petition where a pretrial deposition was filed to preserve testimony because an anticipated action was based on gross
negligence. In re Contractor's Supplies, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 17 2009).
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OPINION
[**1]
[*863] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
PER CURIAM
In this mandamus proceeding we hold that a court
may not order pre-suit discovery by agreement of the
witness over the objections of other interested parties
without making the findings required by Rule 202.4(a) of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Philip R. Klein owns PRK Enterprises, Inc. and
Klein Investments, Inc. The two corporations

(collectively "PRK") operate or have operated a blog
called The Southeast Texas Political Review. Two
anonymous bloggers called Operation Kleinwatch and
Sam the Eagle Weblog (collectively "relators") have
criticized Klein extensively. Relators subscribe to
Blogger.com, a subsidiary of Google, Inc. (collectively
"Google"), which hosts them on the Internet. PRK
petitioned the district court under Rule 202 to order
discovery from Google of relators' identities in
anticipation of a lawsuit by Klein and PRK against
relators for copyright law violations, defamation, and
invasion of privacy. The alleged bases for such causes of
action are contained in the following five sentences of the
petition:
[Relators] have been engaged in a
pattern of libel and defamation per se,
invasion of privacy, and use of
copyrighted [**2] images (both facial and
voice image), without permission. The
purpose of these websites are to disparage,
harass and cause injury to [PRK], as well
as to [Klein] personally. These websites
host significant, false information, and
invade the privacy of [PRK] [*864]
throughout the website. For example,
without limitation, the website Operation
Klein Watch, contains false information
on legal proceedings that do not involve
either [Klein] individually or [PRK],
falsely represent that judgments have been
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taken against [PRK] and/or [Klein]
individually, falsely identify a bankruptcy
proceeding, also identify lawsuits that do
not involve [PRK] and/or [Klein]
individually. Additionally, this website
identifies all members of [Klein's] family,
for no apparent purpose other than to
invade their privacy.
Klein did not join in the petition. The petition named
Google and relators as defendants.
After being served, Google agreed with PRK that it
would respond to a subpoena duces tecum. 1
Accordingly, PRK did not ask for a hearing on the
petition. Federal law generally prohibits a "cable
operator" like Google from disclosing a subscriber's
personally identifiable information without its consent.
47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1). [**3] But there is an exception if
disclosure is ordered by a court with notice to the
subscriber. Id. § 551(c)(2)(B). Google gave relators
notice of its receipt of the subpoena. 2
1
The subpoena duces tecum commanded
production of documents described as follows:
"1. Any and all identifiers, user account IP
addresses, user access Email Addresses, user
entry logs, user posting logs, registered user
information, account access IP addresses and/or
any identifying descriptors for the following
blogspots for the previous year:
a)
http://samtheeagleusa.blogspot.com/
b)
http://operationkleinwatch.blogspot.com/
c)
http://www.notthisonetoojacques.blogspot
.com/
"2. To identify all parties, persons, or entities
responsible
for
the
website
http://operationkleinwatch.blogspot.com
and
http://samtheeagleusa.blogspot.com.
"3. Identify all persons, parties or entities
who provide contributions of money or literary
substance to these websites.
"4. Identify all persons, parties or entities

who posted comments on these websites and/or
have provided financial support to these websites.
"5. Identify all persons, parties or entities
who are in any way affiliated with, or connected
with in any capacity, these websites."
2 We [**4] do not address whether 2 Google
complied with the federal statute.
Relators moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that
the petition's allegations were insufficient to show that
PRK had a cause of action against relators, and that their
identities are constitutionally protected from disclosure.
PRK responded, arguing that the information sought was
not constitutionally protected, and moved to compel
discovery. PRK argued that to obtain the requested
discovery, it should not be required to do more than
assert a cause of action. PRK's motion was no more
specific than their petition with respect to the bases for
claims against relators. After a brief hearing, at which
relators did not appear, the trial court denied relators'
motions and granted PRK's. The court of appeals denied
mandamus relief.
Relators argue that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to comply with Rule 202. Rule
202.4(a), "Required Findings," states:
The court must order a deposition to be taken if, but
only if, it finds that:
(1) allowing the petitioner to take the
requested deposition may prevent a failure
or delay of justice in an anticipated suit; or
(2) the likely benefit of allowing the
petitioner to take [**5] the requested
deposition to investigate a potential claim
outweighs the burden or expense of the
procedure.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a). The trial court did not make
either of these findings.
[*865] PRK argues that compliance with Rule 202
was excused because of its agreement with Google. It is
true that "[e]xcept where specifically prohibited, the
procedures and limitations set forth in the rules pertaining
to discovery may be modified in any suit by agreement of
the parties . . . ." TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1. But PRK and
Google were not the only parties to the proceeding. Rule
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202.3(a) requires that "all persons petitioner expects to
have interests adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated
suit" be served with the petition and given notice of
hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.3(a). PRK asserted that
relators would be defendants in the anticipated lawsuit,
and by their motions to quash, relators made an
appearance in the proceeding. PRK and Google could not
modify the procedures prescribed by Rule 202 by an
agreement that did not include relators.
Nor can the required findings be implied in support
of the trial court's order compelling discovery. For one
thing, PRK made no effort to present the trial [**6] court
with a basis for the findings. Not only are the allegations
in its petition and motion to compel sketchy, they mostly
concern possible causes of action by Klein, who is not a
party to the proceeding. To justify noncompliance with
the requirements of Rule 202, PRK relies entirely on its
agreement with Google. More importantly, however,
Rule 202 expressly requires that discovery may be
ordered "only if" the required findings are made. The rule
does not permit the findings to be implied from support
in the record. The intrusion into otherwise private matters
authorized by Rule 202 outside a lawsuit is not to be
taken lightly. One noted commentator, Professor Lonny
Hoffman, has observed that there is "cause for concern

about insufficient judicial attention to petitions to take
presuit discovery" and that "judges should maintain an
active oversight role to ensure that [such discovery is] not
misused". Access to Information, Access to Justice: The
Rule of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 217, 273-74 (2007). We agree.
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing
to follow Rule 202. Rule 202.5 provides that use of a
deposition may be restricted or prohibited [**7] "to
prevent abuse of this rule", but that remedy for
noncompliance affords relators no relief from their
complaint that their identities not be disclosed. Thus,
relators are entitled to mandamus relief. In re Jorden, 249
S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (party to
Rule 202 proceeding has no adequate remedy on appeal if
court abused its discretion in ordering discovery that
would comprise procedural or substantive rights).
The trial court is directed to vacate its order dated
January 29, 2010, and to grant relators' motions to quash.
We are confident that the trial court will promptly
comply, and the writ will issue only if it fails to do so.
Opinion delivered: April 15, 2011
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OPINION
[*810] Original Mandamus Proceeding
OPINION
Essent PRMC, L.P. (Hospital) filed suit against ten
John Does alleging they had defamed the Hospital and
violated other laws by posting comments on an Internet
site. The trial court ordered that anonymous contributor
John Doe number one be identified by his Internet service
provider (ISP). Anonymous John Doe number one
(identified in his blog 1 as fac_p and Frank Pasquale) has
filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking this Court to
order the district court to withdraw its order directing a

third party ISP to reveal his identity to the Hospital. The
ISP, SuddenLink Communications, is not a party to the
lawsuit; Essent PRMC is the corporate identifier for Paris
Regional Medical Center. For reasons stated in the
opinion, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.
1 The term "blog" is a shorthand version of the
word "Weblog." A Weblog is an Internet Web site
that displays in chronological order the postings
by one or more individuals and usually has links
to comments on specific postings. AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006), available [**2] at
http://dictionary.com.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Hospital sued Does 1-10 alleging that Doe 1 had
set up a blog that contained many scurrilous comments
that "unfairly disparage and criticize the Hospital, its
employees and the doctors who admirably serve patients
there on a daily basis" and that his postings were
defamatory. The Hospital also alleged that some postings
to the blog had disclosed confidential patient health
information and generally complained that the postings
"are otherwise actionable under federal and state law." 2
2 The suit against Does 2-10 is not implicated
here; the trial court's order was directed solely at
the ISP, ordering it to reveal the name of Doe 1.
In that portion of the lawsuit, the Hospital alleged
that Does 2-10 had improperly revealed patient
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information by posting on the blog that might,
under the federal act known as HIPAA, make the
Hospital civilly liable to those patients or their
survivors.
Procedurally, the Hospital filed a petition against the
Does--combined with an "ex parte request to non-party to
disclose information" directed at SuddenLink, explicitly
based on 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c) (West 2001 & Supp.
2007), asking the trial [**3] court to direct SuddenLink
to disclose the identities of the Does. On the day of filing
(June 19, 2007), the court granted the motion. On July 23,
the court issued a second "agreed" order, stating that the
Hospital and SuddenLink had agreed to amend the prior
order which provided for notice to the Does with
opportunity for them to respond. If no response was
made, SuddenLink was to disclose the information.
Counsel James Rodgers appeared on behalf of the
unnamed subscriber by letter filed August 6, and
thereafter at a hearing conducted September 7. At that
time, the only information before the trial court consisted
of an unsworn petition, with no evidentiary attachments
or affidavits. No evidence was presented at the hearing,
only argument of counsel. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court allowed additional briefing to be
submitted by Wednesday of the following week.
The trial court sent a letter to counsel dated
September 14 in which, after quoting excerpts from two
cases, it found that good cause had been shown and the
"burden by plaintiff has been met to meet the
requirements of the exceptions to the Communication Act
to grant the request by Plaintiff . . . ." and directed [**4]
counsel to prepare an order for the court's signature.
On September 24, counsel for Doe 1 filed a letter
pointing out the inherent [*811] weakness of the
Hospital's case as pled, correctly noting that no
evidentiary support had been provided by the Hospital in
support of its claims and that, in the absence of any such
support, even the lowest level of review suggested by the
courts as authorizing such discovery had not been met.
Three days later, on September 27, for the first time,
counsel for the Hospital provided a petition with some
form of evidentiary support--in the form of an affidavit
from a representative of the Hospital stating that the
statements in the petition were true and attached copies of
the blog and various documents generated by the Hospital
in an attempt to bolster its breach of contract claims
against Does 2-10.

On the following Monday, October 1, the trial court
signed an order explicitly stating it had considered the
September 27 filing, as well as everything that had
previously been presented to the court, overruled Doe's
objection to the agreed order, and ordered SuddenLink to
disclose the name and address of the subscriber.
II. Requirements for Mandamus Relief
A. General [**5] Requirements
Mandamus issues only when the mandamus record
establishes (1) a clear abuse of discretion or the violation
of a duty imposed by law and (2) the absence of a clear
and adequate remedy at law. Cantu v. Longoria, 878
S.W.2d 131 (Tex. 1994); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992). Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy that will issue only to correct a clear abuse of
discretion or, in the absence of another statutory remedy,
when the trial court fails to observe a mandatory statutory
provision conferring a right or forbidding a particular
action. Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985).
With respect to the resolution of factual issues or
matters committed to the trial court's discretion, the
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court. Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals,
795 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1990). Review of a trial
court's determination of legal principles controlling its
ruling applies a much less deferential standard, since the
trial court has no discretion in determining what the law
is or applying the law to those facts. Huie v. DeShazo,
922 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tex. 1996); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at
840. Consequently, the [**6] trial court's erroneous legal
conclusion, even in an unsettled area of law, is an abuse
of discretion. Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 927-28.
B. Adequate Remedy at Law
We must initially determine whether the Relator has
another adequate remedy at law, such as a normal appeal.
Such a remedy is not inadequate merely because it may
involve more expense or delay than obtaining an
extraordinary writ. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842. A party
will not have an adequate remedy by appeal when the
appellate court would not be able to cure the trial court's
discovery error or evaluate its impact. This occurs when
the trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of
privileged information that will materially affect the
rights of the aggrieved party, such as documents covered
by the attorney-client privilege, West v. Solito, 563
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S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978), or trade secrets without adequate
protections to maintain the confidentiality of the
information, Automatic Drilling Machs., Inc. v. Miller,
515 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. 1974).

It is within our purview to determine whether the
court properly analyzed and applied the law to this
particular portion of the proceeding.
III. Standing

This situation falls squarely within that reasoning. If
discovery is allowed, then the identity of the blogger is
revealed, the damage is done, and it cannot [*812] be
rectified. Thus, mandamus is appropriate [**7] relief.
Further, a remedy by appeal may also be inadequate
when it is insufficient to protect a specific constitutional
right asserted by the relator. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925
S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996); In re Hinterlong, 109
S.W.3d 611, 621 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, orig.
proceeding). Thus, there is also irreparable harm that
would be done to the defendant's constitutional right to
anonymous free speech if we allowed discovery to
proceed without constitutionally adequate safeguards.
C. Clear Abuse of Discretion
The remaining question is whether the trial court
correctly applied the law to its ruling, and as "[a] trial
court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or
applying the law to the facts," Huie, 922 S.W.2d at
927-28; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840, the issue may be
addressed through mandamus. "Thus, a clear failure by
the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will
constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in
appellate reversal by extraordinary writ." Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 840; In re Rozelle, 229 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.
App.--San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding).
Application of the law is not limited to purely
substantive matters. The Texas Supreme [**8] Court has
in two recent cases addressed the application of
procedural rules under such a rubric, and we shall do
likewise. See In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., No. 04-1129, 247
S.W.3d 670, 2007 Tex. LEXIS 980 (Tex. Nov. 2, 2007); In
re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203 (Tex.
2004).
A failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the
law correctly, as when a discovery order conflicts with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutes an abuse
of discretion. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840; In re Kuntz,
124 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex. 2003). Therefore, a discovery
order that entirely disregards the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure is likewise an abuse of discretion.

The Hospital argues Relator, Doe 1, does not have
standing to assert this petition for writ of mandamus. It is
true Doe 1 has not been served with citation and his
appearance was in response to the court's order requiring
notice to him and allowing an opportunity to respond.
However, the rules of discovery allow any person "from
whom discovery is sought, and any other person affected
by the discovery [**9] request" to move for a protective
order. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.6(a). One of the reasons to ask
for such relief is to protect the movant from "invasion of
personal, constitutional, or property rights." TEX. R. CIV.
P. 192.6(b). A court may then make any order in the
interest of justice that denies or limits the requested
discovery. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.6(b)(1), (2). The request
of Doe 1 that his name should not be released is based on
a possible invasion of personal and constitutional rights.
We believe the rules of procedure authorize a relator to
move for such protection and hence grants standing to
bring this action. See In Re Shell E & P, Inc., 179 S.W.3d
125, 130 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2005, orig.
proceeding). We realize the trial court did not appear to
grant this relief based on any rule of discovery in the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, but as will be explained,
in failing to do so, we believe the trial court abused its
discretion.
[*813] IV. Procedural Mechanism for Obtaining
Identity
A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Hospital sought an order of discovery of the
identity of blogger Doe 1 pursuant to 47 U.S.C.A. § 551
(West 2001 & Supp. 2007), the Cable Communications
[**10] Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA).
The court's initial order to disclose was explicitly
made pursuant to the CCPA, as was its later agreed order.
The final order does not state the basis for the decision,
but it also only overrules Doe's objections to the prior
order in setting a new time line for production. It is clear
from the sequence of events that the court did consider
and believed it was properly applying the federal statute.
The CCPA generally prohibits the disclosure of
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subscriber information, but provides a safe haven for a
cable operator's disclosure of such information when
made pursuant to court order.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
a cable operator shall not disclose
personally
identifiable
information
concerning any subscriber without the
prior written or electronic consent of the
subscriber . . . .
(2) A cable operator may disclose
such information if the disclosure is-....
(B)
subject
to
subsection (h) of this
section, made pursuant to a
court order authorizing
such disclosure, if the
subscriber is notified of
such order by the person to
whom the order is directed;
....

statute to discovery by nongovernmental parties. Others
have stated that the ability to obtain a proper court order
under Section 2(B) is explicitly "subject to" the
requirements of subsection (h).
An example of a situation [**12] where a court
found the "subject to" language inapplicable to private
parties is found in Fitch v. Doe, 2005 ME 39, 869 A.2d
722 (Me. 2005), where the Maine Supreme Court held
that a Doe's argument that the statute should be read as a
whole
misapprehends the plain language of the
statute. Section 551(c)(2)(B) allows a
cable operator to disclose subscriber
information when ordered to do so by a
court. Section 551(h) imposes a stricter
burden when it is a governmental entity
seeking that information. If the
government wants the information, it must
demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. When the party seeking
information [*814] is not a governmental
entity, § 551(h) is not applicable.
Id. at 728 (citation omitted).

47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(1), (2). Subsection (h) governs a
cable operator's disclosure of subscriber [**11]
information to a governmental entity, which may only
occur pursuant to a court order, and only on proof by
clear and convincing evidence of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and the materiality of the information
sought. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(h). Subsection (h) also
provides for a contest of such claim. Id.
The first question that must be answered is whether
the federal statute incorporates the provisions in
subsection (h) (clear and convincing evidence of a
crime), which applies to governmental agencies, into
Section 2(B). The difficulty is that Section 2(B), which
allows the disclosure pursuant to a court order,
specifically states that such is "subject to subsection h"
which allows governmental entities to obtain a court
order only on showing by clear and convincing evidence
that a crime has been committed.
There is an ongoing analytical inconsistency among
the few courts that have addressed the application of this
statute. Some courts have been willing to apply the

The Maine court based its interpretation of Section
551(c)(2)(B) on an analogous holding by the Seventh
Circuit in CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redifsi, 309 F.3d 988
(7th Cir. 2002). In Redisi, the Seventh Circuit vacated a
district court order denying the defendant's discovery
request that the plaintiff, a cable operator, turn over
copies of its subscriber lists--so that the defendant could
contest the plaintiff's damage calculations based on those
lists. [**13] Id. at 996. Citing Section 551(c)(2)(B), the
Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]here is no privilege or
restriction on releasing customer records to a
non-governmental entity pursuant to a court order." Id.
Other courts have recognized that the CCPA
provides that only "a governmental entity may obtain
personally identifiable information concerning a cable
subscriber pursuant to a court order . . . ." 47 U.S.C.A. §
551(h). Further, the CCPA does not independently
authorize a private (i.e., nongovernmental entity) party's
ex parte subpoena to a cable operator. Interscope Records
v. Does 1-7, 494 F.Supp.2d 388, 390 (E.D. Va. 2007);
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1110-11
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(D. Kan. 2000).
We will follow the interpretation given by the
majority of the courts that have addressed this issue and
hold that the statute provides a sanctuary for cable
operators who disclose personal information to private
parties pursuant to a valid court order without imposing
the requirements found in subsection (h). However, we
also find that the federal statute is not a procedural
vehicle for obtaining such a court order. That must be
accomplished through some procedural device, either
state or federal, [**14] depending on the forum of the
case. In Texas state courts, the rules of discovery provide
ample methods for obtaining information from third
parties. In this case, the trial court ordered the release of
this private information without regard to any procedural
rule that would authorize such release.
Most cases involving this type of question have been
formulated under the rules of discovery applicable to that
forum. Under the federal rules, as well as our state rules,
parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3.
This is a broad-ranging ability, but is not one which
overarches all possible contests to discovery, as
acknowledged in the rules themselves. Thus, in most
cases involving Internet lawsuits based on libel or breach
of contract, the scenario is that suit is brought against a
Doe defendant, and the plaintiff at some point early in the
proceeding seeks to discover his or her identity. That
relief is sought, not through some all-controlling federal
statutory exception--but instead through the discovery
tools of that forum, as applied in balancing the right
[**15] to litigate libel with the constitutional protection
of free anonymous speech. 3
3 Some examples of discovery disputes in this
context include Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does
1 Through 20, No. MISC 03-003 3 CRB, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16277 (N.D. Cal. 2003, order)
(not designated for publication); Virologic, Inc. v.
Doe, Nos. A101571, A102811, 2004 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 8070 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2004)
(not designated for publication); La Societe Metro
Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, No.
CV030197400S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3302
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (not designated
for publication); John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884
A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (applying Delaware

procedural rules); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No.
3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 2001); No. 102063/07, In re
Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 18 Misc. 3d 185, 845
N.Y.S.2d 695, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7274 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2007); Klehr Harrison Harvey
Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No.
0425, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 1 (Phila.
Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006).
See Alvis Coatings v. Does 1-10, No. 3:04 CV
374-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30099 (W.D. N.C.
Dec. 2, 2004, order) (relying on FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) for discovery mechanism); [**16] Doe
v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1090
(D. Wash. 2001) (subpoena under FED. R. CIV.
P. 45(a)(2)); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am.
Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS
220, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000, order),
rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 261 Va. 350,
542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) ("Pursuant to Va. Code
§ 8.01-411").
See also Arista Records LLC. v. Does 1-19,
No. 07-1649 (CKK), 246 F.R.D. 28, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78416 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2007) (FED.
R. CIV. P. 45); Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-9,
No. 07-CV-00628-EWN, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25191 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2007) (FED. R. CIV. P.
45); McMann v. Doe, 460 F.Supp.2d 259, 263,
265 (D. Mass. 2006) (discussing ex parte
subpoenas under federal civil procedure,
copyright, and other statutes); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Does 1-4, No. 06-0652 SBA, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32821 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2006)
(FED. R. CIV. P. 45 and Local Rule 7-11(a)); In
re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26001(W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2001) (FED. R.
CIV. P. 27); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No.
1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (California discovery
statute).
[*815] We believe that the federal statute was not
intended or designed as a procedural [**17] vehicle to
obtain identities of subscribers to the network; the intent
of the statute is to prevent the disclosure of such names.
But an exception exists, allowing disclosure (and
therefore protecting the cable operator from liability for
wrongful disclosure) when a proper court order requires
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such disclosure. We point out that it also does not give
carte blanche to a trial court to otherwise release the
information without any further consideration. The
federal statute does explicitly require that the subscriber
be notified before such information is released.
The cases cited by the Hospital in support of the use
of the federal statute to justify issuance of the order are
not on point--they do not rely on the statute as a
mechanism of discovery, but on procedural rules from the
forum in which the case was being tried.
To the extent the trial court determined the CCPA
serves as an independent ground for justifying discovery
in this case, the trial court reached an erroneous legal
conclusion.
That does not, however, end our analysis. The next
question is whether the trial court was bound to utilize
Texas discovery procedures and abused its discretion by
failing to do so, and a corollary [**18] question of
whether there is such a procedure in our discovery rules
that would apply? Or finally, was the court free to fashion
a form of relief outside the bounds of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure?
B. Bill of Discovery
We have concluded that the order issued here was
not authorized by the CCPA itself and that no attempt
was made to comply with the traditional rules of
discovery. Did the trial court have any other basis for
issuing this order? To answer that question, it is
necessary to discuss the history and usage of the
equitable bill of discovery in Texas practice. One of the
earliest articles published in the Texas Law Review was
authored by W. S. Simkins. W. S. Simkins, Comment,
Bills of Discovery--Act of Thirty-Eighth Legislature, 2
TEX. L. REV. 98 (1923). In that article, the author called
to the bar's attention a new statute that had been enacted
by the Legislature in 1923--codified as [*816] Article
2002, which authorized a bill of discovery. In discussing
this development, the article traces the use of such an
equitable bill of discovery.
The bill of discovery originated because under the
common law adopted in Texas in 1840, parties to the suit
were incompetent to testify. To [**19] provide relief
from this rule, under the common law a bill of discovery
could be filed in chancery court and that court could
order a "full confession of the facts" which could be used

as evidence in the cause at law. But, according to the
article, after Texas provided for written interrogatories in
1846, the separate suit in chancery was unnecessary.
Then in 1858, a bill 4 was passed permitting oral
examination of the parties. Apparently that procedure was
in place until 1897 when "some lawyer, evidently having
a case which necessitated a change for his convenience,"
authored a bill preventing the taking of depositions "ex
parte" when a corporation was a party to the suit. So in
1923, the Legislature enacted Article 2002, which
allowed the trial courts to issue bills of discovery and
grant relief in accordance with the usages of courts of
equity. Id.
4 See 4 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas
1822-1897,
at
982-83,
http://texashistory.unt.edu/permalink/me
ta-pth-6730:986.
Article 2002 remained in our law until the "new"
Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1941, at which
time Article 2002 was repealed and Rule 737
incorporated its terms. Repealed by Rules of Civil
Procedure (Acts 1939, [**20] 46th Leg., p. 201, § 1).
Finally, in 1999, the rules regarding discovery were
substantially changed and Rule 737 was replaced and
limited by Rule 202. TEX. R. CIV. P. 737, repealed by
Order of Aug. 5, 1998 and Nov. 9, 1998, eff. Jan. 1,
1999; see NATHAN L. HECHT & ROBERT H.
PEMBERTON, A GUIDE TO THE 1999 TEXAS
DISCOVERY
RULES
REVISIONS
(1998),
http://adrr.com/law1/rules.htm.
So the rule now containing vestiges of the bill of
discovery has been incorporated into Rule 202. Neither
that rule, nor any other procedural rule, was used in this
proceeding. Does the trial court still retain authority to
issue such a discovery order by virtue of the common law
equitable bill of discovery? We think not.
Prior to the enactment of any statute or rule
authorizing a bill of discovery, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the issue in Cargill & Dennis v. Kountze Bros.,
86 Tex. 386, 25 S.W. 13 (1894). The court stated: "If the
courts of equity in England ever entertained bills of
discovery of this character, and if the jurisdiction became
incorporated into our system of jurisprudence by the
adoption of the common law, we are still of opinion that
it is no longer the law of this State." Id. at 400. As
mentioned [**21] earlier, the Legislature enacted a law
in 1923 specifically allowing a bill of discovery. After the
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passage of the bill of discovery statute, an opinion dealt
again with this issue. Chapman v. Leaverton, 263 S.W.
1083 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1924, writ ref'd)
(motion for rehearing overruled combined with a number
of other cases at 114 Tex. 375, 269 S.W. 1024, 1029 (Tex.
1925)). In Chapman, the court held that the Legislature's
act of reviving the bill of discovery "intended to confer
some additional remedy in favor of the plaintiff or the
judgment creditor, in order that he might discover facts
which would be advantageous to him in the furtherance
of his cause of action or in the collection of his
judgment." Id. at 1086. In denying the writ of error, the
Texas Supreme Court agreed that the Fort Worth Court of
Civil Appeals had "correctly construed" the bill of
discovery statute. 269 S.W. at 1029. [*817] This
interpretation was followed in Dallas Joint Stock Land
Bank v. State ex rel. Cobb, 135 Tex. 25, 137 S.W.2d 993
(1940), and Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 149 Tex. 416,
234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
These events demonstrate that in 1894 the Texas
Supreme Court declared that the jurisprudence of the
State [**22] of Texas did not include a common law
equitable bill of discovery. Since that time, the bill of
discovery has been available only by statutory or rule
authorization. No such general bill of discovery statute or
rule now exists; instead, the discovery process in Texas is
now thoroughly controlled by specific rules. Based on
these authorities, even if the order in this case could be
considered one pursuant to a motion for a bill of
discovery, we find that the trial court did not have
authority to grant such a discovery order other than as
sanctioned and regulated by the Texas rules for
discovery.
A trial court does, of course, have inherent power to
facilitate litigation of lawsuits and prevent abuse of
process--although that is partially promoted by, and
partially guided by, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex.
App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
Thus, between the court's "inherent power" and the
applicable rules of procedure and evidence, judges have
broad, but not unfettered, discretion in handling trials.
Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38-39 (Tex.
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). 5
5 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 270 [**23] (allowing
court discretion to permit "additional evidence" to
be offered); TEX. R. CIV. P. 286 (stating that

"[a]dditional argument may be allowed in the
discretion of the court" in event jury receives
further instructions after having retired); TEX. R.
EVID. 611(a) (giving court "reasonable control"
over interrogation of witnesses and presentation
of evidence); Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch,
538 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that court may place
some limits on voir dire examination). The trial
court's authority to dismiss for want of
prosecution stems from Rule 165a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the court's
inherent power. Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck &
Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999). "By
rule, statute, and their own inherent power, trial
courts have broad authority to sanction litigants
for specific misconduct." In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d
799, 807 n.4 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, pet. denied); see also Onstad v. Wright, 54
S.W.3d 799, 804 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, pet.
denied).
In jurisdictional contexts, the Texas Supreme Court
has consistently held that trial courts have only
such powers and jurisdiction [**24] as
are directly provided by law, and, in
addition thereto, they have such further
powers and jurisdiction as are reasonably
proper and necessary,-that is, as ought to
be inferred, from the powers and
jurisdiction directly granted.
Ex parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270, 273-74
(1939).
In the context of procedural rules involving
discovery, the Texas Supreme Court has similarly
held to the doctrine that Texas courts
have no inherent powers, either at law or
in equity, not even to originate new
process to enable parties to secure
evidence in support of their cases. . . . So
if the trial court had authority to issue the
order complained of it must be found in
the written law or it must arise by
reasonably
necessary
implication
therefrom.
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Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d
389, 393 (1950) (cited with approval in Pope v.
Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. 1969)). 6
6 "Whatever may be the powers of courts of
other States, there can be no doubt that the courts
of Texas must look to the Constitution of this
State, the enactments of the Legislature, and the
common law, for their authority to proceed as
requested in this case [to require an injured
plaintiff to submit [**25] to a physical
examination], and, if the authority did not exist at
common law, and has not been conferred by the
Constitution, nor by the statutes of this State, then
no court in Texas has the power to force any
citizen to submit to a physical examination under
such circumstances." Austin & Nw. R.R. v. Cluck,
97 Tex. 172, 77 S.W. 403, 405 (1903).
[*818] An extensive system is in place governing
procedures applicable to this situation; in the absence of
some extraordinary reason to depart from those
procedures, trial courts do not have the inherent authority
to create their own ad hoc procedures.

accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.6. Rule 176.6(d)
provides a procedure for objecting effectively to the
issuance of discovery orders under 176.6(c) (referencing
Rule 193.7). Subsection (d) states that the nonparty may
object and withhold material claimed to be privileged.
Under some circumstances, Rule 176.6(e) further allows
counsel to seek a protective order under the procedures
set out in TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.6. There is also a specific
section specifying how hearings are to be noticed, heard,
and conducted on objections and assertions of privilege.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.4. 8
8 We note that, had that procedural safeguard
been applied, the late-filed affidavits and exhibits
[**27] tendered by the Hospital post-hearing, and
four days before the order was signed, would not
have been considered. The rule requires such
evidence to be served at least seven days before
the hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.4(a).
Similarly, under TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.2(b)(5), which
sets out procedures for noticing oral depositions, if the
witness is a nonparty, the request must comply with TEX.
R. CIV. P. 205, and the nonparty's response to the request
is governed by TEX. R. CIV. P. 176 and 205.

C. The Texas Discovery Rules
Texas discovery rules provide a mechanism for an
orderly process of discovery which was not utilized in
this case. One relevant portion of the rule governing
discovery from nonparties is TEX. R. CIV. P. 205.1(c),
(d), which authorizes discovery from a nonparty by
serving a subpoena compelling production of documents
and tangible things under the rule. That rule also allows a
party to compel discovery from a nonparty by obtaining a
court order under TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.7, 202, or 204. 7
7 Rule 196.7 involves entry onto land, and is
inapplicable. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, et seq.
[**26] controls the method of obtaining
depositions to perpetuate testimony or to
investigate a potential claim. TEX. R. CIV. P.
204.1, et seq. explains how a party may obtain an
order compelling another party to submit to
physical or mental examination.
Another source of authority is TEX. R. CIV. P. 205.3,
which provides that a party may compel production from
a nonparty by serving notice and a subpoena compelling
production or inspection. Rule 205.3(d) provides that the
nonparty must respond to the notice and subpoena in

Rule 202, which supplanted the former Rule 737
relating to a bill of discovery, allows the taking of a
deposition to investigate a potential claim or suit. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 202.1(b).
The result is this: An order compelling production
could have been issued pursuant to the rules of procedure.
The mechanisms set out in the rules of discovery that
might authorize and regulate such an order (and also the
protections to the person inherent in those procedures)
were not utilized. Instead, counsel sought and originally
obtained an ex parte order entirely outside the rules,
based on the application of a statute that is not relevant to
[*819] this situation. By not attempting to follow any
rules regarding discovery, [**28] the parties and the
court were operating without rules concerning such
matters as when objections or privileges should be raised,
when evidence must be submitted, when and if a
protective order was available, and many other matters.
Finally, when no rules are employed, it is impossible to
adequately review the propriety of the actions taken by
the parties and the court.
D. Conclusion
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Texas rules provide a comprehensive procedure for
seeking discovery. They were not used, over direct
complaint by counsel for Doe 1. We have found no other
procedural basis for a trial court to issue such a discovery
order.
A trial court's ruling that requires production beyond
what our procedural rules permit is an abuse of
discretion. In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex.
2004); see, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d
813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding). Similarly, a writ
may issue where the trial court's order improperly
restricts the scope of discovery defined by the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. Lindsey v. O'Neill, 689 S.W.2d
400, 401 (Tex. 1985).
We conclude that, when a discovery order entirely
fails to apply the rules of discovery, issuance of
mandamus requiring the trial court [**29] to utilize those
rules and procedures is appropriate. 9
9
We recognize that TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1
allows the procedures and limitations set out by
the rules of discovery to be modified by
agreement, or by court order for good cause.
Neither situation exists in this case. There was no
agreement, and there was no pleading or finding
that good cause existed to modify the rules of
discovery in this suit.
Because of the unusual posture of this case, and
because of the dearth of Texas authority on this subject,
we will attempt to provide some guidance for the trial
court in applying the rules of discovery in light of the
types of constitutionally-based objections that have
already been raised to the discovery, should this matter be
presented again in this cause.
V. Constitutional Requirements for Ordering the
Disclosure of Anonymous Internet Authors
A. First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment protects anonymous speech.
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S.
182, 199-200, 119 S. Ct. 636, 142 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1999).
The Supreme Court has noted that "[a]nonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority." McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356, 115 S. Ct.
1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995). Indeed, "[u]nder our
Constitution, anonymous [**30] pamphleteering is not a

pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition
of advocacy and of dissent." Id.
First, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like
other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment. McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 342.
Second, the protections of the First Amendment
extend to the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
870, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997). "Courts
have recognized the Internet as a valuable forum for
robust exchange and debate." Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v.
Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Best
W. Int'l v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56014, 2006 WL 2091695 (D. Ariz. July 25,
2006, order).
[*820] Speech over the Internet is afforded no
lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. Reno, 521 U.S.
at 870. Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized
Internet speech by the same terms as traditional political
speech: "Through the use of chat rooms, any person with
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.
Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer." [**31] Id. at 870; see also Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) ("Anonymous internet
speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances can
become
the
modern
equivalent
of
political
pamphleteering."). 10
10
Anonymous speech has a long history,
including Alexander Hamilton's contributions to
the Federalist Papers in which he used the
pseudonymn "Publius." See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
Several courts have noted that Internet anonymity
serves a particularly vital role in the exchange of ideas
and robust debate on matters of public concern. See, e.g.,
Doe v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1092-93
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (Internet exchange of ideas "driven in
large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate
anonymously"); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,
185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The protection of
Internet speech also includes the protection of
anonymous electronic speech. See, e.g., 2themart.com
Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d at 1092 ("The right to speak
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anonymously extends to speech via the Internet.").
B. Limitations on the Right of Free Speech
The First Amendment is not intended to protect
unconditionally all forms of expression. See Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919
(1952) [**32] (libelous statements are outside the realm
of constitutionally protected speech). The right to speak
anonymously is therefore not absolute. However, this
right would be of little practical value if there was no
concomitant right to remain anonymous after the speech
is concluded. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d at 1093.
Those who suffer damages as a result of tortious or other
actionable communications on the Internet are clearly
able to seek a remedy. Therefore, while the anonymous
subscribers in this case have a First Amendment right to
anonymous speech on the Internet, that right is subject to
limitation. Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No.
03CV3218, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 340, 78
Pa. D. & C.4th 328 (Pa. D. & C. Jan. 28, 2004). The
courts must balance the right to communicate
anonymously with the right to hold accountable those
who engage in communications that are not protected by
the First Amendment. Thus, although the right to speak
anonymously "would be of little practical value if . . .
there was no concomitant right to remain anonymous" in
the face of a civil action subpoena, a civil litigant has an
interest in asserting his or her rights through the litigation
process against an anonymous [**33] tortfeasor. Id.; see
Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456. As in other venues, therefore,
anonymous (electronic) speakers may not freely defame
individuals without facing civil responsibility for their
acts. McMann v. Doe, 460 F.Supp.2d 259, 263 (D. Mass.
2006).
There are no cases in Texas directly on point. This is,
however, far from the first court to be confronted with
this problem. The common threads among the various
jurisdictions involve available means for discovery and
the proper application of that means when confronted
with a constitutional [*821] right that otherwise
prevents the information from being obtained. Thus, the
question is: When does a plaintiff have a right to discover
the identity of the writer in light of the constitutional
right to anonymous free speech?
As noted by a number of the cases referenced in this
opinion, the chilling effect on the First Amendment right
of free speech that results from making such
"confidential" information too easily accessible is

apparent. 11 The cases spend a considerable--and
appropriate--amount of time discussing the national
interest in not inappropriately restricting the free flow of
thought and discussion by unsupported threats of
litigation. [**34] However, they also acknowledge that
the anonymity of the blogger can be overcome under
certain circumstances.
11
See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the
Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84
WASH. U.L. REV. 1157 (2006); Daniel J. Solove,
A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy
in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1195
(2006).
To that extent, the cases are in accord. The point of
departure is in determining exactly how much and what
kind of proof of libel or defamation is enough to justify
cutting though the constitutional protection to allow the
identification of the anonymous contributors.
C. Quantum of Proof Required
The cases that have decided this issue range from
placing an extremely light burden (indeed, virtually no
burden at all) on the plaintiff, to requiring the plaintiff to
tender proof of its allegations that would survive a
summary judgment, or even more stringent requirements.
At least one case has essentially concluded that the mere
allegation of libel is sufficient. Alvis Coatings, Inc. v.
John Does One Through Ten, No. 3:04CV374-H, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30099 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2004). Other
cases have articulated requirements that are so weak as to
essentially [**35] require no more than allegations made
in good faith (or not in bad faith), with some evidence to
support the allegations. See Polito, 2004 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 340, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328.
We cannot agree that either of these formulations is
sufficient to survive any form of constitutional balancing.
Thus, the question becomes the degree of actual proof
that must be provided before the balance tips in favor of
piercing the constitutional shield and disclosing the
identity of the anonymous blogger.
We find ourselves more in alignment with the
formulations set out in Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458-61. See
extensive discussion about the application of this
standard in Best W. Int'l, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014,
2006 WL 2091695. The court in Cahill described the test
as: "[B]efore a defamation plaintiff can obtain the
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identity of an anonymous defendant through the
compulsory discovery process he must support his
defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion." Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
This standard does not require a plaintiff to prove its case
as a matter of undisputed fact, but instead to produce
evidence sufficient to create issues that would preclude
summary judgment.
As correctly noted in Best Western, other [**36]
courts have recognized a range of possible
showings--"ranging (in ascending order) from a good
faith basis to assert a claim, to pleading sufficient facts to
survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing of prima facie
evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment and, beyond that, hurdles even more stringent."
Best W. Int'l, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, 2006 WL
2091695, at *4; see Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
[*822] The Arizona court recognized that the
conduct was purely expressive--where in Polito a type of
harassment was involved--and that the Does were
expressing "their views on issues of interest to BWI
members and governors in a forum specifically designed
for an exchange of opinions and ideas anonymously."
The court concluded that such speech is entitled to
substantial First Amendment protection.
The district court imposed a summary judgment
standard before discovery was available to discover the
identities of the John Doe defendants. As described, the
standard does not require a plaintiff to prove its case as a
matter of undisputed fact, but instead to produce evidence
sufficient to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case.
The court opined, citing Cahill:
[T]o obtain discovery of an anonymous
defendant's [**37] identity under the
summary judgment standard, a defamation
plaintiff must submit sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case for each
essential element of the claim in question.
In other words, the defamation plaintiff, as
the party bearing the burden of proof at
trial, must introduce evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact for all
elements of a defamation claim within
plaintiff's control.
Best W. Int'l, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, 2006 WL

2091695; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 465. 12
12 In Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a public figure was not required to produce
evidence of actual malice since such proof would
be almost impossible before the author is
identified. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 ("a public
figure defamation plaintiff must only plead and
prove facts with regard to elements of the claim
that are within his control"). The failure to require
such proof has been criticized. See McMann, 460
F.Supp.2d at 267.
The actual malice requirement is an
additional level of constitutional protection that
applies only in particular circumstances for the
imposition of liability, not discovery. A rule for
identifying anonymous writers should be one of
general application rather than one attempting
[**38] to incorporate the special provision
required for unusual situations. If an actual malice
finding is required to impose liability, that will be
determined at a later stage of the proceedings.
The court noted that, because pleading standards are
so lenient, it could not conclude that the complaint was
asserted in bad faith, or that it would likely be subject to a
motion to dismiss.
Thus, if the standard for permitting
discovery of the John Doe Defendants'
identities required only good faith or the
ability to survive a motion to dismiss,
BWI's proposed discovery would be
permitted and the Defendants' First
Amendment right to anonymous speech
would be defeated. A good faith allegation
of wrongdoing, devoid of factual detail,
would suffice.
Best W. Int'l, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, 2006 WL
2091695.
The court held that:
[M]ore is needed before a defendant's
First Amendment rights may be
eliminated. The Court must examine facts
and evidence before concluding that a
defendant's constitutional rights must
surrender to a plaintiff's discovery needs.
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The summary judgment standard will
ensure that the Court receives such facts
and evidence.
Id.
We agree with this analysis. 13 The Hospital has
made several claims [*823] based not only [**39] on
defamation, but also business disparagement and other
matters. We will not attempt to express an opinion on the
merits of these arguments. We anticipate that, if this
matter is again presented to the trial court, this opinion
will provide guidance concerning the procedure to be
employed and the standard for testing the evidence.
13 Adapting the summary judgment standard to
Texas procedure, the trial court should view the
matter as if Doe 1 had filed a traditional motion
for summary judgment establishing its defense by
alleging that his identity was protected from
disclosure by virtue of the First Amendment right
of free speech. To obtain the requested discovery,

the Hospital would then be required to produce
evidence which would be sufficient to preclude
the granting of a summary judgment. See M.D.
Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28
S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) ("[t]he nonmovant has
no burden to respond to a summary judgment
motion unless the movant conclusively establishes
its cause of action or defense").
For the reasons stated, we conditionally grant the
writ of mandamus and order the trial court to vacate its
order and proceed in accordance with this opinion. We
are confident [**40] the trial court will comply, and our
writ will issue only if it does not.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: October 24, 2007
Date Decided: December 12, 2007
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OPINION
[*140]
delivered by

[**759] The opinion of the court was

FALL, J.A.D.
In this opinion, we examine the appropriate
procedures to be followed and the standards to be applied
by courts in evaluating applications for discovery of the
identity of anonymous users of Internet Service Provider
(ISP) message boards.
Information [***2] contained in postings by
anonymous users of ISP message boards can form the
basis of litigation instituted by an individual, corporation
or business entity under an array of causes of action,
including breach of employment or confidentiality
agreements; breach of a fiduciary [**760] duty;
misappropriation of trade secrets; interference with a
prospective business advantage; defamation; and other
causes of action.
Plaintiff, Dendrite International, Inc. (Dendrite), on
leave granted, appeals from an interlocutory order of the
trial court denying its request to conduct limited
expedited discovery for the purpose of ascertaining the
identity of defendant, John Doe No. 3, from Yahoo!, an
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ISP. Here, the posting of certain comments about
Dendrite on a Yahoo! bulletin board by defendant, John
Doe No. 3, forms the basis of the dispute in this appeal in
the context of a cause of action based on Dendrite's
claims of defamation. 1 We affirm the denial of
Dendrite's motion based on the conclusion of the motion
judge that Dendrite failed to establish harm resulting
[*141] from John Doe No. 3's statements as an element
of its defamation claim.
1
The complaint filed by Dendrite against a
number of fictitiously-named defendants,
including John Doe No. 3, alleged various claims
for breach of contract, defamation and other
actionable statements on the Yahoo! bulletin
board. Although the trial court issued decisions on
Dendrite's request for information concerning the
identity of all fictitiously-named defendants, this
appeal focuses solely on the court's denial of
Dendrite's application for expedited discovery
disclosing the identity of John Doe No. 3.
[***3] We offer the following guidelines to trial
courts when faced with an application by a plaintiff for
expedited discovery seeking an order compelling an ISP
to honor a subpoena and disclose the identity of
anonymous Internet posters who are sued for allegedly
violating the rights of individuals, corporations or
businesses. The trial court must consider and decide those
applications by striking a balance between the
well-established First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its
proprietary interests and reputation through the assertion
of recognizable claims based on the actionable conduct of
the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendants.
We hold that when such an application is made, the
trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake
efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the
subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure, and withhold action to afford the
fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to
file and serve opposition to the application. These
notification efforts should include posting a message of
notification of the identity discovery request to the
anonymous user on the [***4] ISP's pertinent message
board.
The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify
and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by
each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes

actionable speech.
The complaint and all information provided to the
court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether
plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action against
the fictitiously-named anonymous defendants. In addition
to establishing that its action can withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f), the plaintiff must
produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of
its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court
ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed
defendant.
[*142] Finally, assuming the court concludes that
the plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action,
the court must balance the defendant's First Amendment
right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the
prima facie case presented and the necessity for the
disclosure of the [**761] anonymous defendant's identity
to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.
The application of these procedures [***5] and
standards must be undertaken and analyzed on a
case-by-case basis. The guiding principle is a result based
on a meaningful analysis and a proper balancing of the
equities and rights at issue.
With these principles in mind, we now turn to an
analysis of Dendrite's action against John Doe No. 3 and
the trial court's decision.
Dendrite is a New Jersey corporation based in
Morristown that provides "highly specialized integrated
product and service offerings for the Pharmaceutical and
Consumer Package Goods (CPG) industries." Dendrite is
publicly traded and has offices located in 21 countries.
"The Internet is an international network of
interconnected computers[,]" providing "a unique and
wholly new medium of world-wide human
communication." Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334, 138
L. Ed. 2d 874, 884 (1997). In further describing the
Internet and the services available, the Supreme Court
noted, in part:
Individuals can obtain access to the
Internet from many different sources,
generally hosts themselves or entities with
a host affiliation . . . . Several major
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national "online services" . . . offer access
to their [***6] own extensive proprietary
networks as well as a link to the much
larger resources of the Internet. . . .
Anyone with access to the Internet
may take advantage of a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval
methods. . . .
....
The best known category of
communication over the Internet is the
World Wide Web, which allows users to
search for and retrieve information stored
in remote computers, as well as, in some
cases, to communicate back to designated
sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists
of a vast number of documents stored in
different computers all over the world. . . .
....
[*143] The Web is thus comparable,
from the reader's viewpoint, to both a vast
library including millions of readily
available and indexed publications and a
sprawling mall offering goods and
services.
From the publishers' point of view, it
constitutes a vast platform from which to
address and hear from a worldwide
audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers. Any person or
organization with a computer connected to
the Internet can "publish" information.
Publishers include government agencies,
educational
institutions,
commercial
entities, advocacy groups, and [***7]
individuals. Publishers may either make
their material available to the entire pool
of Internet users, or confine access to a
selected group, such as those willing to
pay for the privilege. "No single
organization controls any membership in
the Web, nor is there any single
centralized point from which individual
Web sites or services can be blocked from
the Web."

[Id. 521 U.S. at 850-53,
117 S. Ct. at 2334- 36, 138
L. Ed. 2d at 884-86.
(citations and footnotes
omitted).]

Yahoo! is an ISP that, among other things, provides a
service where users may post comments on bulletin and
message boards related to the financial matters of
particular companies. Yahoo! maintains a message board
for every publicly-traded company and permits anyone to
post messages on it. As such, Yahoo! operates a bulletin
board specifically devoted to Dendrite, [**762] hosting
exchanges of messages and comments about issues
related to the company's stock performance. Generally,
users of the bulletin boards post messages anonymously
under pseudonyms. Yahoo! requires, however, that users
provide identifying information, including real names,
mailing addresses, and e-mail addresses prior to using the
[***8] service. Nonetheless, Yahoo! guarantees to a
certain extent that information about the identity of their
individual subscribers will be kept confidential. Yahoo!'s
privacy policy states that:
As a general rule, Yahoo! will not
disclose any of your personally
identifiable information except when we
have your permission or under special
circumstances, such as when we believe in
good faith that the law requires it or under
the circumstances described below.
....
Yahoo! may also disclose account
information in special cases when we have
reason to believe that disclosing this
information is necessary to identify,
contact or bring legal action against
someone who may be violating Yahoo!'s
Terms of Service or may be causing injury
to . . . anyone . . . that could be harmed by
such activities.

[*144] The postings by John Doe No. 3 on the
Yahoo! Dendrite message board must be viewed in the
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following context. Dendrite filed its Quarterly Report for
the second quarter of 1999 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in August of 1999. In this
report, Dendrite stated:

of recognizing revenue. Sometime after the [*145]
CFRA report was released Dendrite responded, denying it
changed its revenue [**763] recognition policy as
asserted in the CFRA report.

Historically, we have generally
recognized license fees as revenue using
the percentage of completion method
[***9] over a period of time that begins
with execution of the license agreement
and ends with the completion of initial
customization and installation, if any.
However, we believe that with some of
our newer sales force software products,
such as, ForcePharma and SalesPlus, our
customers will not require customization
and therefore we may be able to recognize
license fees from these products upon
delivery.

During the period from March 14, 2000 through June
2, 2000 John Doe No. 3, posted nine comments on the
Yahoo! Dendrite bulletin board under the pseudonym
"xxplrr." Three of these comments related to purported
changes in Dendrite's revenue recognition accounting.
Specifically, these comments included the following:

Following the release of this report, several stock
analysts commented on the disclosures therein. The
Center for Financial Research and Analysis, Inc. (CFRA)
issued a report in September 1999 specifically addressing
what it characterized as Dendrite's "Change in Revenue
Recognition." The CFRA report concluded that due to the
apparent change indicated in its Quarterly Report,
Dendrite's revenue recognition would provide an earnings
boost and was actually one of the reasons for Dendrite's
then-improved financial condition. Further, the CFRA
report opined that the associated earnings boost may have
"masked weaknesses in the company's core segment."
An Internet website, "TheStreet.com," published a
similar article concerning Dendrite in September 1999,
also responding to Dendrite's Quarterly [***10] Report.
There, TheStreet.com noted several "red flags" about
Dendrite, including its "more aggressive recognition of
revenue." The author of the article stated that this change
in Dendrite's revenue recognition policy "could mean
more revenue up front."
Thereafter, at least two users of the Yahoo! Dendrite
bulletin board mentioned the CFRA report and the article
from TheStreet.com in respective postings. On September
21, 1999 one poster, citing the CFRA report, commented
on Dendrite's purported accounting and operational
problems. On September 22, 1999 another poster, citing
TheStreet.com article, noted changes in Dendrite's policy

John's [(Dendrite president John Bailye)]
got his contracts salted [***11] away to
buy another year of earnings--and note
how they're changing revenue recognition
accounting to help it.
....
Bailye has his established contracts
structured to provide a nice escalation in
revenue. And then he's been changing his
revenue-recognition accounting to further
boost his earnings (see about 100 posts
back).
....
[Dendrite] signed multi-year deals
with built in escalation in their revenue
year-over-year (pharma cares most about
total price of the contract, so they don't
care; nor do they care if the price is in
software or services). They also have been
able to restructure their contracts with
Pfizer and Lilly the same way.

The certification of Dendrite Vice President, R.
Bruce Savage, submitted in support of Dendrite's
discovery application, asserts that the substance of these
statements are categorically false, specifically averring
that Dendrite did not change its revenue recognition
policy, nor are Dendrite's contracts structured to defer
income.
Dendrite also takes issue with the following March
28, 2000 posting by John Doe No. 3:
[Dendrite] simply does not appear to be
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competitively moving forward. John
[Bailye, Dendrite's president] [***12]
knows it and is shopping hard. But Siebel
and SAP already have turned him down.
Hope Oracle does want in bad (and that's
why they'll get). But it doesn't help job
prospects in Morristown any does it?
Dendrite contends this statement falsely asserts Dendrite
was secretly and unsuccessfully "shopping" the company.
Dendrite states John Doe No. 3's claims that Dendrite is
not competitive, that its president is aware of this and is
trying to sell the [*146] company, and that the company
is not desirable to potential purchasers, are all false.
In light of these statements, and those posted by
other Yahoo! bulletin board users, Dendrite filed a
verified complaint on May 24, 2000 against numerous
fictitiously-named John Doe defendants, including John
Doe No. 3. The complaint alleged that certain postings on
the Yahoo! Dendrite bulletin board constituted breaches
of contract, defamatory statements and misappropriated
trade secrets. Relevant to this appeal, the complaint
alleged that the aforementioned messages posted by John
Doe No. 3 defamed Dendrite and misappropriated trade
secrets. 2
2 In this appeal, Dendrite bases its application
seeking disclosure of John Doe No. 3's identity on
its contention that John Doe No. 3's posted
messages constitute actionable defamation.
[***13] Since most participants on the Yahoo!
Dendrite bulletin board identified themselves through the
use of pseudonyms unrelated to their actual identities,
Dendrite sought an order to show cause why Dendrite
should not be granted leave to conduct limited discovery
for the purpose of ascertaining the true identity of the
John [**764] Doe defendants Nos. 1 through 4.
Accordingly, on June 20, 2000 the trial court issued an
order directing these John Doe defendants to show cause
why the relief requested by Dendrite should not be
granted. The order further directed that this same notice
be posted on the Yahoo! Dendrite bulletin board.
In the interim, the Public Citizen Litigation Group of
Washington, D.C. filed a motion for leave to file a brief
as amicus curiae. The trial court granted the motion and
permitted the organization's participation.
On July 28, 2000 the motion judge heard argument

on the order to show cause. At the close of argument, the
judge reserved decision on Dendrite's motion to compel
discovery purportedly necessary to identify these John
Doe defendants.
On November 23, 2000, the motion judge issued a
detailed written opinion, granting Dendrite's motion to
conduct limited [***14] [*147] discovery to ascertain
the identities of John Doe defendants Nos. 1 and 2, but
denied the motion as to John Doe defendants Nos. 3 and
4. In reaching his decision, the judge stated, in pertinent
part:
The Court has been called upon to
balance an individual's right to
anonymously voice their opinions against
a plaintiff's right to confront his accusers. .
. . Dendrite has not made a prima facie
case of defamation against John Doe No.
3, as Dendrite has failed to demonstrate
that it was harmed by any of the posted
messages. Dendrite has also failed to
provide this Court with ample proof from
which to conclude that John Does Nos. 3
and 4 have used their constitutional
protections in order to conduct themselves
in a manner which is unlawful or that
would warrant this Court to revoke their
constitutional protections. Therefore,
Dendrite's request for limited expedited
discovery, including the issuance of a
commission to take discovery out-of-state
is denied.
The conclusions of the judge were memorialized in an
order executed on December 13, 2000.
By order entered on January 31, 2001, we granted
Dendrite's motion for leave to appeal from that portion of
the December 13, 2000 order [***15] denying limited
discovery as to John Doe No. 3.
On appeal, Dendrite presents
arguments for our consideration:

the

following

POINT I
DISCOVERY OF THE IDENTITIES
OF
FICTITIOUS
NAMED
DEFENDANTS
IS
PERMISSIBLE
UNDER BLACK LETTER NEW
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JERSEY LAW.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S
DEFAMATION
CLAIM AGAINST JOHN DOE NO. 3
CAN WITHSTAND A DISMISSAL
MOTION
AND,
ACCORDINGLY,
DISCOVERY OF HIS IDENTITY IS
WARRANTED.
A. Dendrite Adequately Plead Harm
to Survive a Motion to Dismiss.
B. As a Matter of Pleading, Dendrite
Is Not Required to Allege Harm.
C. The Lower Court Erred to the
Extent It Used a De Facto Summary
Judgment Standard to Reject Dendrite's
Defamation Claim.
POINT III
JOHN DOES ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO SPECIAL DISCOVERY RULES TO
PREVENT
PLAINTIFF
FROM
DISCOVERING THEIR IDENTITIES.
A. Defendants Are Not Entitled to
Imposition of an Unduly Burdensome
Proof Standard at the Initial Stage of This
Lawsuit. [**765]
B. Requests for Disclosure of
Defendants' True Identities Are Granted
Routinely in Similar Cases Involving
Subpoenas to Internet Service Providers.
C. Defendants Receive Little or No
Privacy in Exchange for Their Use of
Yahoo's Financial [***16] Bulletin Board
and Other Services.
[*148] D. Defendant's Tortious
Conduct Is Not Protected by the First
Amendment and Does Not Warrant
Imposition of Any Special Discovery
Rules.

It is well-established that rights afforded by the First

Amendment remain protected even when engaged in
anonymously. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Found., 525 U.S. 182, 197-99, 119 S. Ct. 636, 645-46,
142 L. Ed. 2d 599, 609-10 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 426 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80
S. Ct. 536, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960).

Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures
and even books have played an important
role in the progress of mankind. Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. at 64, 80 S. Ct. at
538. Great works of literature have
frequently been produced by authors
writing under assumed names. Despite
readers' curiosity and the public's interest
in identifying the creator of a work of art,
an author generally is free to decide
whether or not to disclose his or her true
identity. The decision in favor of
anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official [***17] retaliation,
by concern about social ostracism, or
merely by a desire to preserve as much of
one's privacy as possible. Whatever the
motivation may be, at least in the field of
literary endeavor, the interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace
of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
public interest in requiring disclosure as a
condition of entry. Accordingly, an
author's decision to remain anonymous,
like other decisions concerning omissions
or additions to the content of a
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment.
[McIntyre, supra, 514 U.S. at 341-42,
115 S. Ct. at 1516, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 436.]

In Buckley, supra, 525 U.S. at 197-98, 119 S. Ct. at
645-46, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 606-08, the Court addressed a
Colorado statute that required distributors of political
petitions campaign materials to wear identifying badges
and file affidavits disclosing their identity. There, the
Court found the requirement that petitioners wear
identifying badges was prohibitively burdensome on a
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person's right to anonymously exercise First Amendment
rights. Id., 525 U.S. at 200, 119 S. Ct. at 646, 142 L. Ed.
2d at 614-15. [***18] Specifically, the Court concluded
that "[t]he badge requirement discourages participation in
the petition circulation process by forcing name
identification without sufficient cause." Ibid.
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra,
the Supreme Court made it clear that First Amendment
Protections extend to speech on the Internet. 521 U.S. at
885, 117 S. Ct. at 2351, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 906.
[*149] New Jersey's State Constitution affords
even greater protection to persons' rights to free speech
than does our federal Constitution, specifically providing:

Every Person may freely speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that
right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press. In all prosecutions or indictments
for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury; and if it [**766]
shall appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libelous is true, and was
published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
[N.J. Const., Art. 1, par. 6.]
Our Supreme [***19] Court has held that the rights
attendant to this provision are "the most substantial in our
constitutional scheme." Green Party of New Jersey v.
Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 144, 752 A.2d
315 (2000) (quoting, New Jersey Coalition Against War
in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. 326, 364,
650 A.2d 757 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812, 116 S.
Ct. 62, 133 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1995).) In fact, "the reach of our
constitutional provision [is] affirmative. Precedent, text,
structure, and history all compel the conclusion that the
New Jersey Constitution's right of free speech is broader
than the right against governmental abridgement of
speech found in the First Amendment." Coalition, supra,
138 N.J. at 352, 650 A.2d 757. Our Supreme Court has
further clarified that our "State right of free speech is
protected not only from abridgment by government, but

also from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive
conduct by private entities." Id. at 353, 650 A.2d 757.
Assuming John Doe No. 3's statements are lawful,
they would be afforded Constitutional protection, both
under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution
and our [***20] New Jersey Constitution. Accordingly,
the discovery of John Doe No. 3's identity largely turns
on whether his statements were defamatory or not.
"The key principle in defamation/free expression
cases is the 'profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open[.]'" Sedore v.
Recorder Pub. Co., 315 N.J. Super. 137, 146, 716 A.2d
[*150] 1196 (App.Div.1998) (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721, 11
L. Ed. 2d 686, 701 (1964).) "The law of defamation exists
to achieve the proper balance between protecting
reputation and protecting free speech." Ward v.
Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 528, 643 A.2d 972 (1994);
Sedore, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 146, 716 A.2d 1196.
"Thus, the purpose of the law of defamation is to strike
the right balance between protecting reputation and
preserving free speech." Lynch v. New Jersey Educ.
Ass'n, 161 N.J. 152, 166, 735 A.2d 1129 (1999).
Dendrite argues on appeal that the motion judge
imposed an inappropriate burden of proof when he
evaluated whether Dendrite's claim could withstand a
motion to dismiss. [***21] Dendrite asserts this burden
of proof is contrary to the recognized standards
applicable to motions to dismiss, which require a judge to
look liberally upon a complaint at the pleading stage.
Moreover, Dendrite contends harm is not an element that
must be pled in a defamation action, and if it is a required
element of the pleading, then it has in fact sufficiently
pled that element.
In light of free speech and defamation
considerations, as well as the fact that the Internet played
a role in this dispute, the motion judge relied on the case
of Columbia Ins. Co., v. Seescandy.Com, 185 F.R.D. 573
(N.D.Cal.1999) to resolve whether he should permit
Dendrite to conduct discovery to ascertain John Doe No.
3's identity. In Seescandy.Com, the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of California addressed whether
it should authorize limited discovery so that plaintiff
could ascertain defendant's identity so as to effectuate
service. Id. at 575. There, the unknown defendant had
registered an Internet domain name, "seescandy.com." Id.
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at 575-76. Plaintiff, the assignee of various [**767]
trademarks related to the operation of "See's [***22]
Candy Shops, Inc.", sued the unknown defendants
alleging that in registering that domain name the
unknown defendant infringed on federally registered
trademarks. Id. at 576. However, the actual identity of the
defendant who registered the domain name was unknown
to plaintiff.
[*151] Although the Seescandy.Com case did not
implicate defendant's free speech rights, as alleged here,
the District Court recognized the unique circumstances
created by the advent of the Internet and noted the
following in regards to disclosing the identity of
unknown Internet users:
With the rise of the Internet has come
the ability to commit certain tortious acts,
such
as
defamation,
copyright
infringement, and trademark infringement,
entirely on-line. The tortfeasor can act
pseudonymously or anonymously and may
give fictitious or incomplete identifying
information. Parties who have been
injured by these acts are likely to find
themselves chasing the tortfeasor from
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP,
with little or no hope of actually
discovering the identity of the tortfeasor.
In such cases the traditional
reluctance for permitting filings against
John Doe defendants or fictitious names
[***23] and the traditional enforcement
of strict compliance with service
requirements should be tempered by the
need to provide injured parties with a
forum in which they may seek redress for
grievances. However, this need must be
balanced against the legitimate and
valuable right to participate in online
forums anonymously or pseudonymously.
People are permitted to interact
pseudonymously and anonymously with
each other so long as those acts are not in
violation of the law. This ability to speak
one's mind without the burden of the other
party knowing all the facts about one's
identity can foster open communication
and robust debate. Furthermore, it permits

persons to obtain information relevant to a
sensitive or intimate condition without
fear of embarrassment. People who have
committed no wrong should be able to
participate online without fear that
someone who wishes to harass or
embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit
and thereby gain the power of the court's
order to discover their identity.
[Id. at 578 (footnote omitted).]

In light of the particularly unique arena of discussion
and communication created by the Internet forum, the
District Court imposed certain [***24] limiting
principles on "whether discovery to uncover the identity
of a defendant is warranted" under such circumstances.
Id. at 578. The court outlined a four-prong approach to
this issue seeking to "ensure that this unusual procedure
will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in
good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a
civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of this
method to harass or intimidate." Ibid.
"First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party
with sufficient specificity such that the Court can
determine that defendant is a real person or entity who
could be sued in federal court." Ibid. Second, plaintiff
must "identify all previous steps taken to [*152] locate
the elusive defendant" to demonstrate that plaintiffs have
made a good-faith effort to comply with the requirements
of service of process. Id. at 579. Third, and most relevant
to this appeal, "plaintiff should establish to the Court's
satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could
withstand a motion to dismiss." Ibid. Fourth, the moving
"plaintiff should file a request for discovery [**768] with
the Court, along with a statement [***25] of reasons
justifying the specific discovery requested as well as
identification of a limited number of persons or entities
on whom discovery process might be served and for
which there is a reasonable likelihood that the discovery
process will lead to identifying information about
defendant that would make service of process possible."
Id. at 580.
Relying on Seescandy.Com, the motion judge
reasoned that Dendrite did not satisfy the third prong-the
ability to withstand a motion to dismiss-because it failed
to make out a prima facie case of defamation against John
Doe No. 3. Accordingly, the judge concluded Dendrite
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was not entitled to conduct limited discovery to ascertain
the identity of John Doe No. 3. Specifically, the judge
found Dendrite failed to show that the statements posted
by John Doe No. 3 caused Dendrite any harm. 3 Dendrite
contends the motion judge imposed an excessively
demanding burden of proof, generally not required when
defending a motion to dismiss.
3
The judge found the first prong satisfied
because "the assumption that this court has
jurisdiction and that venue is proper is not
unfounded, and, without evidence to the contrary,
jurisdiction will be presumed." Regarding the
second prong he found "Dendrite has not provided
the Court with any previously taken steps aimed
at locating the defendants[;]" however, the judge
reasoned Dendrite could not have been expected
to know they were supposed to attempt to identify
the defendants on their own since he had just
invoked the Seescandy.Com test. Lastly, the judge
made no findings concerning the fourth prong of
the test.
[***26] Dendrite cites to Printing Mart-Morristown
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 563 A.2d 31
(1989) to support this contention. There, our Supreme
Court reviewed, in part, whether we properly upheld
dismissal of a plaintiff's defamation claim for a failure to
state a cause of action. Id. at 744, 563 A.2d 31. The
[*153] Court initially established that the review of
plaintiffs' pleadings on a motion to dismiss are entitled to
deference, stating:
We approach our review of the judgment
below mindful of the test for determining
the adequacy of a pleading: whether a
cause of action is "suggested" by the facts.
In reviewing a complaint dismissed under
Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is limited to
examining the legal sufficiency of the
facts alleged on the face of the complaint.
However, a reviewing court "searches the
complaint in depth and with liberality to
ascertain whether the fundament of a
cause of action may be gleaned even from
an obscure statement of claim, opportunity
being given to amend if necessary." At
this preliminary stage of the litigation the
Court is not concerned with the ability of
plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained

in the complaint. For purposes [***27] of
analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every
reasonable inference of fact. The
examination of a complaint's allegations of
fact required by the aforestated principles
should be one that is at once painstaking
and undertaken with a generous and
hospitable approach.
[116 N.J. at 746, 563 A.2d 31
(citations omitted).]
The Court reversed, finding three of six contested
statements made by defendants were "open to a
defamatory meaning and actionable on their face." Id. at
766, 563 A.2d 31. Those three statements asserted
plaintiffs were (1) "'ripping off'" clients; (2) plaintiffs
"'were not qualified to do the work for defendant . . . (if
stated as fact rather than merely as opinion, an issue to be
determined at trial)"; and (3) that plaintiffs "did
unreasonably-priced, inadequate work." Ibid. The Court
found the import of these statements to be clear, and
[**769] concluded "that those statements could not be
held as a matter of law to be not defamatory." Id. at
766-67, 563 A.2d 31.
Dendrite's verified complaint alleges, in relevant
part, the following:
46. Defendants' publication of these
statements has caused irreparable harm to
Dendrite for which Dendrite has [***28]
no adequate remedy at law, and will
continue to cause such irreparable harm
unless restrained by this Court. In
addition, as a proximate result of
defendants'
publication
of
these
statements, Dendrite has sustained harm to
its business reputation resulting in
damages in an amount to be proven at
trial, and Dendrite will continue to suffer
additional damages in the future according
to proof.
47. Dendrite is informed and believes,
and thereon alleges, that defendants'
publication of these statements was
willful, malicious and oppressive, in that
they intended to harm the business
reputation of Dendrite. These acts,
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therefore, justify awarding of punitive
damages.
[*154] In addition, the complaint highlights the postings
made by John Doe No. 3, which asserted Dendrite had
changed its revenue recognition policy and that Dendrite
was "shopping" the company.
Dendrite
argues
that
in
applying
the
motion-to-dismiss standard, the motion judge ignored the
Court's direction to review pleadings on motions to
dismiss with liberality and generosity and, instead,
applied a de facto summary judgment standard. Dendrite
asserts the judge mistakenly concluded that Dendrite
must prove "actual reputational [***29] injury" in its
complaint.
Our review of the motion judge's analysis of the
harm/injury element of Dendrite's defamation claim
reveals he required more evidentiary support for the
pleading than is traditionally required when applying
motion-to-dismiss standards. The judge relied on
McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J.
Super. 303, 751 A.2d 1066 (App.Div.2000), as the basis
for outlining the requirement for a defamation cause of
action. However, it is clear the judge implemented an
analysis that relied on more than a motion-to-dismiss
standard, stating:
It is not obvious that the statements at
issue are false or that Dendrite has been
harmed. Dendrite has failed to show that
the messages in question in any way
harmed Dendrite. Although Dendrite
alleges that it has been harmed and that it
will continue to be harmed by the
defendants' statements, saying it is so does
not make the alleged harm a verifiable
reality. In his reply certification, Michael
Vogel, Dendrite's counsel, attempts to link
the messages posted in this case to a drop
in Dendrite's stock price. . . . Furthermore,
Mr. Vogel has not purported to be an
expert in the field [***30] of stock
valuation and analysis, thus, he cannot
draw the conclusion that the fluctuations
in Dendrite's stock prices are anything
more than coincidence.
Despite the fact that Plaintiff is

entitled to every reasonable inference of
fact in this analysis of whether a case
against John Doe No. 3 could survive
dismissal, the Court will not take the leap
to linking messages posted on an Internet
message board regarding individual
opinions, albeit incorrect opinions, to a
decrease in stock prices without something
more concrete.
[(Emphasis added).]

This analysis reveals that the motion judge engaged
in a more probing review of Dendrite's complaint and
pleadings than outlined in Printing Mart, requiring
specific [**770] proof establishing Dendrite's harm as an
element of its defamation claim. The judge [*155] found
Dendrite had not established that fluctuations in its stock
prices were a result of John Doe No. 3's postings, and
could not find any nexus between the postings and the
drop in Dendrite's stock prices.
"In the case of a complaint charging defamation,
plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to identify the
defamatory words, their utterer and the fact of their
publication." [***31] Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 212
N.J. Super. 83, 101, 514 A.2d 53 (App.Div.), certif.
denied, 107 N.J. 32, 526 A.2d 126 (1986). Here, Dendrite
has (1) identified the "revenue recognition" and
"shopping" statements as purportedly defamatory words,
(2) identified "xxplrr" (John Doe No. 3) as the utterer,
and (3) established that they were in fact published on
Yahoo!'s bulletin board. Accordingly, Dendrite meets the
bare minimum requirements for a defamation cause of
action, and would survive a motion to dismiss under the
traditional application of R. 4:6-2(e).
However, application of our motion-to-dismiss
standard in isolation fails to provide a basis for an
analysis and balancing of Dendrite's request for
disclosure in light of John Doe No. 3's competing right of
anonymity in the exercise of his right of free speech.
We first note that the motion judge was not presented
with an actual motion to dismiss and, as such, was not
necessarily bound to a dogmatic application of the
associated rules. Nonetheless, the third prong of the
Seescandy.Com test requires a showing that plaintiff's
claim would survive a motion to dismiss. However, a
closer analysis discloses [***32] that the District Court
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distinguished the actual application of the third prong of
the test from the traditional application of a
motion-to-dismiss standard, stating:

Pre-service discovery is akin to the
process
used
during
criminal
investigations to obtain warrants. The
requirement that the government show
probable cause is, in part, a protection
against the misuse of ex parte procedures
to invade the privacy of one who has done
no wrong. A similar requirement is
necessary here to prevent abuse of this
extraordinary application of the discovery
process and to ensure that plaintiff has
standing to pursue an action against
defendant.
[Seescandy.Com, supra, 185 F.R.D. at
579-80.]

[*156] Probable cause as it relates to obtaining
warrants is a non-technical, flexible concept that does not
require rigid, "technical demands for specificity and
precision[.]" State v. Boyd, 44 N.J. 390, 392-93, 209 A.2d
134 (1965); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918
(1996). The District Court added that by equating this
prong to the probable cause requirement for warrants,
"plaintiff must make [***33] some showing that an act
giving rise to civil liability actually occurred and that the
discovery is aimed at revealing specific identifying
features of the person or entity who committed the act."
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
In fact, the literal reading of the third prong of the
Seescandy.Com test, as worded by the District Court,
supports such a flexible, non-technical application of the
motion to dismiss standard. Specifically, the third prong
provides "plaintiff should establish to the Court's
satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could
withstand a motion to dismiss." Seescandy.Com, supra,
185 F.R.D. at 579 (emphasis added). The court
characterized the four-prong test as "safeguards,"
necessary to "prevent [plaintiffs from] harrass[ing]
[**771] or intimidat[ing]" anonymous persons on the
Internet. Ibid.

Our review of Seescandy.Com discloses that a strict
application of our rules surrounding motions to dismiss is
not the appropriate litmus test to apply in evaluating the
disclosure issue. We conclude that the District Court
envisioned this four-part test to act as a flexible,
non-technical, fact-sensitive mechanism for courts to use
as a [***34] means of ensuring that plaintiffs do not use
discovery procedures to ascertain the identities of
unknown defendants in order to harass, intimidate or
silence critics in the public forum opportunities presented
by the Internet.
Analogous circumstances were recently presented to
the Virginia Circuit Court in In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc.,52 Va. Cir. 26, 2000 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 220, 2000 WL 1210372, *1 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2000). There, a publicly traded company sought and
obtained an order from an Indiana court authorizing
plaintiff to conduct discovery in [*157] order to
ascertain the identities of certain John Does who posted
allegedly defamatory comments on a stock-trading
Internet chat room maintained by America Online (AOL).
AOL refused to voluntarily comply with the order to
disclose its subscribers' identities, contending disclosure
of the subscribers' identities pursuant to the subpoena
would impair the subscribers' First Amendment rights to
speak anonymously. Id. at *2. Ultimately, the circuit
court ordered AOL to disclose the identities, establishing
a test functionally similar to that put forth in
Seescandy.Com, as follows:

[A] court should only order a
non-party, Internet [***35] service
provider
to
provide
information
concerning the identity of a subscriber (1)
when the court is satisfied by the
pleadings or evidence supplied to that
court (2) that the party requesting the
subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis
to contend that it may be the victim of
conduct actionable in the jurisdiction
where suit was filed and (3) the
subpoenaed identity information is
centrally needed to advance that claim.
[Id. at *8.]
The test created by the Virginia Circuit Court departed
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from that state's traditional legal standard applied when
ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena. Id. at *2, *7.
Although the Circuit Court ordered disclosure of the
identities of the John Doe defendants, it found a more
probing evaluation into the "bona fides of [plaintiff's]
claim was necessary in order to properly evaluate the
reasonableness of the subpoena request in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Id. at *8.
The Virginia case supports the notion that when
evaluating a plaintiff's request to compel an ISP to
disclose the identity of a John Doe subscriber, courts may
depart from traditionally-applied legal standards in
analyzing the appropriateness of [***36] such disclosure
in light of the First Amendment implications.
Here, although Dendrite's defamation claims would
survive a traditional motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action, we conclude the motion judge
appropriately reviewed Dendrite's claim with a level of
scrutiny consistent with the procedures and standards we
adopt here today and, therefore, the judge properly found
Dendrite should not be permitted to conduct limited
discovery [*158] aimed at disclosing John Doe No. 3's
identity. Moreover, the motion judge's approach is
consistent with the approach by both the District Court in
Seescandy.Com, and by the Virginia Circuit Court in the
America Online decision.
A defamatory statement is one that is false and 1)
injures another person's reputation; 2) subjects the person
to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or 3) causes [**772]
others to lose good will or confidence in that person.
Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 289, 537 A.2d 284
(1988). A defamatory statement harms the reputation of
another in a way that lowers the estimation of the
community about that person or deters third persons from
associating or dealing with him. McLaughlin v. Rosanio,
supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 312, 751 A.2d 1066; [***37]
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977). "Words that
clearly denigrate a person's reputation are defamatory on
their face and actionable per se." Printing
Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 765, 563 A.2d 31.
When determining if a statement is defamatory on its face
"a court must scrutinize the language 'according to the
fair and natural meaning which will be given it by
reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence.'" Ibid.
(quoting Romaine, supra, 109 N.J. 282 at 290, 537 A.2d
284). A plaintiff does not make a prima facie claim of
defamation if the contested statement is essentially true.

Hill v. Evening News Co., 314 N.J. Super. 545, 552, 715
A.2d 999 (App.Div.1998).
The motion judge determined that Dendrite failed to
demonstrate the statements posted by John Doe No. 3
caused it any harm. The certification of Dendrite Vice
President, Bruce Savage alleges John Doe No. 3's
postings "may . . . have a significant deleterious effect on
Dendrite's ability to hire and keep employees." (Emphasis
added). Dendrite also contends that John Doe No. 3's
postings caused detrimental fluctuations in its stock
prices.
Dendrite's NASDAQ trading [***38] records were
submitted to the court for the period of March 1, 2000
through June 15, 2000. Those records indicate Dendrite
experienced gains on 32 days, [*159] losses on 40 days,
and no change on two days during that period, which
overlaps the period when John Doe No. 3 was posting his
statements on the Yahoo! bulletin board. Dendrite's total
loss during this period was 29/32 of a point.
Moreover, John Doe No. 3 made nine postings, two
on the same day. On three of the days that immediately
followed a posting by John Doe No. 3, Dendrite's stock
value decreased. However, on five of the days that
immediately followed a posting by John Doe No. 3,
Dendrite's stock value increased. The net change in
Dendrite's stock value over those seven days was actually
an increase of 3 and 5/8 points.
Although the motion judge stated Dendrite was
"entitled to every reasonable inference of fact in this
analysis[,]" he refused to "take the leap to linking
messages posted on an internet message board regarding
individual opinions, albeit incorrect opinions, to a
decrease in stock prices without something more
concrete." The record does not support the conclusion
that John Doe's postings negatively affected [***39] the
value of Dendrite's stock, nor does Dendrite offer
evidence or information that these postings have actually
inhibited its hiring practices, as it alleged they would.
Accordingly, the motion judge appropriately concluded
that Dendrite failed to establish a sufficient nexus
between John Doe No. 3's statements and Dendrite's
allegations of harm.
We are satisfied that the analysis and conclusions by
Judge MacKenzie set forth in his comprehensive letter
opinion dated November 23, 2000 are supported by the
record. Dendrite has failed to establish that the judge
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abused his discretion in entering the December 13, 2000
order.

Accordingly, we affirm.
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OPINION
[*454] STEELE, Chief Justice:
The defendant-appellant, John Doe No.1,
anonymously posted allegedly defamatory statements
about the plaintiff-appellee, Cahill, on an internet blog.
Cahill brought a defamation action. Seeking to serve
process on Doe, [**2] Cahill sought to compel the
disclosure of his identity from a third party that had the
information. A Superior Court judge applied a good faith
standard to test the plaintiff's complaint and ordered the
third party to disclose Doe's identity. Doe appeals from
the Superior Court's order. Because the trial judge applied
a standard insufficiently protective of Doe's First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, we reverse that
judgment.
I.
On November 2, 2004, the plaintiffs below, Patrick
and Julia Cahill, both residents of Smyrna, Delaware,
filed suit against four John Doe defendants asserting
defamation and invasion of privacy claims. This appeal
involves only one of the John Doe defendants, John Doe
No. 1 below and "Doe" in this opinion. Using the alias
"Proud Citizen," Doe posted two statements on an
internet website sponsored by the Delaware State News
called the "Smyrna/Clayton Issues Blog" 1 concerning
Cahill's performance as a City Councilman of Smyrna.
The "Guidelines" at the top of the blog stated "this is your
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hometown forum for opinions about public issues." The
first of Doe's statements, posted on September 18, 2004,
said:
If only Councilman Cahill was able
[**3] to display the same leadership
skills, energy and enthusiasm toward the
revitalization and growth of the fine town
of Smyrna as Mayor Schaeffer has
demonstrated! While Mayor Schaeffer has
made great strides toward improving the
livelihood of Smyrna's citizens, Cahill has
devoted all of his energy to being a
divisive impediment to any kind of
cooperative movement. Anyone who has
spent any amount of time with Cahill
would be keenly aware of such character
flaws, not to mention an obvious mental
deterioration. Cahill is a prime example of
failed leadership - his eventual ousting is
exactly what Smyrna needs in order to
move forward and establish a community
that is able to thrive on its own economic
stability and common pride in its town. 2
The next day, Doe posted another statement:
Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone
in the town thinks he is. The mayor needs
support from his citizens and protections
from unfounded attacks.... 3

1
Available at http://newsblog.info/0405
(statements at issue are no longer available on the
website).
2 Compl. P 7 (emphasis added).
[**4]
3 Id. at P 8 (emphasis added).

computer using the internet. IP addresses are often
[*455] owned by internet service providers who then
assign them to subscribers when they use the internet.
These addresses are unique and assigned to only one ISP
subscriber at a time. Thus, if the ISP knows the time and
the date that postings were made from a specific IP
address, it can determine the identity of its subscriber.
Armed with Doe's IP address, the Cahills obtained a
court order requiring Comcast to disclose Doe's identity.
As required by Federal Statute 4, when Comcast received
[**5] the discovery request, it notified Doe. On January
4, 2005, Doe filed an "Emergency Motion for a
Protective Order" seeking to prevent the Cahills from
obtaining his identity from Comcast. The Superior Court
heard argument on the motion on January 7. Following
the argument, the trial judge invited supplemental
briefing and both Doe and the Cahills submitted
additional argument.
4 47 U.S.C. 551(c)(2) requires a court order to a
cable ISP and notice to the ISP subscriber before
an ISP can disclose the identity of its subscriber to
a third party.
On June 14, 2005, the trial judge issued a
memorandum opinion denying Doe's motion for a
protective order. The Superior Court judge adopted a
"good faith" standard for determining when a defamation
plaintiff could compel the disclosure of the identity of an
anonymous plaintiff. Under the good faith standard, the
Superior Court required the Cahills to establish: (1) that
they had a legitimate, good faith basis upon which to
bring the underlying [**6] claim; (2) that the identifying
information sought was directly and materially related to
their claim; and (3) that the information could not be
obtained from any other source. Applying this standard,
the Superior Court held that the Cahills could obtain
Doe's identity from Comcast. 5 Doe filed an interlocutory
appeal, which we accepted on June 28, 2005.

These were the only two internet postings attributed
to Doe or mentioned in the Cahills' complaint.
Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 30, the Cahills
sought and obtained leave of the Superior Court to
conduct a pre-service deposition of the owner of the
internet blog, Independent Newspapers. After obtaining
the IP addresses associated with the blog postings from
the blog's owner, the Cahills learned that Comcast
Corporation owned Doe's IP address. An IP address is an
electronic number that specifically identifies a particular

5 Memorandum Opinion, C.A. No. 04C-11-022,
June 14, 2005, at 19.
II.
In this case, Doe claims that the trial judge
incorrectly applied a good faith standard when he denied
the motion for a protective order. A claim that a trial
court applied an incorrect legal standard raises a question
of law that we review de novo. 6
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6 Epstein v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re
MCA, Inc. S'holder Litig.), 785 A.2d 625, 638
(Del. 2001) (citing Ison v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832, 847 (Del. 1999)).
[**7] III. A.
The internet is a unique democratizing medium
unlike anything that has come before. The advent of the
internet dramatically changed the nature of public
discourse by allowing more and diverse people to engage
in public debate. Unlike thirty years ago, when "many
citizens [were] barred from meaningful participation in
public discourse by financial or status inequalities and a
relatively small number of powerful speakers [could]
dominate the marketplace of ideas" 7 the internet now
allows anyone with a phone line to "become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox." 8 Through the internet, speakers can bypass
mainstream media to speak directly to "an audience
larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have
[*456] imagined." 9 Moreover, speakers on internet chat
rooms and blogs can speak directly to other people with
similar interests. A person in Alaska can have a
conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in
Bangladesh, just as easily as several Smyrna residents
can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.
7 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 Duke
L.J. 855, 896 (2000).
[**8]

12 Id.
It is clear that speech over the internet is entitled to
First Amendment protection. 13 This protection extends to
anonymous internet speech. 14 Anonymous [**9]
internet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances
can become the modern equivalent of political
pamphleteering. As the United States Supreme Court
recently noted, "anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition
of advocacy and dissent." 15 The United States Supreme
Court continued, "the right to remain anonymous may be
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political
speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater
weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of
its misuse." 16
13 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 138 L. Ed. 2d
874, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (There is "no basis
for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet].").
14 See, e.g., Doe v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The
constitutional rights of Internet users, including
the First Amendment right to speak anonymously,
must be carefully safeguarded.").
15 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 357, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, 115 S. Ct. 1511
(1995).
[**10]
16 Id.

8 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 896-97, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 874, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
9
Lidsky, supra note 7, at 895 (citations
omitted).
Internet speech is often anonymous. "Many
participants in cyberspace discussions employ
pseudonymous identities, and, even when a speaker
chooses to reveal her real name, she may still be
anonymous for all practical purposes." 10 For better or
worse, then, "the audience must evaluate [a] speaker's
ideas based on her words alone." 11 "This unique feature
of [the internet] promises to make public debate in
cyberspace less hierarchical and discriminatory" than in
the real world because it disguises status indicators such
as race, class, and age. 12
10 Id.
11 Id. at 896.

It also is clear that the First Amendment does not
protect defamatory speech. "It is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances." 17 Certain classes of speech, including
defamatory and libelous speech, are entitled to no
Constitutional protection. "It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
18 Accordingly, we must adopt a standard that
appropriately balances one person's right to speak
anonymously against another person's right to protect his
reputation.
17 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 S. Ct. 766
(1942).
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18 Id.
III.
B.
[*457] In this case, this [**11] Court is called upon
to adopt a standard for trial courts to apply when faced
with a public figure plaintiff's discovery request that
seeks to unmask the identity of an anonymous defendant
who has posted allegedly defamatory material on the
internet. Before this Court is an entire spectrum of
"standards" that could be required, ranging (in ascending
order) from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to
pleading sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to
a showing of prima facie evidence sufficient to withstand
a motion for summary judgment, and beyond that,
hurdles even more stringent. The Cahills urge this Court
to adopt the good faith standard applied by the Superior
Court. We decline to do so. Instead we hold that a
defamation plaintiff must satisfy a "summary judgment"
standard before obtaining the identity of an anonymous
defendant.
We are concerned that setting the standard too low
will chill potential posters from exercising their First
Amendment right to speak anonymously. The possibility
of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit could intimidate
anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or
simply not commenting at all. A defamation plaintiff,
particularly [**12] a public figure, obtains a very
important form of relief by unmasking the identity of his
anonymous critics. The revelation of identity of an
anonymous speaker "may subject [that speaker] to
ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, invite
retaliation from those who oppose her ideas or from those
whom she criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure
to her mental processes." 19 Plaintiffs can often initially
plead sufficient facts to meet the good faith test applied
by the Superior Court, even if the defamation claim is not
very strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the
defamation action to a final decision. After obtaining the
identity of an anonymous critic through the compulsory
discovery process, a defamation plaintiff who either loses
on the merits or fails to pursue a lawsuit is still free to
engage in extra-judicial self-help remedies; more bluntly,
the plaintiff can simply seek revenge or retribution.
19 Lidsky, supra note 7 at 890.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that many [**13]

defamation plaintiffs bring suit merely to unmask the
identities of anonymous critics. As one commentator has
noted, "the sudden surge in John Doe suits stems from the
fact that many defamation actions are not really about
money." 20 "The goals of this new breed of libel action
are largely symbolic, the primary goal being to silence
John Doe and others like him." 21 This "sue first, ask
questions later" approach, coupled with a standard only
minimally protective of the anonymity of defendants, will
discourage debate on important issues of public concern
as more and more anonymous posters censor their online
statements in response to the likelihood of being
unmasked.
20 Id. at 872.
21 Id. at 859.
The parties inform us that we are the first State
Supreme Court to address this issue, particularly in the
context of a case involving political criticism of a public
figure. In the past, this issue has most frequently been
presented in cases where publicly traded companies have
sued anonymous [**14] internet posters for statements
that allegedly defamed those companies. In In re
Subpoena to AOL 22, a Virginia trial [*458] court
adopted the good faith standard for determining whether
to grant a defamation plaintiff's discovery request seeking
to unmask the identity of an anonymous defendant.
Indeed, in this very case, the Superior Court derived its
standard from the AOL opinion. The AOL Court held that
a trial court should order a non-party ISP to provide
information concerning the identity of an anonymous
subscriber only (1) when the court is satisfied by the
pleadings or the evidence supplied to that court (2) that
the party requesting the subpoena had a legitimate, good
faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of
actionable conduct and (3) the subpoenaed identity
information is centrally needed to advance that claim. 23
In our view, this "good faith" standard is too easily
satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant's right to
speak anonymously. As one of our recent decisions,
Ramunno v. Cawley, 24 illustrates, even the more
stringent motion to dismiss standard, the middle option in
the spectrum of standards from which we may choose,
falls short of providing [**15] sufficient protection to a
defendant's First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.
22 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America
Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 2000 WL 1210372,
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2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 220 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev'd on other grounds, 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d
377 (Va. 2001).
23 Id. at *8.
24 705 A.2d 1029 (Del. 1998).
III.
C.
Long-settled doctrine governs this Court's review of
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). 25 Under that doctrine,
the threshold for the showing a plaintiff must make to
survive a motion to dismiss is low. Delaware is a notice
pleading jurisdiction. 26 Thus, for a complaint to survive
a motion to dismiss, it need only give "general notice of
the claim asserted." 27 A court can dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted only if "it
appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could
not prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief."
28 On a motion to dismiss, [**16] a court's review is
limited to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
29 An allegation, "though vague or lacking in detail" can
still be well-pleaded so long as it puts the opposing party
on notice of the claim brought against it. 30 Finally, in
ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a trial
court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor
of the party opposing the motion. 31
25 Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034
(Del. 1998).
26 VLIW Tech., L.L.C. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
840 A.2d 606, 611 (Del. 2003).
27 Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1034 (citing Solomon
v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38
(Del. 1996)).
28 Id. (citing Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968
(Del. 1978).
29
Id. (citing In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp.
Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 65 (Del. 1995)
(citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634
A.2d 319, 326 (Del. 1993)).
30 VLIW Tech., 840 A.2d at 611.
[**17]
31 Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1034 (citing Solomon,
672 A.2d at 38) (other citations omitted).
In Ramunno, this Court unanimously reversed the
Superior Court's decision to dismiss a plaintiff's libel suit
for failure to state a claim based "solely on pleading
rules." 32 Ramunno was a typical libel case in that the

plaintiff, who was not a public figure, knew the
defendants' identities. In his complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that one defendant made certain false descriptions
of the plaintiff's property holdings [*459] in a letter to
the Mayor of Wilmington, a copy of which went to The
News Journal. 33 The Superior Court granted that
defendant's motion to dismiss, partly on the grounds that
the description in the letter was substantially true. 34
Overturning the trial court, we noted that:
we [did] not necessarily disagree with
the substance of [the trial court's] finding.
The trier of fact might very well find that
the error was immaterial and that the
controversy itself is trivial. Indeed, on a
summary judgment record or at [**18]
trial, the defendants may be successful in
portraying this dispute as silly. 35
Nevertheless, we held that the Superior Court had erred
in dismissing the complaint because it failed to draw
every reasonable factual inference in favor of the
plaintiff, as required by existing precedent. 36
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1036.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

This is not to suggest that the Ramunno decision was
wrongly decided, for it was not. Ramunno clarified how
courts of this state must apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
We cite Ramunno only to illustrate that even silly or
trivial libel claims can easily survive a motion to dismiss
where the plaintiff pleads facts that put the defendant on
notice of his claim, however vague or lacking in detail
these allegations may be. Clearly then, if the stricter
motion to dismiss standard is incapable of screening silly
or trivial defamation suits, then the even [**19] less
stringent good faith standard is less capable of doing so.
In a case like Ramunno where the plaintiff knows the
defendant's identity, no constitutional harm comes from
allowing a silly or trivial claim to survive a motion to
dismiss; the trial court can easily dispose of these cases
on a motion for summary judgment. In a case like the one
at bar, however, substantial harm may come from
allowing a plaintiff to compel the disclosure of an
anonymous defendant's identity by simply showing that
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his complaint can survive a motion to dismiss or that it
was filed in good faith. As we intimated in Ramunno, a
summary judgment proceeding can dispense with weak
or even "silly" libel cases before trial (but even then only
after significant expense and anxiety to the parties).
Applying a summary judgment standard to a public figure
defamation plaintiff's discovery request to obtain an
anonymous defendant's identity will more appropriately
protect against the chilling effect on anonymous First
Amendment internet speech that can arise when plaintiffs
bring trivial defamation lawsuits primarily to harass or to
unmask their critics.
Another court has addressed this issue and reached
the [**20] same conclusion. In Dendrite Intl., Inc. v. Doe
37, an intermediate New Jersey appellate court adopted a
standard more stringent than either the motion to dismiss
or the good faith standard. Dendrite involved a corporate
defamation plaintiff seeking to obtain the identity of an
anonymous defendant who posted comments about the
corporation on an internet message board. The Dendrite
court held that to decide whether to grant discovery to a
plaintiff, a court should carefully review the complaint,
and all information provided to the court in addition to
the complaint, to determine if the plaintiff has set forth a
prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously named
[*460] anonymous defendants. 38 The court went on to
say:
in addition to establishing that its action
can withstand a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted pursuant [to New Jersey court
rules], the plaintiff must produce sufficient
evidence supporting each element of its
cause of action, on a prima facie basis,
prior to a court ordering the disclosure of
the identity of the unnamed defendant. 39

37 342 N.J. Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
[**21]
38 Id. at 760.
39 Id.
Applying its standard to the facts of the case before
it, the Dendrite Court held that:
although [the corporation's] defamation

claims would survive a traditional motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, we conclude the motion judge
appropriately reviewed [the corporation's]
claim with a level of scrutiny consistent
with the procedures and standards we
adopt here today, and therefore the judge
properly found [the corporation] should
not be permitted to conduct limited
discovery aimed at disclosing [Doe's]
identity. 40

40
Id. at 771.
We conclude that the summary judgment standard is
the appropriate test by which to strike the balance
between a defamation plaintiff's right to protect his
reputation and a defendant's right to exercise free speech
anonymously. We accordingly hold that before a
defamation [**22] plaintiff can obtain the identity of an
anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery
process he must support his defamation claim with facts
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. We do
not, however, specifically adopt the holding in Dendrite.
As originally set forth, the Dendrite test has four parts. It
requires a plaintiff:
(1) to undertake efforts to notify the
anonymous poster that he is the subject of
a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure, and to withhold action to
afford the anonymous defendant a
reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application. In the
internet context, the plaintiff's efforts
should include posting a message of
notification of the discovery request to the
anonymous defendant on the same
message board as the original allegedly
defamatory posting;
(2) to set forth the exact statements
purportedly made by the anonymous
poster that the plaintiff alleges constitute
defamatory speech; and
(3) to satisfy the prima facie or
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"summary judgment standard." 41

41
Id. at 760.
[**23] Finally, after the trial court concludes that
the plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action,
the Dendrite test requires the trial court to:
(4) balance the defendant's First
Amendment right of anonymous free
speech against the strength of the prima
facie case presented and the necessity for
the disclosure of the anonymous
defendant's identity in determining
whether to allow the plaintiff to properly
proceed. 42

42
Id. at 760-761.
We retain the notification provision in the Dendrite
test. Thus, to the extent reasonably practicable under the
circumstances, the plaintiff must undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous poster that he is the subject of a
subpoena or application for order of disclosure. The
[*461] plaintiff must also withhold action to afford the
anonymous defendant a reasonable opportunity to file
and serve opposition to the discovery request. Moreover,
when a case arises in the internet context, the plaintiff
must post a message notifying [**24] the anonymous
defendant of the plaintiff's discovery request on the same
message board where the allegedly defamatory statement
was originally posted.
The notification provision imposes very little burden
on a defamation plaintiff while at the same time giving an
anonymous defendant the opportunity to respond. When
First Amendment interests are at stake we disfavor ex
parte discovery requests that afford the plaintiff the
important form of relief that comes from unmasking an
anonymous defendant. While in this case a Federal
Statute required that Comcast notify Doe of Cahill's
discovery request, in future cases this type of statute may
not exist. Accordingly, regardless of the medium in
which the allegedly defamatory statement is published,

the plaintiff must undertake reasonable efforts to notify
the anonymous defendant of the discovery request and
must withhold action to allow the defendant an
opportunity to respond.
While the first prong of the Dendrite test adds a layer
of protection to a defendant's First Amendment right to
speak anonymously in addition to the showing required
under the summary judgment standard, we do not think
that the second and fourth prongs of the [**25] Dendrite
test are necessary. The second requirement, that the
plaintiff set forth the exact defamatory statements, is
subsumed in the summary judgment inquiry. To satisfy
the summary judgment standard a plaintiff will
necessarily quote the defamatory statements in his
complaint. The fourth Dendrite requirement, that the trial
court balance the defendant's First Amendment rights
against the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case is
also unnecessary. The summary judgment test is itself the
balance. The fourth requirement adds no protection above
and beyond that of the summary judgment test and
needlessly complicates the analysis. Accordingly, we
adopt a modified Dendrite standard consisting only of
Dendrite requirements one and three: the plaintiff must
make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant and must
satisfy the summary judgment standard.
III.
D.
The Cahills argue that the Delaware Constitution
gives great weight to the importance of affording
remedies to recompense damage to one's reputation and,
accordingly, we should adopt a good faith standard for
deciding discovery requests to unmask anonymous
defendants in defamation cases. We disagree. [**26] As
we noted recently in Kanaga v. Gannett Co., 43 two
sections of the Delaware Bill of Rights are applicable in a
case that involves the balancing of the First Amendment
right to speak and an individual's right to protect his
reputation: Article I, Section 5 and Article I, Section 9.
The relevant portion of Section 5 provides:
The press shall be free to every citizen
who undertakes to examine the official
conduct of persons acting in a public
capacity; and any citizen may freely
speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty. 44
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[*462] Similarly, Section 9, the so-called "remedies" or
"open courts" clause, provides in relevant part:
all courts shall be open; and every man
for an injury done him in his reputation,
person,
movable
or
immovable
possessions, shall have remedy by the due
course of law, and justice administered
according to the very right of the cause
and the law of the land, without sale,
denial, or unreasonable delay or
expense.... 45

protected by the First Amendment. Given those
countervailing concerns, we are unable to conclude that
the Delaware Constitution's reference to protecting one's
reputation strongly supports setting the showing a
plaintiff must make to unmask an anonymous defendant
at the low thresholds of the good faith or motion to
dismiss standards. A summary judgment standard more
appropriately balances a defamation plaintiff's right to
protect his reputation and a defendant's right to speak
anonymously.
48 Id. at 179.
[**29] III.
E.

In Kanaga we interpreted these clauses to establish a
"strong state constitutional basis for remedies to
recompense damage to one's reputation." 46 [**27]
Accordingly, "the protection afforded to reputations by
the Delaware Constitution weighs heavily in the balance
of the analysis involving constitutionally protected
speech." 47 Although those provisions of the Delaware
Constitution "weigh in the balance" of our analysis in the
case at bar, that weight is not conclusive. We are required
to weigh against those provisions the fact that this case,
unlike Kanaga, involves a public figure and political
speech. Moreover and more importantly, as noted above,
we must also weigh the fact that allowing a defamation
plaintiff to unmask an anonymous defendant's identity
through the judicial process is a crucial form of relief that
if too easily obtained will chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights to free speech. Kanaga did not address
these important values; it is, therefore, distinguishable.
43
44
45
46
47

687 A.2d 173 (Del. 1996).
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5., (emphasis added).
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9. (emphasis added).
Id. at 177.
Id.

[**28] In Kanaga we addressed the issue of when
allegedly defamatory speech could qualify as "opinion"
and thereby become entitled to protection under the First
Amendment. We noted that a statement of opinion "would
be actionable if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." 48 Kanaga
offers little, if any, guidance on how to effect a balance
between one individual's right to protect his reputation
and another's right to engage anonymously in speech

Although a good faith or motion to dismiss standard
sets the bar too low to protect a defendant's First
Amendment right to speak anonymously on the internet, a
summary judgment standard does not correspondingly set
the bar too high for a defamation plaintiff seeking redress
for reputational harm to obtain relief. What follows are
our reasons for reaching this conclusion.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "a trial
court shall examine the factual record and make
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine if there is
any dispute of material [*463] fact." 49 "If from the
evidence produced there is a reasonable indication that a
material fact is in dispute or if it appears desirable to
inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify
application of the law, summary judgment is not
appropriate." 50 Thus, to obtain discovery of an
anonymous defendant's identity under the summary
judgment standard, a defamation plaintiff "must submit
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for
each essential element of the claim in question." 51 In
other words, the defamation plaintiff, as the party [**30]
bearing the burden of proof at trial, must introduce
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for all
elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff's
control.
49 AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus
Indus., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005).
50 Id.
Under Delaware law, a public figure defamation
plaintiff in a libel case must plead and ultimately prove
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that: 1) the defendant made a defamatory statement; 2)
concerning the plaintiff; 3) the statement was published;
and 4) a third party would understand the character of the
communication as defamatory. 52 In addition, the public
figure defamation plaintiff must plead and prove that 5)
the statement is false 53 and 6) that the defendant made
the statement with actual malice. 54 Finally, "proof of
damages proximately caused by a publication deemed
libelous need not be shown in order for a defamed
plaintiff to recover nominal or compensatory damages."
55

51
Colgain v. Oy-Partek Ab (In re Asbestos
Litig.), 799 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Del. 2002).
[**31]
52 Read v. Carpenter, 1995 Del Super. LEXIS
251, 1995 WL 945544, *2 (Del. Super. 1995).
53
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps., 475.
U.S. 767, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 106 S. Ct. 1558
(1986).
54 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11
L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
55
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 970 (Del.
1978). Doe and the amici curiae in this case argue
extensively that we should change Delaware libel
law to require that a libel plaintiff must plead and
prove damages. This is contrary to the settled law
of libel. As we noted in Spence "the general rule
is that any publication which is libelous on its
face is actionable without pleading or proof of
special damages." We see no reason to change
this rule here.
The first element is perhaps the most important.
Whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of
law. 56 In answering this question, Delaware [**32]
courts must determine: "first, whether alleged defamatory
statements are expressions of fact or protected
expressions of opinion; and [second], whether the
challenged statements are capable of a defamatory
meaning." 57 Because this question is one of law, a judge
can just as easily make the determination under a
summary judgment standard as under a motion to dismiss
standard or a good faith standard. The judge will have
before him the allegedly defamatory statements and can
determine whether they are defamatory based on the
words and the context in which they were published. In
short, insofar as the question is one of law, the summary

judgment standard imposes no heavier burden than would
any other standard with respect to the first element.
56 Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248, 251 (Del.
1987).
57 Id.
The second element of a libel claim requires that the
plaintiff show that the allegedly defamatory statement
concerns the plaintiff. In most cases, this will be apparent
[**33] from the face of the statement. In [*464] cases
where it is not facially apparent, to satisfy this element
the plaintiff can, by affidavit or verified complaint, offer
particular facts that establish that the statement refers to
him. For example, additional factual averments might be
necessary when the allegedly defamatory statement refers
to the plaintiff by a nickname.
The plaintiff should also have easy access to proof
that the statement was published. He can produce a
computer print-out of the statements made over the
internet or simply direct the court to the specific website
where the statements were made should they still be
available.
With respect to the fourth element of a libel claim,
the plaintiff can present third party affidavits
demonstrating a third party's understanding of the
statements as defamatory. Similarly, to establish the fifth
element of the public figure defamation claim, which
requires some proof that the statement is false, the
plaintiff can offer his own factually based averment that
the statements are false.
Finally, we are mindful that public figures in a
defamation case must prove that the defendant made the
statements with actual malice. Without discovery [**34]
of the defendant's identity, satisfying this element may be
difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, we do NOT
hold that the public figure defamation plaintiff is required
to produce evidence on this element of the claim. We
hold only that a public figure plaintiff must plead the first
five elements and offer prima facie proof on each of the
five elements to create a genuine issue of material fact
requiring trial. In other words, a public figure defamation
plaintiff must only plead and prove facts with regard to
elements of the claim that are within his control.
Given that the plaintiff will have easy access to proof
of five of the six elements of a defamation claim, it is not
overly burdensome to require the plaintiff to submit a
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verified complaint or affidavits to substantiate that claim.
In short, under the summary judgment standard, scrutiny
is likely to reveal a silly or trivial claim, but a plaintiff
with a legitimate claim should be able to obtain the
identity of an anonymous defendant and proceed with his
lawsuit. Delaware trial judges will then still provide a
potentially wronged plaintiff with an adequate means of
protecting his reputation thereby assuring that our [**35]
courts remain open to afford redress of injury to
reputation caused by the person responsible for abuse of
the right to free speech. 58
58 See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5, 9.
Besides the legal remedies available to a plaintiff
wronged by internet defamation, the potential plaintiff
has available a very powerful form of extra-judicial
relief. The internet provides a means of communication
where a person wronged by statements of an anonymous
poster can respond instantly, can respond to the allegedly
defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus,
can, almost contemporaneously, respond to the same
audience that initially read the allegedly defamatory
statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct any
misstatements or falsehoods, respond to character attacks,
and generally set the record straight. This unique feature
of internet communications allows a potential plaintiff
ready access to mitigate the harm, if any, he has suffered
to his reputation as a result of an anonymous defendant's
[**36] allegedly defamatory statements made on an
internet blog or in a chat room. 59
59 Indeed, in this case, it appears that Cahill
responded to some of his critics on the same
internet blog.
III.
F.
[*465] In adopting the summary judgment standard
to govern situations where a defamation plaintiff seeks to
obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant, we do not
rely on the nature of the internet as a basis to justify our
application of the legal standard. That is, we make no
distinction between communications made on the internet
and those made through other traditional forms of media
in determining the standard to be applied. Thus,
whenever a defamation plaintiff seeks to unmask an
anonymous defendant, we apply the summary judgment
standard regardless of the chosen medium of publication.

While as a form of communication the internet is not
legally distinct and warrants no special protection above
and beyond what traditional forms of communication
receive, it is worth noting that certain factual and [**37]
contextual issues relevant to chat rooms and blogs are
particularly important in analyzing the defamation claim
itself.
Ranked in terms of reliability, there is a spectrum of
sources on the internet. For example, chat rooms and
blogs are generally not as reliable as the Wall Street
Journal Online. 60 Blogs and chat rooms tend to be
vehicles for the expression of opinions; by their very
nature, they are not a source of facts or data upon which a
reasonable person would rely. At least three courts have
recently made this observation. Addressing the issue as it
related to statements made in a chat room about the
performance of a specific publicly traded company, the
Court in Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. John Does 1 through 20,
61 noted that the messages tended to be "replete with
grammar and spelling errors; most posters do not even
use capital letters. Many of the messages are vulgar and
offensive, and are filled with hyperbole." The court
continued, "in this context, readers are unlikely to view
messages posted anonymously as assertions of fact." 62
60 Available at http://online.wsj.com/public/us.
[**38]
61 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16277, *5 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
62 Id.
Another federal court has similarly noted,
"unlike...traditional media, there are no controls on the
postings. Literally anyone who has access to the internet
has access to the chatrooms." 63 Moreover, "the
statements were posted in the general cacophony of an
internet chat-room in which about 1,000 messages a week
are posted...." 64 "Importantly, the postings are full of
hyperbole, invective, short-hand phrases and language
not generally found in fact-based documents....To put it
mildly, these postings...lack the formality and polish
typically found in documents in which a reader would
expect to find fact." 65 The court concluded that the
general tone, context, style and content of the postings
"strongly suggest that they are the opinions of the
posters." 66 Accordingly, the "reasonable reader, looking
at the hundreds and thousands of postings about the
company from a wide variety of posters, would not
expect that [the defendant] was airing anything other than
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his personal views...." 67
63 Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
[**39]
64
65
66
67

Id at 1267.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1268.

[*466] In SPX Corp v. Doe 68 the court granted a
defendant's motion to dismiss a defamation claim. In so
doing the court analyzed four factors: "(1) the specific
language used; (2) whether the statement is verifiable; (3)
the written context of the statement; and (4) the broader
social context in which the statement is made." 69 In
addressing the fourth factor, the court noted:

Apart from the editorial page, a reasonable person
reading a newspaper in print or online, for example, can
assume that the statements are factually based and
researched. This is not the case when the statements are
made on blogs or in chat rooms. "When one
views...allegedly defamatory statements in context - both
the immediate context and the broader social context - it
becomes apparent that many of the allegedly defamatory
statements cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts,
but instead are either 'subjective speculation' or 'merely
rhetorical hyperbole.'" 71
71
Lidsky, supra note 7 at 939 (citations
omitted).
[**41] III.
G.

Statements appearing in such locations
as forum and commentary newspaper
sections, or other venues often associated
with "cajoling, invective, and hyperbole",
are more likely opinion.... Here, the
Defendant's statements were posted on an
Internet message board. Such message
boards are accessible to anyone of the tens
of millions of people in this country (and
more abroad) with Internet access, and no
one exerts control over the content.
Pseudonym screen names are the norm. A
reasonable reader would not view the
blanket, unexplained statements at issue as
"facts" when placed on such an open
[**40] and uncontrolled forum. Indeed,
Yahoo! places a disclaimer which appears
on the copies of the postings submitted
with the Complaint:
Reminder. This board is not
connected with the company. These
messages are only the opinion of the
poster... 70

68 253 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
69 Id. at 980.
70

Having adopted a summary judgment standard, we
now apply it to the facts of this case. Normally an
appellate court does not decide summary judgment
motions in the first instance. A trial judge's decision to
grant or reject summary judgment, however, is a matter
of law 72 that we review de novo. 73 Accordingly,
because we are deciding only a legal question on the
same paper record, and given the social interest in the
prompt resolution of this dispute, we decide the issue
without remanding this case to the trial court.
72 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
73 Plummer v. Sherman, 861 A.2d 1238, 1242
(Del. 2004).
In deciding whether or not a statement is defamatory
we determine, "first, whether alleged defamatory
statements are expressions of fact or protected
expressions of opinion; and [second], whether the
challenged statements are capable of a defamatory
meaning." 74 In this case, Doe made two potentially
defamatory statements:
1) [**42] Anyone who has spent any
amount of time with Cahill would be
keenly aware of ... hischaracter flaws, not
to
mention
an
obvious
mental
deterioration;
[*467] 2) Gahill [sic] is ... paranoid.

Id. at 981 (citations omitted).
Applying a good faith standard, the trial judge concluded,
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"it is enough to meet the 'good faith' standard that the
Cahills articulate a legitimate basis for claiming
defamation in the context of their particular
circumstances." 75 He continued "given that Mr. Cahill is
a married man, [Doe's] statement referring to him as
"Gahill" might reasonably be interpreted as indicating
that Mr. Cahill has engaged in an extra-marital same-sex
affair. Such a statement may form the basis of an
actionable defamation claim." 76 We disagree. Using a
"G" instead of a "C" as the first letter of Cahill's name is
just as likely to be a typographical error as an intended
misguided insult. Under the summary judgment standard,
no reasonable person would interpret this statement to
indicate that Cahill had an extra-marital same-sex affair.
With respect to Doe's other statements, the trial judge
noted:
Again, the context in which the
statements were made is probative. [Doe's]
statements might [**43] give the reader
the impression that [Doe] has personal
knowledge that Mr. Cahill's mental
condition is deteriorating and that he is
becoming "paranoid." Given that Mr.
Cahill is a member of the Smyrna Town
Council, an elected position of public
trust, the impression that he is suffering
from diminished mental capacity might be
deemed capable of causing harm to his
reputation, particularly when disseminated
over the internet for all of his constituents
to read. 77
We agree that the context in which the statements were
made is probative, but reach the opposite conclusion.
Given the context, no reasonable person could have
interpreted these statements as being anything other than
opinion. The guidelines at the top of the blog specifically
state that the forum is dedicated to opinions about issues
in Smyrna. If more evidence of that were needed, another
contribution to the blog responded to Doe's second
posting as follows: "Proud Citizen, you asked for support,
I don't think you are going to get it here. Just by reading
both sides, your tone and choice of words is [that of] a
type of person that couldn't convince me. You sound like
the person with all the anger and [**44] hate..."

74 Riley, 529 A.2d at 251.
75
Memorandum Opinion,
04C-11-022, June 14, 2005 at 20.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 21.

C.A.

No.

At least one reader of the blog quickly reached the
conclusion that Doe's comments were no more than
unfounded and unconvincing opinion. Given the context
of the statement and the normally (and inherently)
unreliable nature of assertions posted in chat rooms and
on blogs, this is the only supportable conclusion. Read in
the context of an internet blog, these statements did not
imply any assertions of underlying objective facts.
Accordingly, we hold that as a matter of law a reasonable
person would not interpret Doe's statements as stating
facts about Cahill. The statements are, therefore,
incapable of a defamatory meaning. Because Cahill has
failed to plead an essential element of his claim, he ipso
facto cannot produce prima facie proof of that first
element of a libel claim, and thus, cannot satisfy the
summary judgment [**45] standard we announce today.
Doe's statements simply are not sufficient to give rise to a
prima facie case for defamation liability. 78
78
We do not hold as a matter of law that
statements made on a blog or in a chat room can
never be defamatory. We hold only that in order
to recover, a plaintiff having a defamation claim
based on a statement made in an internet chat
room or on a blog must prove that a statement is
factually based and thus capable of a defamatory
meaning. See Kanaga, 687 A.2d at 179 ("[A]
statement of opinion would be actionable if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis for the opinion.")
IV.
[*468] For these reasons, we REVERSE the
judgment of the Superior Court and REMAND the case
to the Superior Court with instructions to DISMISS the
plaintiff's claim with prejudice.
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LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:
... INTRODUCTION Courts have utilized a variety of standards in determining whether to allow a plaintiff to discover
the identity of an anonymous defendant. ... The right to anonymous speech is largely a development of modern
jurisprudence, and its beginnings are found in Talley v. ... Krinsky first pointed out the shortcomings of the notification
requirement from Dendrite and Cahill, specifically the requirement that plaintiff post a notice of the discovery request in
the same place the allegedly defamatory comments were originally made: "An Internet Web site, chat room, or message
board may no longer exist or be active by the time the plaintiff brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and
unprofitable" to insist a plaintiff follow the notice requirement from Dendrite and Cahill. ... The advantages to society
in allowing anonymous speech outweigh the interests of plaintiffs in easily identifying anonymous defendants. ...
Requiring plaintiffs to make a prima facie case for each element of a defamation claim within their control is the
quantum of proof that should be applied in John Doe defamation cases. ... However, this Note suggests that an
appropriate balance between the two rights can be achieved if the plaintiff is required to make a good faith effort to
notify the defendant of the suit, to set forth the exact statements that allegedly constitute actionable speech, to make a
prima facie case for all elements of the wrongful act allegedly committed that are within the plaintiff's control, and the
court concludes by balancing the rights of the plaintiff against the rights of the defendant.
HIGHLIGHT:
John Doe may be the most wanted person in cyberspace. Corporations everywhere ... are tracking him down in lawsuits
that allege sins ranging from interference with business relationships to defamation to breach of fiduciary duty. n1

This kind of case - in which a plaintiff seeks to identify a defendant for purposes of serving process - poses a substantial
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challenge for courts because they are called upon at the very outset of the case to make the critical, and often
outcome-determinative, decision whether to permit discovery of the defendant's identity. n2

TEXT:
[*429]
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have utilized a variety of standards in determining whether to allow a plaintiff to discover the identity of an
anonymous defendant. Many of the standards currently utilized are contradictory, and oftentimes poorly explained. This
Note seeks to guide the reader through the quagmire of existing standards, and to recommend a uniform approach to this
issue that finds common ground in satisfying the various concerns of the courts.
[*430]
II. THE PROBLEM OF JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS AND HOW COURTS HAVE TRIED TO FASHION
REMEDIES
A. The Right to Anonymous Speech
Most Americans are familiar with the right to free speech derived from the First Amendment. If the average American
were asked what the right to free speech meant to him, he would likely answer something about the freedom of the press
or the right to criticize our government. However, the average layperson may not be familiar with the concept of the
right to anonymous speech.
The right to anonymous speech is largely a development of modern jurisprudence, and its beginnings are found in
Talley v. California. n3 The case concerned a Los Angeles city ordinance that made it illegal to distribute any handbill
that did not include information identifying the name and address of the person who created the publication. n4 The
petitioner in Talley was convicted of violating the ordinance when he distributed handbills urging people to boycott
certain named businesses that engaged in racial discrimination in hiring. Petitioner argued that the ordinance "invaded
his freedom of speech and press in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments ... ." n5 The Court agreed,
discussing the important role anonymous literature has played in the "progress of mankind" and invalidating the
ordinance on the grounds that "there can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict
freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression." n6 Although the Court's opinion in Talley falls
short of proclaiming that "there is a right to anonymous speech under the First Amendment," the opinion has been used
as a basis for that conclusion. n7
[*431] Following Talley, jurisprudence regarding the right to anonymous speech lay dormant, at least as far as the
Supreme Court was concerned, until it granted certiorari in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission thirty-five years
later. n8 The subject matter of McIntyre was nearly identical to that of Talley in that a law prohibiting the distribution of
anonymous literature was challenged as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. n9 The Court in McIntyre
defended the decision in Talley, holding that "an author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment." n10 As in Talley, one of the Court's rationales was the important role
anonymous publications have played in the advancement of American society, referring again to the Federalist Papers,
but also citing examples such as novels by Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) and O. Henry (William Sydney Porter). n11
The Supreme Court relied on the right to anonymous speech two more times in the subsequent decade to strike
down laws that required the identification of anonymous speakers. In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, the Court invalidated a Colorado law that required anyone circulating a petition in favor of putting a
particular initiative or issue on an election ballot to wear a badge that included their name, holding that "Colorado's
current badge requirement discourages participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name identification
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without sufficient cause." n12 Similarly, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
the Court struck down a village ordinance requiring anyone who wanted to go door-to-door to promote any cause to
obtain a permit first. n13 Part of the Court's opposition to the permit requirement was that it required all canvassers,
solicitors, and peddlers to carry the permit with [*432] them when they went door-to-door and display it if requested
by a police officer or resident. n14 The Court concluded that these requirements resulted in "a surrender of [the
canvasser's] anonymity," and as such, "the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular
causes." n15
The four cases discussed above - Talley, McIntyre, Buckley and Watchtower - form the foundation for the
"well-established First Amendment right to speak anonymously." n16 Although these cases all dealt primarily with
printed materials, the principles elucidated in those opinions have, without reserve, been interpreted to apply not only to
the physical distribution of literature, but to the Internet as well. n17
B. How Courts Have Dealt with John Doe Defendants in the Past
Several competing standards have emerged to deal with the problem of anonymous, or John Doe, defendants in
defamation cases. As the court noted in Doe v. Cahill, there is

an entire spectrum of "standards' that could be required, ranging (in ascending order) from a good faith basis to assert a
claim, to pleading sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing of prima facie evidence sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, and beyond that, hurdles even more stringent. n18
In order to understand the current confusion regarding the correct standard in a John Doe defamation case, a review of
the chronological progression of these standards is necessary.
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com was one of the first cases to analyze the competing interests of plaintiffs
seeking discovery of anonymous defendants and the "legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously." n19 [*433] Columbia Insurance Company filed suit in the Northern District of California on behalf of
See's Candy Shops seeking injunctive relief because a different entity had registered the domain names
www.seescandy.com and www.seecandys.com. n20 An impasse arose when the court determined it could not grant
injunctive relief until the defendants had been served with the complaint. n21 However, the defendant could not be
served with the complaint because his identity was unclear as the domain names had been registered online under
potentially fictitious names. n22 The specific issue before the court was whether to allow discovery before the
defendant had been made a party to the suit. n23 The court adopted the following safeguards to limit the situations in
which discovery could take place before the defendant was a party to the suit:
. "First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine
that defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court." n24
* . "Second, the party should identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant." n25
* . "Third, plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could withstand
a motion to dismiss." n26
* . Fourth, the "plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the Court" including justification for the specific
discovery requested and "identification of a limited number of persons" on whom discovery could be served that will
produce a "reasonable likelihood" of identifying the defendant. n27
* One year later a Virginia court used a simpler standard in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.
n28 In that [*434] case, the plaintiff sought to compel America Online (AOL) to provide the identities of four
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subscribers allegedly engaged in defamation. n29 A subpoena was issued to AOL, who subsequently filed a Motion to
Quash. n30 In denying the Motion to Quash, the court held that a non-party Internet service provider (ISP) should only
be ordered to identify a subscriber or user if "the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis" for
bringing suit and "the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim." n31 The requirement
of a "good faith basis" adopted in this case is considered one of the lowest standards required before unmasking an
anonymous defendant. n32
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe represents the next important development in John Doe defamation cases. n33
The facts were similar to those in America Online. Dendrite International, Inc. (Dendrite) brought a defamation claim
against various John Doe defendants and sought expedited discovery to identify the defendants. n34 In Dendrite, the
John Doe defendants had posted messages on a Yahoo! bulletin board dedicated to matters related to Dendrite. n35
Specifically, the anonymous posters accused Dendrite of restructuring its accounting practices in a way that would
cause the company's annual earnings to appear to increase, but without any accompanying increase in the number of
sales. n36 The New Jersey court, in denying Dendrite's interlocutory appeal, offered a four-step set of guidelines for
trial courts to use when "striking a balance between the well-established First Amendment right to speak anonymously,
and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and reputation ... ." n37 First, the plaintiff must try to
notify the anonymous posters by placing a notice regarding the identity [*435] discovery request on the same message
board where the allegedly defamatory material appeared. n38 Second, the plaintiff must identify the exact statements
made that allegedly constitute actionable speech. n39 Third, the plaintiff must establish that its action can withstand a
motion to dismiss and must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to support each element of its cause of action. n40
Finally, the "court must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength
of the prima facie case presented ... ." n41 The notification required by the court in Dendrite is an important aspect of
these guidelines. The most important provision, however, is the third step - the ability to withstand a motion to dismiss
coupled with sufficient evidence supporting each element of the claim. As the law develops, this third step will be the
subject of much debate. n42
The next important case that addresses the issue of identifying defendants in John Doe cases is Doe v. Cahill. n43
As the only state supreme court case to deal specifically with the issue of John Doe defendants in defamation suits
arising in the context of the Internet, Cahill is the highest appellate court opinion addressing the subject. n44 Cahill
involved a situation that should be familiar by now: comments are posted on an online forum; the subject of those
comments doesn't like them; the subject subsequently sues for defamation. n45 The plaintiffs in the case were Patrick
and Julia Cahill. n46 Mr. and Mrs. Cahill were residents of Smyrna, Delaware, and brought suit in response to
anonymous messages posted on a website hosted by [*436] the Delaware State News. n47 An anonymous online
poster using the alias "Proud Citizen" criticized Patrick Cahill's performance as a City Councilman and made other
disparaging statements about Mr. Cahill as well, alleging that he was paranoid and that he was suffering from "an
obvious mental deterioration." n48 Mr. Cahill understandably took issue with those statements, and he and his wife filed
suit on November 2, 2004. n49 On June 14, 2005, the Delaware Superior Court applied a "good faith" standard in
deciding to compel disclosure of the John Doe defendant's identity and ordered the anonymous defendant's Internet
Service Provider to disclose his identity. n50 John Doe filed an interlocutory appeal, which was accepted by the
Supreme Court of Delaware. n51
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court of Delaware was whether the "good faith" standard applied by the
trial judge was the correct legal standard. n52 In deciding that issue, Cahill explicitly referenced the guidelines set forth
in Dendrite, but offered some criticisms of that standard and modified it in a few ways. First, the court adopted the
notification provision of the Dendrite guidelines. n53 However, that was the only step of the test the court specifically
adopted. Cahill instead recharacterized the third step of Dendrite, that the plaintiff must establish that its action can
withstand a motion to dismiss and must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to support each element of its cause of
action, as a "summary judgment standard." n54 Although the Dendrite opinion never used the words "summary
judgment," Cahill simply substituted the summary judgment standard for the Dendrite language and purported to follow
the third prong of Dendrite. n55 If this approach seems confusing, it should, because it has caused confusion among
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courts and scholars ever since the opinion was published. With regard to the rest of the test from Dendrite, the court in
Cahill dismissed the second and fourth steps as [*437] unnecessary. n56 The court found the second step subsumed by
the summary judgment standard. n57 Similarly, the Cahill court stated that balancing "the defendant's First Amendment
rights against the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case is also unnecessary," because the "summary judgment test is
itself the balance." n58
Two years after Cahill, the issue of what standard to apply when deciding to unmask a John Doe defendant was
again before an appellate court, although not in a defamation suit. In Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, an Arizona court was faced
with a plaintiff who wanted to discover the identity of an anonymous entity that allegedly accessed certain information
on Mobilisa's protected computer systems illegally and then sent the information to various Mobilisa employees via
e-mail. n59 Although the court in Mobilisa said it agreed with the two steps adopted in Cahill, notification and
surviving a summary judgment motion, it disagreed "with [the Cahill] court's conclusion that a balancing step is
unnecessary." n60 The Mobilisa opinion recognizes that there will likely be a "vast array" of cases that involve
anonymous speech, and that these cases will be factually distinct. n61 Including a balancing test will allow the court to
consider factors that might weigh against disclosure of an anonymous defendant's identity that are not taken into
account by a summary judgment standard, such as whether the anonymous speaker is a non-party witness, what type of
speech was involved, and what kind of expectation of privacy the speaker had. n62 Subsequently, the Mobilisa decision
revitalized the balancing test deleted from the Dendrite test by Cahill.
The Texas Court of Appeals reiterated the absence of a consensus regarding whether courts must balance a
plaintiff's right to pursue her case against an anonymous defendant's [*438] rights under the First Amendment in In re
Does 1-10. n63 Less than a month after the court in Mobilisa decided that a balancing test was necessary to adequately
protect anonymous plaintiffs, the Texas Court of Appeals adopted only the second prong of the test from Cahill, while
disregarding the notification provision and declining to add a balancing test. n64
Following the decision in In re Does 1-10, there continues to be disagreement regarding the inclusion of a
notification step and the necessity of a balancing test. A consensus had emerged, however, around the summary
judgment standard from Cahill. A California decision in Krinsky v. Doe upset that emerging consensus. n65 Krinsky
first pointed out the shortcomings of the notification requirement from Dendrite and Cahill, specifically the requirement
that plaintiff post a notice of the discovery request in the same place the allegedly defamatory comments were originally
made: "An Internet Web site, chat room, or message board may no longer exist or be active by the time the plaintiff
brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and unprofitable" to insist a plaintiff follow the notice requirement
from Dendrite and Cahill. n66 Criticisms aside, the court in Krinsky conceded the notification requirement was not
unduly burdensome. n67 These two positions leave the reader, and other courts, unclear about where the court in
Krinsky stands on the notification provision. With regard to the summary judgment standard, the court "found it
unnecessary and potentially confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment or motion to dismiss, to
the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker ... ." n68 Instead, the court decided a
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of the elements of their case. n69 Finally, concerning the [*439] use of a
balancing test, the Krinsky opinion concluded it was unnecessary to balance the interests of the competing parties, at
least in a defamation case, because "when there is a factual and legal basis for believing libel may have occurred, the
writer's message will not be protected by the First Amendment." n70
In summary, when deciding whether to allow a plaintiff to discover the identity of an anonymous defendant, some
courts have required the defendant be given notice and others have not. n71 Some courts have required the defendant's
First Amendment rights be balanced against the strength of the plaintiff's case, and some have held that step to be
unnecessary. n72 The quantum of proof the courts deem necessary in pleading a case ranges "from placing an extremely
light burden (indeed, virtually no burden at all) on the plaintiff, to requiring the plaintiff to tender proof of its allegations
that would survive a summary judgment, or even more stringent requirements." n73 It is out of this confusing state of
contradictory and competing standards that this Note attempts to reconcile the competing interests and recommend a
single standard that may bring uniformity to the issue.
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III. A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NEEDED
It is well known that different states have different common law. This fact is the inevitable result of a judicial system in
which thousands of judges across the country try to find equitable dispositions to the problems created by difficult
cases. In many instances, these differences in law may not present insurmountable problems, and the courts are able to
administer effective justice. Some areas of the law, however, suffer from a lack of uniformity. John Doe defamation
cases are one such area. A new approach to John Doe defamation cases is needed because "existing law lacks nimble
ways to resolve disputes about speech and privacy on the Internet." n74
The fact that Constitutional rights are at stake in these [*440] cases is one of the reasons they should be closely
scrutinized. The confusing array of competing standards currently being adopted across the country creates problems
unique to John Doe defamation cases. Most of the defamation suits that raise problems regarding the anonymity of the
defendant arise in the context of the Internet which raises the potential for jurisdictional problems. Unlike libelous
statements published in a newspaper that only circulates in a particular geographic area, anything posted on the Internet
is easily accessible to anyone in the United States with an internet connection, and as such, the defendant may be
subject to personal jurisdiction in any state in America. n75 As such, if standards for unmasking a defendant are easier
to meet in some jurisdictions than others, a plaintiff in a John Doe defamation case will have significant incentive to
forum shop. This encouragement of forum shopping is particularly troubling in light of the fact that many plaintiffs in
John Doe defamation cases are not actually seeking a monetary reward, but rather more of a symbolic victory. n76 In
many instances, simply unmasking a John Doe defendant for the purposes of shaming them may be enough to satisfy
the plaintiff. n77 If this scenario unfolds as speculated above, the plaintiff may be able to obtain the relief they want in
violation of the defendant's First Amendment rights, and the defendant will be left without recourse.
The considerable confusion among different jurisdictions is another reason to adopt uniform standards. Courts in
different jurisdictions disagree on issues frequently. However, there is a difference between disagreement and
confusion. Lower courts that have to deal with the questions presented in John Doe defamation cases are not merely
following the decisions made [*441] by the appellate courts in their jurisdiction, resulting in the application of two or
three competing standards. Instead, lower courts are left without clear guidelines. Rather than having two competing
standards between federal circuits, each jurisdiction in the country is utilizing different standards. The confusion that
results from having a myriad of different standards is considerably greater than that created by having two competing
standards.
Another argument in favor of establishing a uniform standard is that it will be more cost effective and efficient.
Many commentators are concerned that free speech on the Internet will be chilled by fear of litigation and identification.
n78 The more complex the problem presented in litigation, the more time and expense it will take to find a solution. As
such, if there were a uniform standard for dealing with John Doe defamation cases, litigation expenses for such cases
would likely decrease and the chilling effect that defamation suits have on free speech may be somewhat ameliorated.
The above paragraphs all point to the need for a uniform approach to John Doe defamation cases. As David
Anderson remarked, "libel is a field that cries out for some uniformity." n79 That sentiment translates wholly to
defamation in general, particularly in the context of the Internet. Based on the First Amendment rights at issue in John
Doe defamation cases; the potential for jurisdictional problems and forum shopping; the existing confusion regarding
this area of the law; and the potential for saving litigants, as well as the court system, time and money, a uniform system
for dealing with John Doe defendants should be adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE APPROACH THAT COURTS SHOULD TAKE FOR JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
As demonstrated above by section II-B, courts across the country have chosen to deal with the problem of John Doe
defendants in many different ways. This section analyzes and critiques the various approaches taken, and suggests a
course of action for each potential element of the test to decide whether a court should unmask an anonymous
defendant.
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[*442]
A. Why a Notification Provision is Needed
In many instances when someone is trying to identify an anonymous defendant, the defendant will learn about it, either
from their Internet Service Provider (ISP), or through a third party. However, many ISPs may not notify a subscriber if
they are served with a court order to divulge that subscriber's identity. n80 Steps have been taken to prevent this from
happening, but there is no guarantee that an Internet subscriber will be notified before their identity is divulged. n81
However, when a "provision imposes very little burden on a defamation plaintiff while at the same time giving an
anonymous defendant the opportunity to respond," n82 and the defendant's "First Amendment interests are at stake,"
n83 a balancing of the competing parties' interests favors including a notification provision. As a general principle, "[a]
court should not consider impacting a speaker's First Amendment rights without affording the speaker an opportunity to
respond to the discovery request." n84
Although notification of a defendant is important, any notification provision adopted should not be absolute. In the
past, some courts have required the plaintiff to notify the defendant by placing a notification in the same place where
the allegedly defamatory material was posted. n85 The problem with this requirement is that, due to the fluid and
impermanent nature of the Internet, the website where the allegedly defamatory material was posted may no longer exist
by the time a suit is brought. n86 Given this challenge, there should not be an absolute requirement that an anonymous
defendant be notified before their identity is disclosed. However, the plaintiff should be required to make a good faith
effort to notify the [*443] defendant, whether by posting on the same board where the material originally appeared or
through some other means, before discovery of the defendant's identity is allowed. n87
B. A Requirement that the Exact Statements in Question Be Stated Should Be Included
The requirement found in Dendrite that the court "require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements
purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech," is an important
requirement. n88 Although the court in Cahill may be correct in saying that requiring the exact statements to be set forth
is unnecessary if a summary judgment standard is being utilized, n89 there are potential problems presented by this
step's absence. First, because this Note is not advocating a summary judgment standard, it makes sense to retain the
requirement that the exact statements in question be set forth. Second, procedural motions may create unique difficulties
as explained by the court in Krinsky: "If a complaint is filed in a notice-pleading state in which defamation claims are
not excepted by statute or case law, the second Dendrite requirement (setting forth the statement with particularity) will
be essential, while in Wisconsin it will be superfluous ... ." n90 The requirement that the statements in question be
stated with particularity would be superfluous because Wisconsin "requires particularity in the pleading of defamation
claims." n91 Although in some states requiring the plaintiff to set forth the exact statements that allegedly constitute
defamation may be redundant or unnecessary, the benefits to be gained from the additional clarity provided, as well as
the benefits to be realized from having a uniform law, outweigh any concerns about superfluous language. n92
C. The Appropriate Quantum of Proof
"The proper focus ... [of John Doe defamation suits] [*444] should be on providing an injured party a means of
redress without compromising the legitimate right of the Internet user to communicate freely with others." n93
Achieving this balance, however, is easier said than done. It is the position of this Note that the optimum quantum of
proof is to require a plaintiff to make a prima facie case for all elements of defamation that are within the plaintiff's
control. Although requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of all elements of a claim may seem like a high
standard to impose at the discovery stage, it is necessary. The considerations that led to this conclusion are discussed
below.
1. A High Standard is Needed to Adequately Protect First Amendment Rights
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As discussed above in section II-A, there is a well established right to engage in anonymous speech, and that right has
been applied to the Internet without reserve. n94 Unfortunately, how to protect that right in John Doe defamation cases
has not enjoyed a similar consensus, as evinced by the wide variety of standards adopted by different courts. n95
There are many reasons to insist on a high standard in John Doe defamation cases, one of them being the
Constitutional importance that is placed on anonymous speech. n96 The advantages to society in allowing anonymous
speech outweigh the interests of plaintiffs in easily identifying anonymous defendants. n97 It is true that much of the
"speech" on the Internet is not scholarly discourse. n98 Anyone who has [*445] used the Internet recognizes that
celebrity gossip and personal websites that bear more similarities to online diaries make up a large percentage of all
websites. n99 However, it is also true that, partially due to its anonymous nature, the Internet is a great equalizer, and as
such it fulfills a very democratic function - it allows anyone with an Internet connection to voice their opinion on any
matter, "however silly, profane, or brilliant [the idea] may be ... ." n100 Some commentators have even gone so far as to
say that the Internet has had the greatest effect on a person's ability to make their opinion heard since the invention of
the printing press. n101 The reason the Internet is such a great innovation in speech is because it "allows ordinary John
Does to participate as never before in pnblic [sic] discourse, and hence, to shape public policy." n102
However, the ability of the Internet to realize its potential for facilitating a marketplace of ideas will never occur if
people do not use it for that purpose, and "the free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability
of Internet users to communicate anonymously." n103 The democratic nature of the Internet is what gives it value
deserving of being protected by the First Amendment, and it is why a high level of protection should be afforded to
speakers on the Internet. If the standard of proof is set too low, it may "chill potential posters from exercising their First
Amendment right to speak anonymously." n104
Another reason to insist that plaintiffs meet a high evidentiary burden before being allowed to unmask an
anonymous defendant is that there is evidence to suggest many defamation suits would not succeed if carried through to
[*446] trial. n105 In fact, only 13% of plaintiffs in a libel suit will ultimately prevail in libel litigation, n106 and of
those who do, they "owe more to good fortune than "to their virtue, their skill, or the justice of their cause.'" n107
Because defendants are much more likely to succeed in defamation litigation than plaintiffs, courts should be
particularly cautious in letting a suit proceed that will irreversibly destroy the defendant's anonymity. Furthermore, by
imposing a high standard on plaintiffs, courts are making it easier for legitimate plaintiffs to succeed at trial, because
once "vigorous criticism descends into defamation ... constitutional protection is no longer available," n108 and
anonymous defendants will no longer be able to hide behind the First Amendment.
2. Why Standards Adopted in the Past Are Inadequate
The lowest level of protection offered to anonymous defendants in defamation cases is the good faith standard imposed
in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. n109 It seems clear that this standard is insufficient because, as
the court remarked in Krinsky v. Doe, "It offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff's good faith and
leaves the speaker with little protection." n110 The condemnation of the "good faith" test was best articulated, however,
in Doe v. Cahill, which not only pointed out the test's shortcomings but also raised the specter of some troubling
consequences of applying such a lax standard, making it clear that a good faith standard offers too little protection for
John Doe defendants:
Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to meet the good faith test ... even if the defamation claim is not
very strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a final decision. After obtaining the
identity of an [*447] anonymous critic through the compulsory discovery process, a defamation plaintiff who either
loses on the merits or fails to pursue a lawsuit is still free to engage in extra-judicial self-help remedies; more bluntly,
the plaintiff can simply seek revenge or retribution. n111
The next lowest quantum of proof that courts have required of plaintiffs to successfully unmask an anonymous
defendant is requiring a plaintiff to bring a claim that could survive a motion to dismiss. n112 In order to survive a
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motion to dismiss, all a plaintiff is required to do is include sufficient information to give "general notice of the claim
asserted." n113 This standard is also insufficient to protect an anonymous defendant's First Amendment rights. Even if a
claim is not meritorious or is unlikely to win, it may still survive a motion to dismiss. When weighing a right that is
protected by the Constitution, simply requiring a plaintiff to assert a coherent legal claim is not a high enough threshold
because "even silly or trivial libel claims can easily survive a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff pleads facts that put
the defendant on notice of his claim, however vague or lacking in detail these allegations may be." n114 The opinion in
Cahill went on to point out that if the motion to dismiss standard does not afford enough protection for anonymous
defendants, then the good faith standard is also clearly insufficient. n115
The next standard utilized by courts in an attempt to protect First Amendment rights of anonymous defendants is
the summary judgment standard. n116 The summary judgment [*448] standard suffers from a different problem than
the standards that have already been discussed. Rather than failing to provide enough protection to anonymous
defendants, the summary judgment standard lacks the clarity that is needed for a well formulated quantum of proof. In
applying the summary judgment standard to John Doe defamation cases, the court acts as if the anonymous party has
made a motion for summary judgment, and decides whether the plaintiff would survive that motion. n117 If the plaintiff
can survive a motion for summary judgment they are allowed to discover the defendant's identity. To succeed in
learning the identity of an anonymous defendant under a summary judgment standard, a plaintiff would have to show
that, based on the pleadings, the discovery material currently before the court, and any affidavits, there is a genuine
issue as to a material fact of the plaintiff's defamation claim. n118 This does not mean merely the existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties. n119 To survive the summary judgment step, a plaintiff would have to show
that there is a genuine dispute over some fact or facts that could affect the outcome of the case. n120
This practice of attaching a procedural label, while perhaps constituting a high enough hurdle that it adequately
protects the defendant's anonymity, is "unnecessary and potentially confusing." n121 The principal complaint about
utilizing this kind of procedural language is that it results in a standard that does not clearly state the requisite quantum
of proof, and while most lawyers dealing with this issue will be familiar with the summary judgment standard, an
assumption of knowledge is a poor substitute for genuine clarity. Another problem with utilizing a procedural label in
this context is that Internet defamation suits "may relate to actions filed in other jurisdictions, which may have different
standards governing pleadings and motions; consequently, it could generate more [*449] confusion to define an
obligation by referring to a particular motion procedure." n122
3. A Standard Requiring Plaintiffs to Make a Prima Facie Case of All Elements of a Defamation Claim Within
Their Control Should Be Implemented.
Requiring plaintiffs to make a prima facie case for each element of a defamation claim within their control is the
quantum of proof that should be applied in John Doe defamation cases. This standard requires plaintiffs to meet a higher
burden than either the "good faith" standard or the "motion to dismiss" standard, both of which offer inadequate First
Amendment protections. The "prima facie" standard is also devoid of the confusing procedural terms that plague the
"summary judgment" standard. By implementing a "prima facie" standard, the principal shortcomings of all of the
existing standards would be alleviated.
D. A Balancing Test Is Necessary
The last provision of the standards used in John Doe defamation cases about which there is debate is whether to include
a balancing test at the end of the test, whereby a court would "balance the defendant's First Amendment right of
anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented ... ." n123 In Doe v. Cahill, the court
dismissed the balancing test as unnecessary because a balancing test would add "no protection above and beyond that of
the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis." n124 These objections do not outweigh the
benefits of including a balancing test. Allowing a court to conduct a balancing of interests adds only minimal
complexity to the overall test. As for the summary judgment test itself providing the balance, that conclusion fails to
consider "whether balancing a broader range of competing interests is warranted." n125 Such broader interests that may
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need to be taken into account, but which would be neglected without a balancing test, include what type of speech is
involved; the speaker's expectation of privacy; the [*450] consequences unmasking the speaker will have, both on
himself and on others; and the availability of other discovery methods. n126
V. A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NOT AS FAR AWAY AS IT MAY SEEM
Many of the current interjurisdictional disagreements regarding John Doe defamation cases are differences that may be
settled easily. While there is admittedly much disagreement about what quantum of proof to require, n127 the other
elements of the standard to apply when deciding to unmask an anonymous defendant are much less controversial. For
example, several cases have required a notification provision. n128 However, most of the cases that failed to include a
notification provision did not do it because they thought it was a bad idea - they did it because they felt it was
unnecessary. n129 For example, in In re Does 1-10, the court declined to impose a notification provision, but the
opinion never explicitly stated that a notification was a bad idea. n130 In fact, the court in In re Does 1-10 adopts the
standard used by the court in Doe v. Cahill, n131 which contained a notification provision. n132
The requirement that the exact statements be set forth is another element that is not very controversial. The courts
that have rejected it have done so mainly on the grounds that it is unnecessary. n133 But, as with the notification
provision, just because a step of analysis is not always necessary does not [*451] mean courts will find the requirement
that the exact statements be included to be a bad idea.
Even the most controversial aspect of developing a test for when to unmask anonymous defendants in John Doe
defamation cases, i.e. which quantum of proof to use, is not as contentious as it might seem. The two highest courts to
decide the issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware n134 and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin n135 essentially agree on
the standard . Although the court in Cahill called for a "summary judgment test" n136 and the court in Lassa adopted a
"motion to dismiss" standard, n137 these are functionally equivalent because Wisconsin requires "particularity in the
pleading of defamation claims." n138
VI. A SUGGESTED UNIFORM APPROACH
If implemented, the uniform approach advocated in this Note might look something like this:
. First, the plaintiff must make a good faith effort to notify the defendant that plaintiff is seeking to learn his
identity.
. Second, in any motion to discover the identity of an anonymous defendant, plaintiff must state the exact
statements that allegedly constitute actionable speech.
. Third, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of each element of defamation that is in his control.
. Finally, the court must balance the plaintiff's right to relief against the defendant's right to engage in anonymous
speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
The situation presented any time there is a John Doe defendant creates problems above and beyond the normal
difficulties of bringing a suit. The entity bringing the suit obviously believes it was wronged or it would not be in court.
However, the rights of the plaintiff must be balanced against [*452] the First Amendment rights of the John Doe
defendant. When two opposing entities both have strong competing interests, it is difficult to strike a balance between
them, and this difficulty is illustrated by the confused and contradictory development of case law on the subject.
However, this Note suggests that an appropriate balance between the two rights can be achieved if the plaintiff is
required to make a good faith effort to notify the defendant of the suit, to set forth the exact statements that allegedly
constitute actionable speech, to make a prima facie case for all elements of the wrongful act allegedly committed that
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are within the plaintiff's control, and the court concludes by balancing the rights of the plaintiff against the rights of the
defendant. This test is free of confusing procedural terms and can be applied universally to jurisdictions that require
only notice pleading in defamation cases (e.g. Delaware) as well as jurisdictions that require more "particularity in the
pleading of defamation claims" (e.g. Wisconsin). n139 Advocating the above-described standard is the principal
purpose of this Note. However, the only way uniformity, coherence, and finality will be brought to this area of the law
is if the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari to a John Doe defamation case.
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